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CHAPTER 6 
AUDITOR AND GOING CONCERN 1970s-1985: AN EXPLANATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SOCIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
6.0: Introduction 
By 1971, the UK profession began to describe the going 
concern concept as a 'fundamental' and a 'generally accepted' 
accounting concept. Chapter 5 explored the factors which led 
to the institutional recognition of the concept. This chapter 
now focuses on the meanings of the concept in an auditing 
context which began to emerge from the 1970s onwards. Prior 
to this period, literature had little to say about its 
meanings in an auditing context (see chapter 3). But from the 
early 1970s, the discussions of the concept in an auditing 
context began to be widespread. Why did discussions of the 
concept in an auditing context take-off in the 1970s? Within 
the methodological framework of chapter 2, this chapter will 
identify a number of influences which brought the concept in 
an auditing context to the forefront. 
In order to present the various arguments, this chapter, as 
figure 6.1 shows, is divided into two broad sections. The 
first part (6.1) focuses on a number of developments which 
formed a cradle for the discussions of the concept in an 
auditing context. These related to the contested nature of 
the meanings of an audit (6.1.1), uncertainties about auditor 
responsibilities (6.1.2) and the impact of corp·orate 
collapses (section 6.1.3). A combination of these factors 
gave rise to new kind of pressures from the State in the 
shape of critical Department of Trade inspectors' reports 
(6.1.4) and lawsuits from the State (6.1.5). 
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Further pressures came from lawsuits by various fractions of 
capital (6.1.6). Such developments gave particular visibility 
to the inter~sts of large auditing firms (6.1.7) which may 
have given them incentives to promote some meanings of the 
concept. Section 6.1.8 argues that a combination of the 
aforementioned developments placed the going concern concept 
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in an auditing context on the professional agenda. Section 
6.1.9 concludes the first part with a summary. 
The discussions of going concern in an auditing context did 
not arise in a sociopolitical vacuum. They coincided with 
what many scholars call the end of the 'longest economic 
boom' (Allen and Massey, 1988) and the beginning of massive 
structural changes~ (Gough. 1978; Armstrong Glyn and 
Harrison, 1984; Cox. 1986) in industry. This period is noted 
for the continuing prominence o~ 'finance capital' (Coakley. 
1984), a breakdown in the international and national 
structures of regulation (Coakley and Harris, 1983), global 
interdependence of capitalism (O'Connor, 1987) and 
significant shifts in State policies (Bosanquet. 1983; Hall 
and Jacques, 1983). The period witnessing the increasing 
discussions of the concept is particularly marked by the 
decline of a traditional manufacturing base (Harris, 1988), 
making the UK an importer of manufactured goods rather than 
the traditional exporter (table 6.1). During this period, 
Britain experienced high rates of inflation (table 6.2); the 
highest ever nominal rates of interest (table 6.3) and real 
rates of interest (table 6.4); falling rates of profitability 
(table 6.5) and liquidity (table 6.6); highest ever number of 
liquidations (table 6.7) and under the influence of new 
technologies and divisions of labour (Massey, 1988; Meegan, 
1988), high unemployment (table 6.8). Against such a 
background, the second part (section 6.2) considers a number 
of interconnected episodes and events which formed a 
significant backdrop for the profession's deliberations on 
the going concern concept. These relate to continuing 
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attempts to revive the ailing British economy (6.2.1), a 
property and banking collapse (6.2.2), continuing decline of 
the economy (6.2.3) and the rise of the 'New Right'· (section 
6.2.4) which adopted a particular way of managing the 
economy. After a summary of the second part (section 8.2.5), 
section 6.3 concludes the chapter with a discussion and 
summary. 
6.1: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MEANINGS OF THE GOING CONCERN 
CONCEPT IN AN AUDITING CONTEXT 
The discussions of the going concern concept in an auditing 
context began to be voluminous in the early 197~s. Some of 
the meanings and implications were shown in figure 3.5 (page 
156). Increasingly, it was being associated with questions of 
corporate profitability, solvency, liquidity and survival. By 
issuing going ooncern qualifications, auditors were 
expressing doubts about the ability of a business to continue 
in existence. Auditors were increasingly being urged to pay 
attention to accounting ratios, post balance sheet events, 
corporate forecasts, budgets and plans to determine solvency 
and liquidity of businesses. Such interpretations seemed to 
coincide with the earlier literal interpretations in which 
going concern was interpreted as a business which will 
continue. 
The literature began to suggest that the going concern 
concept required the auditor to comment upon corporate 
survival. The profession, however, did not wish to 
acknowledge such audit objectives. The multi-accented nature 
of an audit and the struggle over its ascendant meanings 
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provided a backdrop for the discussions of the concept2 • A 
further boost was given by the legal developments which 
enabled third parties to sue auditors for negligence. Such 
developments changed the balance of power between auditing 
firms and 'significant others'. This coincided with a major 
economic downturn in which many businesses collapsed. 
In professional circles, compliance with the going concern 
meant that the "enterprise will continue in operational 
existence for the forseeable fu~ure" (ASC, 1971, para 14). In 
many cases, the business failures occurred soon after a 
company received an unqualified audit opinion. Thus, whenever 
a business with an unqualified audit opinion ceased trading, 
attention focused upon the legitimaoy of the audit procedures 
and the opinion. Many parties alleged that "the auditors knew 
far more than their reports disclosed" (Woolf, 1986a, page 
511). Upon the collapse of a business, the 'significant 
others' frequently invoked one of the competing meanings of 
going concern (and audit) and sought damages by issuing 
law-suits. Indeed, some well publicised company failures and 
their implications for auditor liability have been the main 
instigators of discussions about going concern in an auditing 
context (Coopers and Lybrand, 1987). The law-suits were 
issued not just by companies, but also by the State in its 
capacity as a 'fraction of capital'. To manage the crisis of 
legitimacy caused by a large number of corporate collapses, 
the State conducted a large number of investigations and 
found that the extant auditing practices were deficient. The 
resulting criticisms had implications for the meanings and 
interpretations of the going concern concept in an auditing 
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context. 
The remainder of this section provides further details of 
the arguments outlined above. 
6.1.1: Meanings of an Audit 
The word 'audit' is multi-accented and does not have a fixed 
meaning. Each meaning competes for space and depending upon 
the power of the competing groups, gains ascendancy. Within 
this context, the meanings of going concern are also 
oontested. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth oentury. when 
aooountants were mainly ooncerned with bankruptcy and 
liquidation work, audits were primarily associated with 
detection and reporting of fraud (Dicksee, 1892, page 6). 
With emphasis on fraud detection. the oourts expected 
auditors to pay particular attention to corporate solvency 
(Lee, 1979). However, as the aooountancy profession grew in 
strength and sooial status. audit objectives beoame more 
ambiguous. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, in 
professional oircles, the primary audit objective is assumed 
to be 'attesting or.edibility to financial statements' (Lee, 
1982; Waldron. 1978). In this context. it is interesting to 
note that the Companies Aots do not define the meaning of an 
audit. though it is aoknowledged that an auditor is required 
to give an opinion stating whether the financial statements 
show a 'true and fair' view. Such an expression itself 
remains ill-defined and misunderstood (Skerratt. 1982). It is 
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fr.equently the subject of struggles between various parties 
who assign competing interpretations in order to challenge 
and advance some preferred meanings of an audit (Chastney, 
1975) . 
In such a struggle, the profession argues that an auditor 
does not express opinion on management quality and does not 
give assurance that a business is a going concern (Shaw, 
1980, page 16). Furthermore, auditors are assumed not to be 
primarily responsible for reporting and detecting fraud 
(Allan and Fforde, 1986), though some continue to argue that 
'detecting fraud and errors' is a secondary objective 
(Millichamp, 1978, page 3). The accountancy firms argue that 
they plan and conduct their work with a view to discovering 
"major irregularities and fraud" (Thomson McLintock, 1983, 
page 8). The profession argues that it has little or no 
responsibility for alerting the readers of accounts to 
financial unsoundness, likelihood of insolvency, corporate 
inefficiencies and so on (Lee, 1982, pages 105-107). Through 
the professional education processes, the profession's views 
on audits are legitimised. When numerous auditing books 
repeat the same meanings of an audit and hardly present any 
competing meaning, after a time that meaning begins to assume 
a sense of concrete reality (Sikka, 1987). The students and 
aspiring accountants are made to feel that they belong to 
some 'imaginary community' which shares some dominant 
beliefs. Even if. the professional bodies assent to some 
meanings of an audit, other groups are always capable of 
challenging such meanings. 
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Numerous research studies (for example, Lee, 1970; Beck, 
1973; Briston and Perks, 1977; Arrington, Hillison and 
Williams, 1983; Purewal and Sikka, 1987) have shown that many 
private and institutional shareholders and other users have 
audit expectations contrary to those acknowledged by auditors 
(i.e. an 'expectations gap' exists). Such studies have shown 
that contrary to the professional statements, 'significant 
others' expect auditors to detect and report fraud, warn of 
the likelihood of bankruptcy, inform of financial 
unsoundness, give assurances on solvency, report on 
efficiency and comment on company forecasts and 
competitiveness. Beck (1973) reported that 81% of the 
shareholders expected the auditor to assure them that the 
company being audited is financially viable. The professional 
bodies are well aware that the public expects auditors to 
report on the factors affecting the likely survival, 
solvency, liquidity and bankruptcy of a company, i.e its 
ability to remain a going concern (Connor 1986; Mednick, 
1986; The Accountant's Magazine, February 1987, page 19). The 
perception that an auditor is concerned with the survival of 
a company is promoted by the very processes of auditing. 
During the course of an audit, an auditor pays an almost 
obsessional attention to internal controls, stock counts, 
uses accounting ratios to diagnose corporate health, 
acertains cash at bank, bank overdrafts and even counts petty 
cash to the last penny. Such auditing procedures create the 
feeling that the auditor is concerned with the future well 
being of a company. 
The competing meanings of an audit reflect the 'interests' 
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of the parties involved. A President of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Ireland (lCAl) argued, 
"Don~t blame the auditors immediately a 
business fails ...... Most business failures 
are due to management failures. People simply 
misunderstand the role of the auditor" (The 
Accountants Magazine, 25th April 1985, page 
2) . 
The conflicting interests of the various groups frequently 
become visible whenever a company ceases to be a going 
concern unexpectedly. Within the dynamics and contradictions 
of capitalism, such liquidations are inevitable and necessary 
for mobility of capital. However, such a reality can threaten 
confidence in the capitalist order and thus cannot be easily 
presented to the masses. Instead, a very selective 
(inevitably distorted) version is presented. Corporate 
collapses are presented not as an inevitability, but in a 
moral sense. Liquidations are not shown to be the result of 
competition, tensions between labour and capital, fractions 
of capital and the profit motive, but the fault of directors, 
auditors, irrational decision-making, government policies and 
so . on. Thus, ideology presents a particular and distorted 
view of the world. The question then becomes who has acted 
irrationally or immorally and is thus responsible for the 
corporate collapse, or whose actions might have prevented a 
collapse? In this context, the contested nature of auditor 
responsibility affects whether some meanings of going concern 
will become more critical or dominant and whether auditors 
would be forced to assign/accept particular interpretations 
of the concept. 
PAGE 303 
6.1.2: Auditor Responsibility 
Under the Companies Acts, an auditor is appointed by the 
shareholders and reports to them. However, there are 
ambiguities in who exactly is entitled to rely upon audited 
financial information. The capital, finance and credit 
markets require information and the profession and the State 
promote audited information as 'reliable' information. In a 
quest for social legitimacy, the professional bodies argue 
that not only investors, bu~ creditors as well, are 
legitimate users of audited information (FASB, 1978). Some 
publications such as 'The Corporate Report' (ASSC, 1975) 
argue that almost every member of society has a reasonable 
right to receive and use information. Such views reflect 
ambiguities about the nature of auditor accountability. For 
example, are the auditors just responsible to the company, 
shareholders collectively, shareholders individually, 
creditors, investors or society generally? In this context, 
case law plays an important part. The court decisions can 
open up or constrain opportunities of legal actions against 
auditors and thus have consequences for the wealth of 
partners and the ability of the firms to reproduce 
themselves. Case law is also a consequence of the continuing 
tensions between accountancy firms and other fractions of 
capital. 
By the 1950s, British case law had established that in the 
absence of a contractual obligation, a third party could not 
succeed in any civil action against auditors. Such a 
principle was reaffirmed in the case of Candler versus Crane 
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Christmas & Co. (1951) 2 K.B. 164 and there were very few 
direct challenges to it. However, with the developments in 
credit, banking and capital markets and their reliance on 
audited financial information, such principles came to be 
challenged. The most celebrated challenge came in the 
aftermath of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd 
(1964) A.C. 465; (1963) 2 All E.R. 575; (1962) 1 Q.B. 396. 
This case did not involve auditors directly, but had 
implications for auditors, especially as audited financial 
information is used for a wide- variety of investment and 
credit decisions. In his judgement, Lord Morris, stated that 
.......... if someone possessed of a special 
skill undertakes, quite irrespective of 
contract, to apply that skill for the 
assistance of another person who relies on 
such skill, a duty of care will arise ...... . 
if in a sphere in which a person is so placed 
that others could reasonably rely on his 
skill or on his ability to make careful 
inquiry, a person who takes it on himself to 
give information or advice to, or allows his 
information or advice to be passed on to 
another who, as he knows or should know, will 
place reliance on it, then a duty of care 
will arise" (Judgement delivered in Hedley 
Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) 
A.C. 502 and 503). 
Following this landmark decision, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) became concerned 
with the likelihood of increased litigation against auditors 
and in 1967 sought a Counsel's opinion. The Counsel concluded 
that the 
"Accountants may now be held in law to owe a 
duty of care to persons other than those with 
whom they are in a contractual or fiduciary 
relationship and may be liable for neglect of 
duty if, but only if, they knew or ought to 
know that a financial report, account or 
statement prepared by them for a specific 
purpose or transaction, will be shown to a 
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particular person or class of persons in that 
particular connection" (section va of the 
ICAEW handbook). 
The principle of Hedley Byrne was subsequently affirmed in 
the Canadian case (not involving accountants) of Myers v 
Thomson & London Life Insurance Co. (1967) and the Australian 
case of Evatt v Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co (1971) 
1 All E.R. 150. Such cases placed further question marks 
against the extent to which an auditor might be held liable 
and the damages which might ~e awarded against him. Hardly 
any case involving auditors oame to the courts, but the ICAEW 
reflected its oonoern by saying that 
"there are more and more olaims against 
aooountants, both as regards size and 
inoidenoe and diversity of alleged 
negligence ..... Majority of olaims in the UK 
emanate from failure to disoover defaloations 
and taxation in general, although several 
other areas are beginning to appear prominent 
....... As yet, few very substantial cases 
have been brought against British aooountants 
but the frightening prospect, both for 
aocountants and their underwriters, is the 
possibility that the anti-aooountant 
litigation ...... will spread ...... .. 
(Aooountancy, February 1971, page 65). 
Most of the olaims oontinued to be settled by out-of-court 
payments, espeoially as many aooountanoy firms were reluotant 
to have some prinoiples of responsibility enshrined in law. 
The ICAEW advised (as reproduoed in The Aooountant, 10th 
August 1972) its members to use 'professional disolaimers' to 
limit and avoid liability and oontinued to offer further 
advioe along slmilar lines (The Aooountant. 19th April 1973, 
page 526; The Aooountant, 19th September 1973. page 527). 
As the mid-1970s eoonomio orisis worsened and the number of 
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liquidations increased, new threats to auditor liability 
appeared. In suing auditors, the plaintiffs argued that they 
expected auditors to report whether a company was a going 
concern. A widespread view was that the auditors 
"must have known that the company was going 
to the ground" (The Accountant, 6th May 1982, 
page 4). 
Around this time articles on going concern, prompted by the 
economic crisis and its implications for auditor liability, 
began to appear. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS) asked Strachan (1975)# a Peat Harwick partner 
to indicate a possible audit' approach to going concern 
issues. In the first UK institutional statement on 'going 
concern' in an auditing context, the ICAS wrote, 
....... it may be that in 
or later a 
otherwise) 
expected 
circumstances sooner 
decide {or may decide 
auditor should not be 
crystal-gazer ...... " 
present 
judge may 
that an 
to be a 
...... the auditor has to think of his 
responsibility to shareholders. in that, 
accounts purporting to give a true and fair 
view on a going concern basis having been 
prepared, he may have doubts on whether the 
company may continue to be a going concern" 
(The Accountant's Magazine, February 1975, 
page 64). 
In 1976, as a way of controlling the incidences of claims 
against auditors, the ICAEW was suggesting a formula of 10 
times the audit fee or a maximum of £500,000, whichever is 
the lowest. Cases (not involving accountants) such as Anns v 
Merton London Borough Council (1978) A.C. 728; (1976) Q.B. 
882 extended the Hedley Byrne principle, but the auditing 
cases reaching the courts remained almost nil. Indeed, the 
question of auditor responsibility remained remarkably 
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ambiguous and was rarely directly tested in the courts until 
1981. 
The case of JEB Fastners v Marks Bloom & Co (1983) All E.R. 
583; (1981) 3 All E.R. 289, directly involved the auditors of 
a recently liquidated company and for the first time 
established that under certain circumstances, they owe a 
'duty of care' to third parties even in the absence of any 
contractual relationship. The main points of this case were 
subsequently confirmed by a court of appeal. The Scottish 
case of Andrew Oliver and Son Ltd v Douglas (1982) SLT 222 
also suggested that an auditor owes a duty of care to third 
parties. The subsequent case of Twomax Ltd and Others v 
Dickson. McFarlane and Robinson (1983) S.L.T. 98 once again 
related to proceedings against auditors after the company had 
ceased to be a going concern. It affirmed the JEB Fastners 
principle and actually awarded £65.000 damages against 
auditors to three shareholders who suffered a loss by relyin~ 
upon the negligently audited accounts. Such cases 
acknowledged wider auditor responsibility and with it 
increased the likelihood of litigation against auditors, 
especially if investors could demonstrate that they had 
incurred losses by relying on negligently prepared audited 
accounts. Such developments continued to provide the cradle 
for going concern discourses and persuaded the professional 
bodies to advance particular meanings of the concept in order 
to protect the interests of their members. 
It is during such a time (Spring 1982) that the Auditing 
Practices Committee set up a working party. It was formed 
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because 
........ We were in the throes of a 
recession and the situation was becoming 
worse .. ..... the question of auditor 
liability was becoming extremely important 
....... a lot of different perceptions 
existed out there about our responsibility 
and somebody screamed for a paper on going 
concern ...... and a working party was 
hastily assembled" (A member of the APe 
working party). 
To sum up, this section has argued that the discussions of 
the going concern concept in an auditing context gathered 
pace because the scope of auditor responsibilities had been 
widened. This happened at a 'time when the meaning of audit 
was being contested by 'significant others'. In this 
environment, the case law responded to changes in financial 
and capital markets by giving recognition to the value of 
audited information. Previously, third parties could not sue 
auditors, but now they could. In their claims against 
auditors, the third parties invoked competing meanings of an 
audit and with it, competing meanings of accounting 
principles. The threat of lawsuits themselves was located in 
wider economic crises. Falling profitability and liquidity 
ratios were the symptoms of such crises. These crises 
resulted in a large number of corporate failures and drew 
further attention to the nature of an audit and the meanings 
of going concern. 
6.1.3: Corporate Failures 
The discussions of going concern in an auditing context 
became widespread against a background of falling 
profitability (table 6.5), falling liquidity ratios (table 
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6.6) and a rising number of corporate insolvencies (see table 
6.7). In such an economic downturn, questions began to be 
raised about the meaning of an audit, especially as many 
companies collapsed within weeks of receiving an unqualified 
audit opinion. A major issue was whether 
"the seed of failure had been sown at the 
time of the previous audited accounts and, if 
so, whether the auditors should have 
recognised this and varied their report to 
take account of the position" (Coopers & 
Lybrand, 1987, para 8.1). 
In many cases, the auditors claimed that the accounts were 
'true and fair' and complied with 'generally accepted 
accounting principles', but the companies were not going 
concerns any more. The increasing rate of corporate failures 
and their implications for auditor liability, made going 
concern a major issue for the UK accountancy bodies (The 
Accountant's Magazine, February 1975, page 64). In a volatile 
economic environment, with lawsuits by third parties a 
possibility, the accountancy firms felt threatened and 
started to devote greater attention to the meanings of going 
concern. As an editorial in Accountancy noted, 
"In the difficult days that undoubtedly lie 
ahead, auditors will be forced increasingly 
to think in each individual case whether the 
going concern concept is satisfied 
something which has rarely been necessary to 
consider in the'past" (November 1974, page 
5) • 
These tdifficult days' related to the collapse of the 
secondary banking and property sectors where asset values 
were falling alarmingly (see section 6.2 for a discussion). 
In this context, the profession was even prepared to 
downgrade the implications of its 'fundamental' accounting 
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concepts. In 1971, the profession recognised. the going 
concern concept as a tfundamental' concept (ASC. 1971). 
However, in the prevailing economic environment, many 
tsignificant others' were interpreting the concept in a 
literal sense, i.e. they were expecting the accounts to give 
an indication of the probability of corporate survival. Any 
incorporation of declining market values in the financial 
statements would have shown erosion of capital, inhibited 
investment and might have made the crisis worse. In these 
circumstances, the ICAEW (1974) claimed that going-concern 
values are 
"unsuitable for use in relation to property 
assets of a company" (para 3). 
The high number of corporate collapses and the continuing 
liquidity crisis led to a demand for an auditing standard on 
going concern by Percy and Logie (1976). In the face of a 
deepening recession, foreign competition, low profitability, 
escalating costs, inflation and corporate insolvencies. going 
concern qualifications became more common. The plight of 
Britain's major car manufacturer, the British Leyland Motor 
Corporation (BLMC) became highly visible with the publication 
of its 1974 accounts on 18th December 1974. Coopers & Lybrand 
issued a going concern qualification on the grounds that the 
company could only survive with continuous financial support 
from the State. Burmah Oil Company, another major company was 
also rescued by the Bank of England. Many auditing firm 
• 
partners were anticipating "a number of spectacular failures 
in the next twelve months [and feared that] auditors would 
inevitably get much of the blame":S. 
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The possibility of large corporate failures and their 
consequences for auditor liability had impact on discussions 
of going concern in an auditing context. Such fears persuaded 
the ICAS (1975) to issue guidance on going concern and 
commission an article. In an ICAS commissioned article, F.A. 
Strachan (1975), a Peat Marwick partner warned that 
"After the approaches to the government by 
The Burmah Oil Company Limited and the 
British Leyland Motor Corporation Limited (to 
name only the biggest companies), asking for 
financial assistance, every accountant and 
businessman in the United Kingdom must now 
consider whether the "going concern" concept 
still applies to the financial accounts of 
the business with which he is involved. If he 
does not, the practical consequences may be 
alarming .......... (page 65). 
The same article also noted contemporary auditor anxieties 
relating to an increase in the number of liquidations, 
falling property values and secondary banking crisis. 
By 1976, the profession had formed the Auditing Practices 
Committee (APC) to issue auditing standards. The first of 
these standards was not issued until 1980, but significantly 
the first edition of its bulletin tTrue & Fair' contained 
advice on going concern. It noted that 
"In 1975 there were 9,849 liquidations in 
England, Wales and Scotland and the latest 
estimates suggest that 1976 will be a boom 
year in this respect, so don't assume the 
going concern basis is appropriate for all 
your clients confirm that it is! (APC, 
1976, page 5). 
This concern with increased auditor liability, frequently 
resulting from corporate collapses, continued to provide the 
background for increasing discussions of the going concern 
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concept in an auditing context. In 1982, the profession 
established a working party to consider the formulation of an 
auditing guideline. During this period, the number of 
corporate failures hit 16,893, roughly twice the number in 
1974 and included household names such as Laker Airways and 
the State sponsored DeLorean Motor Company. By the time the 
APC issued an exposure draft of the going concern auditing 
guideline (APC, 1983a), the number of liquidations was 
approaching 18,141 (see table 6.7). In marketing the 
guideline, the working party ch~irman, Ray Hinton, wrote that 
"In the first half of 1983 there were nearly 
2,500 compulsory company liquidations in 
England and Wales. In the public's mind, the 
auditor as one of the company's principal 
advisors is inevitably associated with these 
events" (Hinton, 1983). 
The APC further referred to the connections between corporate 
failures, auditor liability and going concern discussions, by 
adding the following commentary to the exposure draft, 
"A company issues its accounts and a clean 
audit report - six months later it goes bust: 
angry customers, rueful creditors, 
heartbroken employees, wailing investors, a 
head-shaking public. Number one target for 
venting of this discontent will be directors. 
However, the auditors and the profession as a 
whole cannot realistically expect to escape 
criticism. 
In the first six months 
2363 compulsory company 
England and Wales alone. 
ruefulness, heartbreak, 
headshaking. 
of 1983 there were 
liquidations in 
A lot of anger, 
wailing and 
Set against this socio-economic background, 
the exposure draft of an Auditing Guideline 
on the audit implications of going concern 
problems ...... is a very important document" (APe, 1983b, page 1). 
This section has shown that the discussions of going concern 
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in an auditing context 
corporate insolvencies. 
were prompted by the high rate of 
This, against a background of a 
contested nature of audit and changes in the case law 
position, gave many 'significant others' an opportunity to 
contest and sharpen issues about auditor liability. In this, 
they argued that the auditors had failed to provide the 
requisite legitimacy to the audited financial information and 
that thus, such accounts were misleading. The auditors faced 
increased litigation which threatened their wealth. The 
Department of Trade inspector.s criticised the auditors' 
failure to highlight going concern problems. Such factors 
helped to propel discussions of the going concern concept and 
created an environment for institutional pronouncement. 
6,1,4: Lawsuits from Companies 
The discussions of going concern in an auditing context took 
place at a time when auditors were experiencing an increase 
in litigation. Such litigation frequently arose in the 
aftermath of companies ceasing to be going concerns. 
In the 1970s, lawsuits began to increase because of the 
feeling that "In so many cases they [auditors] must have 
known the company was going to the ground" (The Accountant, 
6th May 1982, page 4). The auditors argued that they had no 
responsibility for reporting on the financial unsoundness or 
the likelihood of corporate insolvency. An early opportunity 
to test the issue of auditor responsibility was provided by 
the Tremletts case, a company which ceased to be a going 
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concern soon after receiving an unqualified audit opinion. 
In October 1973, Tremletts acquired Tower Assets, a company 
audited by Arthur Young. Soon after the acquisition, cashflow 
and working capital deficiencies totalling nearly £5 million 
were discovered. In November 1974, the bankers refused to 
grant any further loans and the company ceased to be a going 
concern. In December 1974, receivers were appointed and 
Tremletts issued a law-suit (The Times, 17th January 1976, 
page 17) seeking damages of £5' million from auditors Arthur 
Young, merchant bankers and four company directors. The 
auditors were accused of negligence in detecting liquidity 
and financial problems. However, before the case could be 
heard, the defendants made an out-of-court settlement 
totalling £550,000 (The Times 22nd January 1976, page 23). 
The bulk of what was described as the "largest out-of-court 
settlement" involving accountants (The Times, 10th February 
1976), was paid by Arthur Young and the financial world was 
relieved as a "lengthy court action might challenge some of 
the standards that up till now have been acceptable in the 
City" . 
By 1976, the 
10,727. Whilst 
number of liquidations in the UK reached 
the ICAEW was lobbying for a financial limit 
on auditor liability, Coopers & Lybrand received a lawsuit of 
£1.3 million from Burnholme & Forder (The Times, 10th 
February 1976, page 17). In 1974, Burnholme & Forder bought a 
3~% stake in Brayhead Limited by relying on its 1973 
published accounts and profit forecasts, but now alleged that 
the 1973 accounts did not show a true and fair view. Over the 
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last few years of its life. Brayhead had been audited by 
Coopers & Lybrand. Joslyne Layton-Bennett (JLB) and Fuller 
Jenks. Following the collapse of Burnholme & Forder. a 
Department of Trade report was commissioned in 1975 and 
published in 1979. The report (DTI. 1979a) was critical of 
the management for preparing over-optimistic forecasts and 
for selecting accounting methods which served their personal 
interests and manipulated company profits. The company's 
accounting records were incomplete, confusing and 
contradictory and the accounts omitted some creditors figures 
altogether. The Inspectors " .... found evidence to suggest 
that ...... JLB had not adequately summarised the work 
carried out by their staff or recorded the results of any 
critical review ....... (DT!. 1979a. para 222). The outcome of 
the lawsuit is not publicly known. 
The going concern concept received particular attention by 
the Auditing Practices Committee in the very first edition of 
'True & Fair' in Autumn 1976. But further pressures came 
amidst the secondary banking and property collapse of the 
mid-1970s (discussed in section 6.2). Deloitte Haskins and 
Sells received an £8 million negligence lawsuit in connection 
with the collapse of London and County Securities. a 
secondary bank (Accountancy, August 1977. page 56). The 
collapse had been investigated by the Department of Trade 
inspectors (DoT. 1976a). The report noted a number of 
accounting irtegularities, such as deliberate window 
dressing. back-dating of transactions. falsifying books and 
transactions, paying third parties to support share price and 
so on. The report was critical of auditors (see chapter 7 for 
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more details) and the liquidator cited it as evidence in his 
law-suit against Harmood Banner (now part of Deloitte Haskins 
and Sells). The previous belief was that such evidence could 
not be cited in civil cases. High Court proceedings started 
on 15th January 1980 and on 28th January, the court judgement 
in the case of London and County Securities Ltd and others v 
Nicholson and others (1980) 3 All E.R. 861 broke new ground 
by establishing that the evidence included in a DTI report 
could be cited in civil and criminal proceedings against the 
auditors. In February 1980, Deloittes made an out-of-court 
settlement of £900,000 (The Times, 8th February 1980, page 
17) . 
Another major firm, Arthur Anderson also faced litigation. 
In 1979, Christopher Melville MacLaren sued Arthur Anderson 
for damages of £453,000. Back in 1975 McLaren was considering 
investing in Media Electronics and asked Arthur Anderson to 
check the company's affairs. The firm gave the company a 
clean bill of health and McLaren invested heavily both in 
1975 and 1976. But the business had been running at a loss 
for a number of years and in 1977 a receiver had to be 
appointed. McLaren alleged "professional negligence and 
breach of duty between 1975 and 1976" (Daily Telegraph, 28th 
June 1979, page 19) by Arthur Anderson. The firm first 
decided to contest the lawsuit, but then suddenly the damages 
claim was withdrawn after "out-of-court discussions at the 
High Court" and "no details were given of the terms of 
disposal" (Daily Telegraph, 26th July 1979, page 8). 
Arthur Anderson, Deloittes, Robson Rhodes and Arthur Young 
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were not the only firms facing extensive litigation. Ernst & 
Whinney were at the receiving end of a £1.8 million lawsuit 
relating to the affairs of the stockbroking firm Hedderwick 
Sterling. The dealings of the stockbroking firm of Hedderwick 
Sterling Grumbar had been the subject of Stock Exchange 
investigations in 1979 and 1980 after allegations of lending 
stock to other firms and failing to maintain adequate 
liquidity margins. The Fraud Squad had also investigated the 
firm's gilt dealings (Financial Times, 11th April 1981, page 
1), but the firm was cleared. In view of its continuing 
liquidity problems and the loss of some key personnel, the 
firm was about to merge with a firm run by the Chairman of 
the Stock Exchange, but some irregularities were discovered 
and the merger was called off. Following a refusal by the 
National Westminster Bank to handle its cheques, the company 
collapsed with a deficit of £1 million in April 1981 and a 
Receiver was appointed (Financial Times, 16th April 1981, 
page 40). The Receiver claimed that the firm had been running 
up unauthorised debts by not complying with the appropriate 
regulations, yet the published accounts and the audit report 
made no mention of such matters. A writ for £1.8 million 
damages against the auditors, Ernst & Whinney, was issued 
(Financial Times, 14th February 1981). In 1984, just 10 days 
before the start of the court case it was reported (Financial 
Times, 9th June 1984, page 1) that Ernst & Whinney had agreed 
an out-of-court settlement of £850,000. 
Successive Governments have been keen to promote the 
financial sector and encourage invisible exports. But a 1982. 
scandal shook the establishment and affected auditors. 
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Alexander and Alexander (an American company), following its 
£150 million takeover of Alexander Howden (a British broker), 
in accordance with the Securities Exchange Commission's 
requirements, had it thoroughly investigated and discovered 
multi-million dollar deficiencies in assets (Financial Times, 
2nd September 1982, page 1). Some $55 million of the 
company's assets were thought to have been transferred into 
Panamanian companies controlled by four individuals (The 
Times, 24th September 1982, page 13). Further complex 
re-insurance frauds were also· reported (The Times, 26th 
September 1982, page 26). Such discoveries were also to lead 
to the discovery of other major frauds at the PCW syndicate 
and covered major insurance companies such as Minet (Davison, 
1987, chapter VI). In accordance with legislation, the 
auditors at Lloyd's are required to pay particular attention 
to solvency, that is the ability of the underwriters to meet 
their obligations. However, the asset deficiency had not been 
detected by the auditors. Alexander & Alexander sued the 
auditors for $220 million, alleging that the purchase price 
paid by them was influenced by the audited accounts and that 
they were misled4 • 
In 1983, the Allied Irish Banks group bought the Insurance 
Corporation of Ireland ( ICI) for £86 million by relying on 
its 1982 accounts audited by Ernst & Whinney. The accounts 
showed net assets of £51 million and the company also 
forecast a profit of £6.7 million for 1983 (The Times 28th 
March 1985, page 28). Subsequently it was discovered that the 
assets were grossly overstated. The company made losses to 
the tune of £99 million and the Irish government had to 
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rescue ICI (The Times, 16th March 1985, page 19). It alleged 
that the accounts were false and sued Ernst & Whinney for £90 
million (Accountancy, April 1985, page 7). 
In February 1985, Ernst & Whinney faced a 26 page, £8.9 
million lawsuit from Ruberoid alleging negligence in the 1982 
audit of its newly acquired subsidiary Camrex (The Times, 
19th February 1985, page 26). Ruberoid bought Camrex as a 
profitable business, but it showed a loss of £1.1 million in 
1983 and £584,000 in 1984. Ruberoid alleged that Camrex's 
profits and assets for 1982. were grossly overstated and a 
provision of £482,800 was omitted. In addition, Camrex had 
been involved in a legal battle in the USA since 1977, but 
these facts were not known to the buyers. The Chairman of the 
company claimed that "Had we known what we now believe to 
have been the correct financial position at that time we 
would not have been prepared to bid at the price we did" (The 
Times, 16th May 1985, page 17). 
In view of the continuing litigation, auditing firms were 
facing a severe profit squeeze. It was reported that out of a 
sample of 3,000 firms, 562 had faced negligence claims, 
frequently after the collapse of a client company. The 
probability of lawsuit against a firm was thought to be one 
out of five (Financial Times, 14th April 1986, page 5) and 
considered to be a major barrier to accountancy. firm 
expansion (Financial Times, 5th August 1985, page 6). Faced 
with increasing uncertainty and negligence claims, in 1984, 
the Guardian Royal Exchange, a major insurer for accountants 
professional indemnity, ceased offering negligence cover 
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(Financial Times, 3rd April 1986, page 48). The Economist 
(29th June 1985) reported that lawsuits against British 
accountants had tripled in the last ten years. Most of these 
lawsuits related to liberalisation of the financial sector by 
the government. The Economist added that 
"the crux of the matter in most cases lies in 
defining the accountant's responsibility" 
(page 74). 
The auditors' insurance costs escalated by as much as 273 
percent and a ten fold increase. was being forecast (Financial 
Times, 14th April 1986, page 21). This was against a 
background where Accountancy (April 1985) claimed that the 
"last 18 months have seen a flood of writs 
against accountants" (page 7). 
Pressures on firms continued and they were keen to "stop the 
rot" (Accountancy. April 1985, page 7) through a test case. 
An opportunity to contest auditor's responsibility was taken 
up when Caparo Industries launched a £14 million negligence 
lawsuit against auditors. Touche Ross. The case involved 
Caparo's takeover of Fidelity. Fidelity's accounts for the 
year to March 1983 showed a profit of £830.000 and in July 
1983 the company made a rights issue of £300,000. The 
circular was accompanied by a profit forecast for 1984 of 
£2.2 million. On 12th March 1984. in a press release, 
Fidelity noted its production difficulties and stated that 
the profit would be considerably less than the forecast 
• 
figure. On 21st May 1984, Touche Ross issued an unqualified 
audit opinion on accounts showing a profit of £1.3 million. 
By relying on the accounts for the year to 31st March 1984, 
Caparo already a shareholder, increased its shareholding to 
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13.6% and by October 1984 to 92% of the issued capital. After 
the takeover costing nearly £14 million, Caparo allegedly 
discovered irregularities in Fidelity's stock valuation, 
arguing that the stock was worthless and obsolete. It argued 
that instead of showing a profit of £1.3 million, the 
accounts should have shown a loss of £460,000. Therefore, the 
accounts on which its investment decision was made were 
misleading. A lawsuit seeking £14 million damages for 
neglience against Touche Ross was issued (The Times, 22nd May 
1985, page 17 and 22nd July 1985, page 17) but Touche Ross 
denied that they owed individual shareholders any 'duty of 
In January 1985, PRISM, the largest distributor of Sinclair 
Research home computers, ceased to be a going concern. It had 
sales of £30 million and accounted for 30% of Sinclair sales, 
but "due to a shortfall of contribution from its principal 
activities and a write-down in the value of software and 
modem stocks it faced severe cashflow problems 
(Financial Times, 30th January 1985, page 30). Other problems 
related to product failures, marketing, legal actions and 
competition (Financial Times, 31st January 1985, page 6), yet 
the published accounts did not mention any such problems. The 
company issued a writ against its auditors Arthur Anderson. 
The three financial institutions, standing to lose about £1.2 
million ,claimed to have made their investment on the 
strength of audited figures and were particularly concerned 
at the speed with which an apparently healthy company went 
into receivership (The Times 1st February 1985, page 10). 
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This section has suggested that the rising number of 
liquidations and negligence claims provided a major backdrop 
for discussions of the going concern concept in an auditing 
context and the formulation of the auditing guideline. Such 
factors were considered to be decisive in discussions of the 
concept (Woolf, 1985). The auditing guideline itself was 
meant to be a response to visible criticisms of auditors and 
"public expectation 
alarm bell before 
(Charlesworth, "1985). 
that the auditor sound 
corporate failure" 
At a meeting, the Chairman of the APC working party described 
the guideline as 
"one of the most crucial issues currently 
facing the profession because the risk of 
litigation against firms is increasing in 
importance It • 
The next section shows that the State also exerted pressure 
by issuing lawsuits. 
6,1,5: Lawsuits from the State 
The lawsuits came not only from companies, but also from the 
State who in its capacity as a 'fraction of capital', exerted 
pressures for consideration of the going concern concept in 
an auditing context. Through lawsuits, the State officials 
were arguing that the auditors ought to be concerned with 
solvency, liquidity, financial unsoundness and matters which 
had a bearing on the survival of a company. An early 
indication was provided by claims against auditors. 
For example, Deloitte Haskins and Sells made an out-of-court 
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settlement of £150,000 to a State agency. In 1978, the 
National Enterprise Board (NEB) agreed to invest £180,000 in 
the ordinary shares and £120,000 in Power Dynamics, a company 
specialising in hydraulic tube and pipe bending machines (The 
Times, 21st February 1978, page 23). The company was formed 
in 1974 and used new technology to generate profits but had 
been experiencing severe financial problems and difficulties 
in securing additional finance. The NEB's investment was 
supposed to alleviate financial pressures and enable the 
company to continue to exploit its technological lead. The 
decision to invest was also influenced by the company's 
unqualified accounts showing a turnover of £60,372 and a 
profit of £312 for 1975 and a turnover of £196,861 and profit 
of £21,756 for 1976. After acquiring a one-third share of the 
business, NEB discovered irregularities and called in a 
Receiver (The Times, 3rd November 1978, page 3). Deloittes 
also made further enquiries in respect of the 1976 and 1977 
accounts and then tried to withdraw their unqualified 
opinions (Accountancy, 
Subsequently, Deloittes 
settlement of £150,000 to 
1979) . 
December 1978, pages 7-8) . 
agreed to make an out-of-court 
NEB {Daily Telegraph, 9th May 
Another instance of State action related to the Barrow 
Hepburn Group. a leather and chemicals concern. This too had 
been operating with the NEB's financial involvement and 
reported a decline in its 1977 profits (The Times, 9th March 
1978, page 24). The company announced that it had discovered 
"serious irregularities" during the winding-up of one of its 
subsidiaries, Schrader Mitchell and Weir (The Times, 23rd 
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March 1978, page 21). The irregularities within the range of 
£945,000 to £4.2 million occurred between 1974 and 1978 and 
involved concealment of losses and false book-keeping, but 
the accounts carried clean audit reports (The Times. 7th 
October 1978). The company's auditors. Mann Judd resigned by 
"mutual agreement" and the Fraud Squad moved in to 
investigate (The Times. 10th October 1978, page 17). In May 
1979, it was announced that Mann Judd had agreed to pay "a 
substantial amount" (Daily Telegraph, 11th May 1979, page 
21). estimated to be in the region of £1.5 million 
(Accountancy. June 1979. page ~). 
By December 1981. the profession had not announced any 
plans6 to issue a going concern guideline. Around this time. 
it was confronted with the JEB Fastners case which stated 
that an auditor owed a duty of care to certain third parties. 
even in the absence of a contractual obligation. Whilst a 
working party to consider the issue of the auditing guideline 
was formed in Spring 1982. the State continued to give 
visibility to auditing aspects of going concern through 
further legal actions against auditors. This time the legal 
action was against Arthur Anderson over the collapse of the 
DeLorean Motor Company, a company set up with State-aid by 
John DeLorean in Northern Ireland. 
DeLorean is thought to have diverted the State funds fqr his 
personal use and into drug dealings (Fallon and Srobes, 
1983). He was earning some £270.000 p.a and additional 
bonuses of £400,000, but the Public Accounts Committee heard 
that $17.5 million of the company's money went 'walkabout' 
PAGE 325 
(The Accountant, 22/29 December 1983, page 682) and $8.9 
million ended up as loans to DeLorean through Swiss bank 
accounts (The Times, 19th July 1984, page 13). The company 
collapsed in October 1982, resulting in a loss of 2,500 jobs 
and some £80 million of taxpayers money. The UK government 
filed a £245 million writ against auditors Arthur Anderson in 
the USA under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organisation 
(RICO) legislation. The RICO laws were designed to deal with 
gangsters and drug dealers. The 100 page writ alleged that 
Arthur Anderson were negligent in failing to uncover 
accounting irregularities and practiced public accounting 
functions "fraudulently and with gross incompetence" (Sunday 
Times, 17th February 1985, page 1). The auditors were alleged 
to have "known of the irregularities but failed to bring them 
to the government's attentions" (Financial Times, 18th 
February 1985, page 6). In its defence, Arthur Anderson 
argued that 
"The auditor's responsibility did not include 
judging the viability of the project or 
monitoring its progress" (Financial Times, 
23rd February 1985, page 3). 
The government continued to take action against auditors. 
One of the most visible episodes related to the collapse of 
Johnson Matthey Bankers. 
Johnson Matthey, the banking arm of a large international 
bullion dealer had been subject to control under the Banking 
• 
Act 1979, introduced after the 1971-73 secondary banking 
crisis. Despite a recent record of profits, the bank had been 
experiencing liquidity problems (Clarke, 1986). But on 18th 
June 1984, auditors Arthur Young issued an unqualified audit 
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report. On 1st October 1984, the Bank of England mounted a 
dramatic rescue bid (Financial Times, 2nd October 1984, page 
1) and the auditor's role soon came under scrutiny. The 
Financial Times (2nd October 1984) argued that "the last 
minute rescue bid has raised serious questions about 
faith in audited figures" (page 36). The auditing practices 
were further challenged when it was reported that the Bank of 
England had suspected the company's accounts (Financial 
Times, 3rd October 1984. page 6). An editorial comment 
(Financial Times, 3rd October 1984) asserted that the 
....... auditors were seemingly slow to 
realise just how fast good money was thrown 
after bad ...... the process of auditing is 
slow ...... if one bank can vanish out of an 
apparently blue sky whose blueness has 
recently been certified by the auditors, just 
how dependable are the figures from the other 
600-odd authorised banks?" (page 23). 
MPs wondered. "why the Johnson Matthey auditors gave the 
bank a clean bill of health" (Financial times. 11th October 
1984, page 7). The supervisory authorities argued that the 
auditors should have alerted the authorities of the bank's 
affairs, whereas Arthur Young argued that the situation had 
rapidly deteriorated after they signed off the last year's 
accounts (Financial Times, 6th October 1984, page 18). In 
order to protect its interests (The Times, 24th July 1985», 
the government sued Arthur Young for failing to highlight the 
Bank's financial problems. eventually receiving £25 million 
in an out-of-court settlement in 1988. Commenting on the 
government's influence on the discussions of going concern, a 
partner from a major auditing firm stated that the 
"investors taking risks seem to have the 
impression that we are going to compensate 
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them. A 'deep pockets' syndrome. This 
impression has to be corrected. We do not 
guarantee the continuation of a business . 
. ... The directors make the 'going concern 
assumption'~ not us. An unqualified audit 
opinion simply means that we have not found 
anything to contradict the directors 
assertions. The government is the worst 
culprit ...... There is a bank not too far 
from here [Johnson Matthey] and the 
Government is suing a major firm [Arthur 
Young] over its collapse ...... we have to 
educate the public. It is just not part of 
the auditors job to comment on business 
viability and continuation. You tell me 
...... have auditors ever put a company out 
of business ...... our insurance costs have 
soared beyond belief". 
Soon afterwards. the issue of the going concern auditing 
guideline was accompanied by a comment that 
"In view of the accusing fingers which have 
recently been pointed at auditors in 
connection with certain well-publicised 
company failures. this guideline is a 
significant addition ....... (APe. 1985b. page 
2). 
Woolf (1985) referred to rising liquidations7 and negligence 
risks as being the main motives for the auditing guideline. 
This section has argued that discussions of going concern in 
an auditing context were considerably influenced by the 
actions of the State. In common with other 'fractions of 
capital', it took legal action against auditors and received 
damages. Such actions were damagaing to the economic 
interests of auditors and helped to concentrate attention on 
going concern issues. In addition, the State also acted in 
the long term interests of capital, including 'accountancy 
capital', by highlighting the shortcomings of the prevailing 
auditing procedures. This happened via the pUblication of the 
Department of Trade inspectors' reports, which amongst other 
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things suggested the kind of matters to which the auditors 
should have paid attention, in order to detect going concern 
problems. 
6.1.6: Critical Reports from the Department of Trade 
The critical reports from the Department of Trade inspectors 
did two broad things. Firstly, they drew attention to 
deficiencies in auditing procedures which had failed to pay 
adequate attention to going concern problems. In this 
context, the reports were indicating the procedures which the 
auditors should have adopted. Such procedures eventually 
found their way into the auditing guidelines issued by the 
profession. Secondly, the critical reports paved the way for 
the formation of the Auditing Practices Committee. which was 
responsible for issuing the guideline. 
In order to safeguard the long-term interests of capital. 
the State began to authorise an increasing number of 
investigationsB into many corporate collapses. The resulting 
reports were critical of the auditors' failure to highlight 
going concern problems. Though a number of reports have been 
published (see table 6.9), this section will only focus on 
the few which provide a general indication (also thought to 
be significant by various interviewees) of the pressures. 
Whilst the question of auditor responsibility had not been a 
major political issue in recent years, by the early 1970s. 
the position began to change. Much of the concern began to be 
exPressed by Departments of the State. 
PAGE 329 
An early indication came with the collapse of the Pinnock 
Finance Group (DoT, 1971b), a business which was the result 
of the State sponsored expansion of the financial sector 
(Reid, 1982, page 24). The company was described as a 
"gigantic fraud in the history of private business" (Hansard, 
28th May 1971, col. 773). It had accumulated losses of £2 
million in 1964, £3 million on 1965 and £5.6 million in 19S7. 
The group~s manufacturing arms were insolvent and had been 
making losses, but kept going by falsifying its accounts and 
thus attracting more money. Company officials were thought to 
be misusing the assets. However. the company continued to 
receive unqualified audit opinions. At the date of its 
collapse, the company had liabilities of £9.2 million and 
assets of only £1.2 million. The inspectors concluded that 
the "asset figures in the balance sheets were not merely 
unrealistic but blatantly false" (DoT, 1971b, page 249). The 
auditors were described as 'tame and grossly negligent' (The 
Times, 27th May 1971, page 1). 
The auditors were also criticised in the interim report on 
E.J. Austin Limited (DoT, 1972) for failing to look at the 
company's adverse liquidity position (page 40), excessive 
overdraft (page 43) and difficulty in meeting its capital 
commitments (page,. 46). Auditors Chalmers Impey were 
criticised in the Pergamon Press report for too easily 
accepting the management's position on particular valuation 
and income measurements for the 1964-1968 accounts (DoT, 
1973, para 625). The inspectors added "we were struck by the 
pattern whi?h has emerged throughout such a period without at 
any point of time provoking reservations by auditors in the 
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reports ...... " (DoT, 1973, para 1244). In the wake of 
corporate collapses, the Department of Trade inspectors' 
critical comments continued to give public visibility to 
questions of audit procedures and auditor responsibility. 
The 1975 report on Blanes Ltd and Russell Ltd was critical 
of the auditors' stock verififcation procedures. Auditors 
Thomson HcLintock were criticised for their role in the 
collapse of Roadships Limited (DoT, 1976b). They were accused 
of not having paid adequate attention to profit forecasts. 
The firms procedures for checking creditors, accruals and 
purchases were found to be deficient. 
In 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath described the 
activities of Lonrho as the "unacceptable face of capitalism" 
(The Times, 7th July 1976, page 14). The resulting 
inspectors' report was critical of Peat Harwick and Fuller 
Jenks for their failure to verify directors' expenses (DoT 
1976c, pages 651-652). The inspectors report on Hartley Baird 
(DoT, 1976d) found that the company was having difficulties 
in repaying its loans. However, the financial problems were 
covered up by manipulation of the accounts and the audit 
qualification was not helpful at all (page 101). 
The 300 page report on the collapse of Vehicle and General, 
insuring some 10% of Britain's motorists, was critical of 
auditors B1ease Lloyd (DoT, 1976e). The company did not create 
adequate provisions to meet insurance claims, but manipulated 
the financial statements to conceal the situation (page 317). 
The company's accounting records were defective and auditors 
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did not spot this. For example, an investment of 
£82,040 was shown as £820,040 in the accounts. Some 
investments were ommitted altogether from the accounts. The 
final report on E.J. Austin (DoT. 1976f) criticised auditors 
for failing to spot working capital deficiencies and 'cheque 
swapping arrangements' entered by the company to enable it to 
meet its profit forecast (page 110). 
Additional shortcomings of the audit procedures to highlight 
going concern problems came in the London and County report 
(DoT, 1976a), commissioned after the collapse of the 
secondary bank. It was highly critical of the auditors' 
failure (see chapter 7 for further details) to highlight the 
liquidity problems. In order to conceal its worsening trading 
position, the directors supported share purchase schemes and 
other illegal transactions. There were loans at less than 
commercial rates of interest. Bad debts were not written-off 
and inadequate provisions were made for the losses sustained. 
The accounts included income not yet earned, but the auditors 
gave an unqualified opinion. At the date of the collapse, the 
bank boasted assets of £80 million, but £10-12 million of 
this was due to fictitious assets. The auditors were 
criticised for failing to pay adequate attention to 'post 
balance sheet events' and for failing to note the artificial 
inflation of cash balances. In addition, inadequate attention 
was paid to the realizable value of current assets. 
The auditors 
criticised 
forecasts 
for 
(DoT, 
of Edward Wood & Company Limited were 
paying 
1977a). 
inadequate attention to profit 
The report on London and Capital 
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Group (DoT, 1977b) criticised auditors Thornton Baker for 
their failure to verify loans and advances to directors. The 
auditors of Electerminations Limited (DoT, 1978d) issued 
unqualified audit opinions and were criticised for paying 
inadequate attention to stock valuation and value of 
investments. During the economic crisis, attention focused on 
the accounts of Court Line, a major shipping and holiday 
company. The company's accounts had been heavily criticised 
in the press (see the Economist, 14th February 1976, pages 
79-60 for a review) for at least three years prior to its 
collapse, but still attracted unqualified audit opinions. The 
resulting DoT report was critical of the company's accounts 
for 1969-73 (DoT, 1976b) and criticised Peat Marwick (for 
1971 and 1972 audits) and Robson Rhodes (for the 1973 audit). 
The company was overgeared, facing liquidity problems for 
some years and had been considering selling its fixed assets 
to service its debt. The financial statements were found to 
be deficient on the account of foreign currency translations, 
treatment of goodwill, 'off balance sheet finanoing', dubious 
debts, unrealistic asset values and exclusion of liabilities, 
etc (para 549-582). Clarksons (a Court Line subsidiary) did 
not keep proper books of accounts for 1970 to 1973 but the 
auditors, Robson Rhodes, gave an unqualified report (para 
716). The Group's 1973 accounts were signed off on 12th Maroh 
1974, yet the company was forecasting losses and little 
consideration appeared to have been given to this. Robson 
Rhodes were criticised for paying inadequate attention to 
management data, profit and cash forecasts (para 703). The 
auditors were further criticised for failing to pay adequate 
attention to the company's adverse trading conditions and 
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ignoring their impact on liquidity in the post balance sheet 
period (para 705). 
The auditors of Ashbourne Investments (DoT, 1979b) were 
criticised for failing to spot non-existent loans and false 
books. The 1979 report on the collapse of the Grays Building 
Society (Registry of Friendly Societies, 1979) made savage 
criticism of auditors for failing to 
fraud over a period of 40 years. 
Investments (DT!, 1980a), criticised 
spot a £7.1 million 
The report on Scotia 
auditors Lubbock Fine 
for their inadequate procedur,es for verifying cash and bank 
balances (page 155); failure to note that a bank deposit of 
£500,000 was secured and that the accounts made no mention of 
it and failure to pay adequate attention to back-to-back 
financial operations (page 174). The inspectors concluded 
that the auditors "fell short of the professional standard of 
care required from auditors" (DTI, 1980a, page 174). Further 
criticisms of auditors came in the report relating to The 
Central Provinces Manganese Ore Company Limited, Data 
Investments and Vivella Limited (DTI, 1980b). The inspectors 
concluded that "the auditors' report contained no 
qualification in relation to the acquisition or disposal of 
the master stakes. We conclude that the information given to 
the shareholders was inadequate and misleading, and that the 
auditors failed to seek adequate explanations regarding the 
transactions. As a result, they failed to qualify their 
report, as in our opinion, they should have done" (DTI, 
1980b, page 57). The inspectors noted that "Robson Rhodes 
..... failed to carry out an adequate investigation into the 
circumstances in which loss had been incurred" (page 162). 
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The investigation into 'Gilgate Holdings (DT!. 1981b) was 
prompted by the filing of unsound accounts for 1975 with the 
Registrar and the subsequent attempts by auditors to retrieve 
them. The companies entered into transactions with related 
parties; the directors concealed liabilities and published 
misleading information. The inspectors criticised Thornton 
Baker for failing to exercise "proper professional judgement" 
(DT!, 1981a, para 29.37). 
Peat Marwick were criticised. for failing to spot liquidity 
problems at Orbit Holdings (DTI, 1981b) and Price Waterhouse 
suffered the same fate for the failure to note the financial 
problems at Norwest Holst (DTI, 1982). Interestingly, the DTI 
report commissioned on 12th September 1974 on Ramor 
Investments and Bryanston included a section on 'going 
concern' (DTI, 1983, page 243). The report was critical of 
Price Waterhouse but noted the impact of contemporary 
economic policies. property values, liquidity and bank 
finance on auditor consideration of going concern. An 
interviewee from a multinational firm described the impact of 
DT! reports, thus: 
"Every time a. DT! report appeared, it 
effectively drew our attention to 
difficulties in spotting going concern red 
flags. Most of the investigations were 
conducted after the collapse of·companies and 
with the benefit of hindsight. Of course, 
everyone is wise with the benefit of 
hindsight ....... A distinct impression was 
created that we had a responsibility to warn 
people of impending failure and comment on 
its ability to continue as a 'going concern' . 
....... every time a critical DT! report 
appeared, it made us look foolish, we were on 
the front pages of newspapers, ..... they 
increased writs, pushed up our insurance 
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premiums ...... [and] made us think hard 
about going concern matters". 
In an economically volatile environment (see section 6.2), 
the problems of accountancy firms were being made 
particularly visible by lawsuits and critical DTI reports. 
Such firms are identified in the next section. 
6. 1. 7: 'Interests of Large Firms 
The preceeding sections have referred to two highly 
significant developments; the lawsuits against accountancy 
firms (6.1.4 and 6.1.5) and the critical reports from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (6.1.6). In the post Hedley 
Byrne era, the threat of lawsuits had increased. In a period 
when 562 firms out of a sample of 3,000 had faced negligence 
law-suits (Financial times, 14th April 1986. page 5) and the 
number of lawsuits against auditors had tripled (The 
Economist, 29th June 1985, page 74), many accountants feared 
lasting financial damage and may have wanted the professional 
bodies to deal with the situation. The litigation frequently 
came after one of the clients failed to remain a going 
concern and the 'significant others' alleged that the auditor 
should have warned them of the impending collapse. The major 
firms were the visible face of the auditing woes, especially, 
as they frequently faced DTI criticisms and large lawsuits. 
For example. Arthur Anderson were involved in the DeLorean 
lawsuit; Peat Marwick and Touche Ross were facing a lawsuit 
over the collapse of Fidelity from Caparo; Arthur Young were 
involved in the Johnson Matthey lawsuit and criticised over 
the collapse of Milbury by the DTI inspectors, Robson Rhodes 
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were criticised for their role in the collapse of Court Line; 
Price Waterhouse faced criticisms over the collapse of Ramor 
Investments. Such firms are identified in figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 
Major Firms Confronting Lawsuits and DI! Criticisms 
Accountancy Firms *Ranking Based on Fees 
Coopers & Lybrand 1 
Peat Harwick 2 
Price Waterhouse 3 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells 4 
Ernst & Whinney 5 
Arthur Young 6 
Touche Ross 7 
Thornton Baker 8 
Arthur Anderson 9 
Thomson McLintock 10 
Pannell Kerr Forster 13 
Robson Rhodes 19 
Chalmers Impey 20 
* As per The Accountant, 26th June 1986, page 14. 
Also see Hansard 19th December 1989 col. 139 and 21st 
February 1990, col. 782 for identification of accountancy 
firms criticised by the DTI inspectors. 
In view of the current and potential litigation claims, the 
major firms had incentives to try and take control of their 
environment by having favourable professional pronouncements 
and preferred meanings of 'going concern'. However, this 
could only be achieved, if despite the public criticisms of 
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their standards of work, they could exercise control over the 
institutions responsible for formulating the auditing 
guidelines. Chapter 7 will show that such firms came to 
control the Auditing Practices Committee, a Committee 
responsible for formulating the going concern guideline. 
Meanwhile, the firms tried to refine their going concern 
audit procedures. 
6,1,8: Professional Interest in Going Concern in an Auditing 
Context 
The increased professional interest in the meanings and 
interpretations of the going concern concept in an auditing 
context coincided with the rise in litigation, corporate 
collapses and critical DTI reports. Whereas previously the 
profession argued that the auditors had no responsibility for 
directly reporting on corporate solvency, liquidity and the 
likelihood of impending bankruptcy, now the profession at 
least acknowledged that "it was reasonable to exPect the 
auditor to consider the future viability of his client" (APC, 
19Se, page 32). Towards this end, the auditors were urged to 
develop appropriate auditing procedures. The Scottish 
Institute (leAS, 1975) urged auditors to look at post balance 
sheet events, forecast of operating losses, liquidity 
problems, loan defaults and loss of major customers. Dunlop 
and Land (1975) urged auditors to focus on company forecasts 
and recoverability of debtor balances. Strachan (1975) urged 
auditors to pay particular attention to cash flow forecasts, 
overgearing, the company's borrowing powers, realisation of 
inventories, debtors and investments. Such factors also 
appeared in the going concern checklist issued by the AISG 
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(1975). Blackwood (1976) advised auditors to evaluate 
economic and financial indicators by focusing on ratios. In 
time, company cash position, history of operating losses, 
overgearing, etc. came to be regarded as the obvious signs of 
going concern problems (Campisi and Trotman, 1985). 
It is also significant that the DT! reports and court cases 
were also suggesting the auditing procedures for dealing with 
going concern problems. For example, the DT! reports, such as 
the Court Line report were urging auditors to pay attention 
to overgearing, liquidity ratios, profit forecasts, cash 
forecasts, post balance sheet events and recoverability of 
debts. Burnholme and Forder mentioned the dangers of relying 
upon over-optimistic forecasts. The Scotia report referred to 
the importance of collecting evidence about the company's 
financial arrangements. The Gilgate report mentioned the 
particular importance of related party transactions. The 
Ramor Investments report urged the auditor to pay particular 
attention to the economic and market conditions surrounding 
the company. The Bedderwick case referred to an examination 
of the creditors and debtors position. Alexander Bowden and 
Ruberoids related to valuation and verification of assets. 
Affairs such as Power Dynamics, highlighted the importance of 
profit record and financial arrangements. Barrow Hepburn 
referred to the importance of paying attention to a record of 
losses. Such auditing procedures were to become an integral 
part of the auditing guideline. 
The senior members of the profession interviewed for this 
thesis were asked to cast their minds back and think about 
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the time 'going concern l became important to them. They 
vividly recalled the events of the mid 1970s. Here is a 
typical view, 
" .... when big names such as BLI and some 
banks suddenly went to the wall, we smelt 
dangers. It wasn't just the odd John Bloom 
[referring to Rolls Razor] ...... Big 
companies were going out of existence and we 
were alerted ....... just think of the 
liability problems. It was a terrible time 
..... Every time a company collapsed, 
accountancy firms were on the front pages of 
newspapers. People were saying why was there 
no warning; why were we nQt informed; where 
were the auditors ...... there were 
questions in Parliament .... Of course we had 
to reconsider and mod,ify our auditing 
procedures to identify going concern 
problems, but there was not much wrong with 
them. . . . . . It has never been part of our 
responsibility to look at business viability 
and neither do we guarantee its survival . 
....... The profession was under suspicion 
and hardly organised to do anything. After 
some banks went to the wall, we started 
making more use of the going concern 
checklists and qualification ...... I guess 
we hardly used this type of qualification 
before ..... .. 
A senior partner from a Big-eight firm explained that 
II At the annual general meetings, the 
shareholders were asking questions about the 
impact of inflation, company liquidity, stock 
levels, profit margins, dividend covers, 
likelY wage settlements and the replacement 
cost of fixed assets. To us, going concern 
concept meant paying attention to all these 
aspects. Historical cost accounts were not 
and probably still are not much use. We had 
to look at forecasts. It was a case of being 
more careful or perishing ...... ". 
One Big-eight interviewee recalled a flurry of meetings of 
his and other firm's partners to consider going concern 
issues and even approaches to the professional bodies, 
seeking a professional pronouncement. Another interviewee 
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trom an international firm (which has subsequently been 
strongly represented on the Auditing Practices Committee) 
recalled that in view of the deepening economic crisis, a 
memorandum was prepared to brief all partners and managers on 
the question of 'auditor and going concern'. A copy of this, 
is shown in Appendix 5.A number of features should be noted. 
It makes clear references to factors causing a liquidity 
crisis: such as high interest rates, over borrowing, high 
commodity prices, declining property values and falling rates 
of profitability. It includes a'checklist for making going 
concern evaluations and expec,ts auditors to consider future 
oriented information such as forecasts. The newness of the 
topic is suggested by words such as, "Is it [the company] a 
going concern? Now necessary to determine answer to this on 
each and every occasion for all clients" (see para 2.2 of 
Appendix 5). 
The accountancy firms paid attention to going concern 
problems, but the implications for auditor responsibility 
still remained somewhat unclear. Such issues were to be dealt 
with in the auditing guideline in 1985 and will be examined 
in chapter 7. 
B.1.9: A Connective SYmmarY and Discyssion 
This section argued that discussions of the going concern 
• 
concept in an auditing context became widespread in the 
1970s, mainly due to a combination of certain elements. For a 
considerable time, the meaning of an audit and the nature of 
auditor responsibilities had been contested. However, the 
L 
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1970s saw an important change. The Hedley Byrne case 
indicated~ that auditors may owe a 'duty of care' to third 
parties, even in the absence of any contractual obligations. 
This possibility occurred against a background of falling 
rates of profitability, liquidity ratios and an increasing 
rate of corporate insolvencies. During such an economic 
climate, the auditing procedures were frequently seen to be 
deficient by 'significant others', The State, a prime sponsor 
of the monopolies and privileges of the accountancy 
profession was transmitting such messages through the DT! 
inspectors' reports. The increasing scrutiny of auditing 
procedures, auditor responsibility and the damage done to 
accountancy firm profits by the large number of lawsuits, 
forced the profession to devote more and more attention to 
discussions of the going concern concept. Such pressures also 
threatened the legitimacy of the profession and the functions 
it performs for the reproduction of capital. In such an 
environment, the profession was forced to develop a strategy 
for dealing with such pressures, eventuallY leading to the 
issue of an auditing guideline in August 1985. 
The DTI reports highlighted deficiencies in auditing 
procedures and indicated the steps the auditors ought to take 
to satisfy themselves that a business is a going concern. It 
is also important to note that many of the publicly reported 
lawsuits and the DTI criticisms were levelled against major 
firms such as Arthur Anderson, Touche Ross, Peat Harwick, 
Price Waterhouse, Arthur Young and others. In an attempt to 
protect their economic interests, such firms had economic 
incentives to play a significant role in the formulation of 
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the auditing guideline. 
The next section refers to the social, economic and political 
developments which created 
discussions and emergence of 
context. 
conditions 
the concept 
for 
in an 
widspread 
auditing 
6.2: SOCIAL. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS 1970s-1985 
The discussions of going concern in an auditing context 
occurred within the space created by the economic, political 
and social developments. The discussions arose in the context 
of what the Accountants International Study Group (1975) 
called a "volatile economic environment" (para 5) and the 
ICAS (1975) argued that the "present economic climate is 
causing the position to be less obvious" (page 141). Strachan 
(1975) also argued that the "economic conditions in the 
United Kingdom ..... cause many companies and their auditors 
to consider the validity of the "going concern" concept in 
relation to the financial accounts" (page 66). This section 
now examines a number of related events and episodes which 
provided a backdrop for the increasing attention being paid 
to the going concern concept in an auditing context. These 
relate to attempts to revive the ailing British economy 
(6.2.1), a property and secondary banking collapse (6.2.2), 
continuing decline of the economy (6.2.3), and the policies 
of the 'New Right' which adopted a particular way of managing 
the British economy (6.2.4). 
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6,2,1: Reviving the British Economy in the Early 1970s 
Relatively low investment (table 6.10) in the British 
industry has been blamed for slow rejuvenation of the 
post-war British economy and successive Governments have 
pursued economic policies to change this. Historically, 
British industrial capital has been less dependent on the 
banks for finance and more reliant on internal sources for 
investment. For example, between 1950 and 1972, 76% of gross 
capital formation in Britain- was funded from earnings 
compared to 62% in Germany and 49% in France. When seeking 
long term finance, the British industry favoured equity 
rather than debt and the banks generally provided short-term 
loans (Coakley and Harris, 1983). Such preferences were seen 
as barriers to industrial development and the Heath 
Government decided to relax the monetary policies. 
In March 1971, the Bank of England announced its proposals 
for 'Competition and Credit Control' to replace the 
previously restrictive credit policy (Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, June 1971). Under this, the banks' 
liquidity ratios were to be reduced and competition was to be 
encouraged. Following the Chancellor's budget speech of April 
1971, the government engineered a mini-boom by ending credit 
ceilings for banks and hire-purchase companies, which allowed 
them to lend more freely. The financial sector was one of 
the few rapidly expanding areas of the economy and the 
government was keen to lure international banks to London and 
promote it as an international financial centre (Clarke, 
1986). This expansion of the financial sector was to be 
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accompanied by a "less formal system of supervision" (Reid, . 
1982, page 4). In 1972, Sterling was also floated to prevent 
any constraints on domestic expansion (Smith, 1981, page 80). 
At the same time. the government was using the public sector 
to reflate the economy. For example. between 1970 and 1972, 
public sector expenditure increased by more than 8% in real 
terms (Thomson. 1986. page 317). 
In this climate, the banks began lending money in new and 
novel ways to many secondarY banks (Moran, 1984; Clarke, 
1986). However, the government ,aspirations and policies had 
contradictory effects. Since the late 1960s, the government 
had been keen to move businesses to unemployment blackspots 
and was making it difficult to build new office blocks in 
London, especially the City of London. Special permits were 
needed for office development. The office space was 
effectively being rationed, but at the same time. the 
government was encouraging foreign banks and financial 
institutions to come to London. Property prices and rents in 
and around London began to increase. Office rents in the City 
of London rose fourfold between 1965 and 1970 (Moran, 1984) 
and in anticipation of new tenants and high rents, lots of 
new office blocks sprung up on the fringes of the City of 
London. Whilst the average profitability of the British 
economy was declining (table 6.5), the returns on property 
looked very attractive and many banks were lending money for 
such ventures through new practices. 
The economic measures were politically designed to reduce 
unemployment and revitalise the economy, but the effects were 
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oomplex. Increased bank competition and money supply pushed 
up demand and inflation. Imports flooded ill, partcularly of 
cars and consumer durables and British jobs disappeared at a 
faster rate. The main reason, according to the Wilson 
Committee was that 
"there was less rebuilding after the war than 
in many continental oountries, with the 
result that more of Britain's faotories are 
in old and unsuitable buildings than 
elsewhere, even if machines in them may not 
be appreciably older than in other countries. 
British industry has not adopted new 
technology to the same degree as industry in 
other oountries ....... Britain's industrial 
mix is poorer than that of many developed 
competitiors. In engineering, for example, 
more of Britain's industrial maohinery 
exports are in relatively standard items, 
less in high value-added, high technology 
items" (Wilson, 1980, page 128). 
Excessive cash, fierce competition and low investment soon 
resulted in double figure inflation and unemployment started 
to increase sharply (Lisle-Williams, 1986) . Increased 
competition and lending in an expansionary environment vastly 
increased bank lending, not so much to the British 
manufacturing Industry, but rather much more to speculative. 
ventures (Coakley and Harris, 1983). Much of the newly 
released bank finance went to the property sector, whose 
borrowings, despite the Bank of England's restraining 
measures, trebled between 1971 and 1973 (Grady and Weale, 
1986, page 148) and reached an estimated figure of £5,000 
million by the end of 1973. Some £1,300 million of the 
speculative money to the property sector was provided by the 
main clearing banks, who between May 1972 and 1973 increased 
their advances to property companies by 70%. The property 
boom in the main was fuelled by loans from the secondary 
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banks who borrowed short and lent long, with loans being 
secured against the property itself in an ever rising market. 
The secondary banks provided nearly £1,400 million to 
property companies and some £2,000 million to other financial 
borrowers (Reid, 1982, page 61). Easy money, credit and over 
optimism caused the commercial property prices to treble 
between 1970 and 1973 and the price of new houses rose by 
around 50% between 1972 and 1973 (Moran, 1984). 
The period leading to the break-up of the Bretton Woods 
system on 19th March 1973 also increased financial 
uncertainty and attracted more than a fair share of 
speculative money to the City of London, by now one of the 
world's major international financial centres. The 
international currency status of Sterling led to a run on 
Sterling in 1972 and the first half of 1973 was marked by an 
almost continuous international currency crisis (Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1973, page 127). The 
economic uncertainty led to a rush to buy gold and the London 
gold price rose two and half times between early 1972 and mid 
1973. Speculative buying also pushed up the property and 
commodity prices and this, combined with other factors, soon 
gave the appearance of a serious economic crisis in Britain 
(Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1984, chapter 12). In the face 
of a deteriorating industrial performance and import 
penetration, unemployment had already begun to increase. 
In an attempt to control the situation, the Heath Government 
now sought to cut demand (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
September 1973, page 271), inhibit competition and credit by 
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imposing a supplementary special deposit scheme on all banks 
(Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. 1974). As a part of this 
strategy. the banks were required to make non-interest 
bearing deposits with the Bank of England amounting to as 
much as 4% of their total eligible liabilities (Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin. July 1973, page 269). In an 
attempt to control inflation, the Government imposed controls 
on prices and income and a freeze on all business rents. thus 
further worsening the rates of profitability. 
In July 1973. the government sought to curb demand for money 
by hoisting the bank lending rate from 7.75% to 11.5% and 
then to a record 13% in November. At the same time it imposed 
a new development gains tax on property speculation. 
Suddenly, the property values started to appear highly 
uncertain. The inflation rate (see table 6.2), under the 
spell of rising commodity prices and imports, was pushed up 
even higher and became a major government policy issue (Bank 
of England Quarterly. June 1973). By 1973. 53% of the energy 
of the western world was supplied by oil (Green and 
Sutcliffe, 1987, page 324) and the increased demand had 
already caused the oil prices to accelerate (Bank of England 
Quarterly, June 1973). A further jolt came in the wake of the 
October 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The price of oil rose 
from $2 to $11 a barrel (Green and Sutcliffe, 1987; page 
326), adding some $4-$4.5 billion to the British import bill 
and increased the industrial costs by 2-3% (Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin. March 1974, page 3). Such a sudden 
increase in costs further fuelled the inflationary fires in 
Britain and affected its ability to export. Unemployment and 
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bankruptcies began to increase. This, combined with the 
impact of a 'three day week' caused by the miners' strike, 
increased pressures on the British economy and the rate of 
profitability continued to decline (see table 6.5). Such a 
decline was considered to be threat to investment, business 
survival and confidence (Financial Times, 27th June 1973, 
page 22). It was further argued that "a continuing drop in 
the return on investment. whatever its cause. would raise 
serious doubts about the stability of what is loosely 
described as the capitalist system" (Financial Times, 4th 
July 1973, page 22). Faced wit~ low return on investment, 
companies such as Courtaulds and GEe took to arbitraging in 
the money markets rather than investing in their 
manufacturing capacity. The prospects for the British economy 
and its secondary producers looked bleak. To boost the 
falling rate of profitability, the government increased 
grants. capital allowances and other tax reliefs to industry, 
resulting in a drastic reduction in the effective rate of 
corporate taxation on profits from a 1970 figure of 40% to 
the 1973 figure of 11% (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison 1984, 
page 258). Despite the concern with falling 
liquidity (see table 6.6). in an attempt to 
inflation, the government deflated the economy by 
public expenditure by £1,200 million (Bank of 
Quarterly Bulletin, March 1974, page 3). 
Such contradictory policies were to have 
consequences. 
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6,2,2: Property and Banking Collapse in the Mid 1970s 
The government economic policies, a continuing fall in the 
rate of profit, a global economic crisis and London's place 
as an international financial centre, led to some highly 
visible events in Britain. The immediate result was to 
intensify the competition for money, with some companies and 
banks paying way over the odds to secure cash (Moran, 1984, 
page 82). This was eventually to feed into a crash in the 
property values and a subsequent secondary banking crisis 
(Reid, 1982; Coakley and Harris, 1983; McRae and Cairncross, 
1985). Almost the first British secondary bank to collapse 
was London and County Securities~ . Just before its collapse, 
the bank had published good half-year profits but these 
turned out to be 'illusory' and misleading (Moran, 1984). In 
view of the financial squeeze, the bank was unable to secure 
additional finance and depositors from the wholesale money 
markets quickly withdrew their deposits. By 29th November 
1973, its share price plummeted from a 1973 high of 400p to a 
low of 30p and its shares were suspended. The government 
launched an investigation into its sudden collapse and the 
resulting DoT report found that 36% of the company's deposits 
were payable within one month and 43% within three months, 
yet almost all of the bank's assets, consisting of property 
and loans were highly illiquid (DoT, 1976a). The published 
accounts and the audit report gave no clue of such a 
situation 1m Confidence saving rescue attempts were launched 
by the Bank of England. The interdependence of banks and the 
impact of economic crisis set-off a domino effect. The 
position was made worst by the fact that banks were unable to 
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borrow to service the debt and 
sequestrated the property assets, 
liquidity crisis set in. 
the lenders, having 
could not sell them. A 
In November 1973, Moorgate Mercantile boasting paper assets 
of £50 million, but almost completely illiquid, went into 
liquidation. December 1973 saw suspension of the shares in 
Cedar Holdings 11 , another secondary bank. This bank once 
again borrowed short and lent in the medium-term second 
mortgage market, but was now unable to meet its obligations. 
The share price dropped from a high of 90p to 15p and 
dealings were suspended. Barclays Bank mounted a rescue 
operation of £80 million (Grady and Weale, 1986, page 151). 
Around the same time the National Westminster Bank mounted a 
£14 million rescue of Twentieth Century Banking. 
Cornhill Consolidated Group, a discount house backed by a 
number of financial institutions, built up its capital 
employed from £35,000 to £20 million in less than five years 
by offering generous rates to depositors and using the money 
for a wide variety of activities (DTI, 1980c). During August 
1973, whilst borrowing at 27.5% and 30%, it was unable to 
borrow more from the secondary banks and service its debts 
and finally failed in January 1974. The company had regular 
audits and trading losses of £5 million, but failed to file 
any accounts with the Registrar of companies from August 1970 
to December 1973. The company was described as "no more than 
a huge speculation with borrowed money" (Financial Times, 
17th December 1981, page 6). Window dressing was rampant in 
the oompany's aocounts and the inspectors ooncluded that such 
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accounts "did not show a true and fair view" (page 258). 
However, Price Waterhouse had given an unqualified audit 
opinion on all of them (DTI, 1980c). 
The crisis soon affected many other banks and financial 
institutions, especially as the major banks and insurance 
companies owned as much as a quarter of the equity of leading 
secondary banks (Coakley and Harris, 1983, page 71). The 
State had to bailout the troubled banks. Between December 
1973 and March 1974, 21 institut"ions were assisted at a cost 
of about £400 million (Grady and Weale, 1986, page 151). The 
list of well established companies and institutions needing 
State-aid continued to lengthen. In April 1974, Triumph 
Investment Trust and J.H. Vavasseur were aided. The Lyon 
Property Group faced a liquidity crisis in May 1974 and was 
assisted. In June 1974, the Stern Property Group consisting 
of nearly 180 companies collapsed and four years later its 
director William Stern was declared the world's biggest 
bankrupt owing £118,690,524 and earned an entry in the 
Guiness Book of Records (Aris, 1985, page 66) . In 
anticipation of rising property values, the group continued 
to borrow and the banks and Crown Agents (a State agency) 
continued to accept such assets as securities. The group was 
extremely overgeared, with interest payments alone totalling 
some £23 million, now reaching three times its total income. 
Subsequently, some of the group's buildings were sold at only 
40% and some sitea at only 20% of their previous values 
(Reid, 1982, page 106). The failure affected its bankers 
Keyser Ullman who were kept afloat by an injection of £65 
million by the Bank of England. Crown Agents had also been 
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speculating and was exposed by the collapse of secondary 
banks and property values (Grady and Weale, 1986, page 167). 
In Decmber 1974, it also received financial assistance of £85 
million and in view of the political sensitivity of issues, a 
three man team, led by a chartered accountant Peter Godfrey, 
was asked to conduct an investigation. The First National 
Finance Corporation (backed by Phoenix Assurance Company, 
Hambros Bank, Crown Agents and the Electricity Supply Pension 
Fund) brought in to rescue London and County, itself had to 
be rescued. By August 1974,. the aid given to banks was 
estimated to have reached £1,200 million (Grady and Weale, 
1986). At one stage, even the National Westminster Bank was 
rumoured to be in financial trouble and its chairman had to 
issue a public denial to restore confidence in the Bank 
(Moran, 1984). 
In January 1975, the Bank of England also came to the rescue 
of Slater Walker Limited (SWL), a division of Slater Walker 
Securities. The bank had given very large loans to relatively 
few clients. Four of its largest loans ranged from £5 million 
to £18 million and accounted for 51% of the bank's portfolio 
and 16 loans of over £1 million accounted for 31% of the 
portfolio. In total, it gave 150 loans, but only 13% of these 
accounted for 82% of the total value of its portfolio. It had 
liabilities of £57 million payable within three months and 
assets available to meet them of only £22 million. Its 
banking activities were in breach of its Articles of 
Association. In October 1975, the Bank of England gave the 
SWL subsidiary a secured standby facility to help it meet the 
rush of withdrawals from private investors. In November 1975, 
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this facility was estimated to be £75 million. By an 
agreement reached on 11th December 1975, the Bank of England 
indemnified SWL and its banking subsidiaries against losses 
on advances to the tune of £40 million. Another bank, Edward 
Bates was saved. by Arab money (Grady and Weale, 1986, page 
152). Institutions such as Mercantile Credit, British 
Bangladesh Trust, United Dominions Trust, Crown Agents and 
many others were badly affected by the falling property 
values and ill-judged speculation and were rescued by State 
assistance. The shares in Scoti~ Investments, a leisure giant 
with considerable development property, collapsed in November 
1975 and on 11th February 1976, a DTI inquiry team was 
appointed. The falling property values and rising interest 
rates created liquidity problems for the company (DTI, 
1980a). The company continued to sell assets to stay alive 
yet the accounts continued to show unrealistic asset values. 
The financial position was manipulated and the auditors paid 
inadequate attention to cash and bank balances (page 155). 
Company assets were pledged to secure personal loans, but the 
auditors continued to give unqualified opinions (page 174). 
The State restored some order in the secondary banking and 
property sector by spending an estimated £3,000 million on 
rescues (Reid, 1982, page 192), and this does not include any 
interest and capital repayments written off. The mechanisms 
for regulating banks and industry were seen to be deficient 
and in the search for solutions, the Department of Trade 
authorised a record number of investigations, 158 in 1974 and 
177 in 1975 (see table 6.9) and enacted new legislation12 • 
Many of the published DTI reports (table 6.9) were also 
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critical of the role of auditors who had failed to act in the 
long-term interests of 'capital'. The secondary banking 
crisis curtailed the speculative boom and restored some 
measure of balance between the financial and real economy. It 
also resulted in a management shake-out and an enforced 
restructuring of the British financial sector and industry, a 
process which also enabled some to buy assets at knockdown 
prices, indulge in asset stripping and affect employment and 
liquidations levels in all sectors of the economy. 
6.2.3: Continuing Decline of the EconoMY in the Mid-1970s 
After some unsuccessful attempts, Britain finally joined 
the European Economic Community (EEC) on 1st January 1973. 
The ailing British industry with falling profitability (table 
6.5) and low investment, was now to be subjected to much more 
extensive European competition by a significant reduction in 
import tarriffs. In 1974, the incoming Labour Government 
inherited an unemployment total of 600,000 and pursued mildly 
expansionary policies to tackle it. But, under the influence 
of rising commodity prices rather than wages, the rate of 
inflation reached 16.1% and the government imposed prices, 
income and dividends controls in order to manage the economic 
crisis. Profit margins were not allowed to rise above a 
certain figure based on an average of the two preceeding 
years and thus further squeezed profit margins and borrowings 
increased. Companies borrowed more and around 1974, the 
British companies' gearing ratios reached their highest ever 
level (Barclays Bank Review, May 1982). To provide additional 
funds for investment and reduce pressures on liquidity, the 
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government further reduced the taxation burden on industry by 
about £800 million by granting 'stock relief', a measure 
designed to exempt paper gains from taxation (Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, December 1974, page 397). But, the 
British industry's rate of profitability continued to decline 
(see table 6.5). The additional money did not find its way 
into industrial investment, instead many major companies used 
the finance to play the money markets in an effort to earn 
higher profits. 
The companies staying in the manufacturing field were 
buffeted by low profitability, fierce competition and lack of 
finance and investment. Between 1973 and 1976, industrial 
production in Britain fell by 8%. The plight of the British 
industry is perhaps typified by the fortunes of British 
Leyland Motor Corporation Limited (BLMC), a company brought 
about by mergers and active policies of the State (Dunnett, 
1980). The market share of this giant multi-national, 
continued to decline from 40% in 1968 to 32% in 1974, a 
situation not helped by the recent government engineered 
mini-booms which sucked in imports and eroded its market 
position. In view of the implications for employment, balance 
of payments and exports, the government was keen to maintain 
and promote the BLMC ~s a major volume car manufacturer. In 
July 1974, BLMC unveiled a five year investment programme, 
designed to help it recover its markets, but the bankers 
refused to make the necessary funds available and the 
company's ability to remain a going concern was in doubt. On 
6th December 1974, the Secretary of State for Industry 
announced that the government was effectively underwriting 
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all loans to BLMC. Eventually. BL was nationalised on 11th 
August 1975 (Williams, Williams and Haslam, 1987). Motor car 
import penetration also threatened the manufacture of cars by 
other established companies in Britain. In October 1975, the 
American owned Chrysler company also threatened to shut its 
operations and with it damage the prospects for employment 
and the dependent industries. In December 1975, a government 
committed to promoting British manufacture of cars and 
helping the BLHC, had to rescue one of its major competitors, 
Chrysler. 
Another candidate for State support was the Burmah Oil 
Company. This winner of the 1973 'The Accountant award for 
best annual report' with extensive interests in Britain's new 
found oil wealth in the North Sea, had been raising money 
overseas to avoid the high British interest rates and 
investing in huge new tankers. Following the oil price rise, 
it was having financial difficulties in meeting its $650 
million debt obligations and in November 1974 sought State 
assistance (The Times, 2nd January 1975, page 13). In view of 
the companY's strategic role in North Sea oil exPloitation, 
the Bank of England agreed to provide appropriate credit 
lines and in January 1975 bought a 21% stake in the company, 
increasing it to 51% in April 1975. 
Spectacular company crashes such as the Court Line collapse 
hit press headl~nes. The Court line group consisted of 100 
companies specialising in North sea oil. shipping. leisure, 
leasing and holidays and included such household names as 
Horizon and Clarksons holidays. Faced with a massive rise in 
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fuel costs, declining property values and demand for its 
products and services, it went into liquidation in August 
1974, leaving 40,000 stranded holidaymakers. The State 
quickly intervened and bought off the Sunderland and Devon 
shipyards to safeguard jobs and on 21st July 1975, appointed 
inspectors to investigate the sudden demise of this group 
(DoT, 1978b). The once invincible companies were collapsing 
and ceasing to be going concerns. This at a time when major 
industrial concerns such as Rolls Royce13 , Harland and 
Wolff, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, Ferranti and others were 
being rescued and the State was also struggling with the 
secondary banking crisis. In 1975, the government responded 
by establishing a National Enterprise Board (NEB), not only 
to nurse some companies, but also to promote regional 
policies, industrial reorganisation and invest in profitable 
projects. 
In 1975, control of inflation, rather than unemployment, 
became the main government policy (Dunnett, 1980), but 
inflation continued to rise and in 1975 it hit a record 
24.9%. The general loss of confidence in the British economy 
sent the Financial Times index plummeting to an all time low 
of 146 in early January 1975. The British industry's rate of 
profit sank to almost 3.9% before tax (Green and Sutcliffe, 
1987, page 302). The n~mber of compulsory liquidations rose 
sharply (table 6.5). The government policies, pressures from 
the City and international markets could not halt the decline 
of the British economy. In order to manage the 'economic 
crisis' and related legitimacy crisis for the State, the 
government had to seek financial assistance ($3.9 billion) 
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from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and accept its 
punitive conditions. It was forced to implement a £2.5 
billion deflationary package. This resulted in public 
expenditure cuts, reductions in demand and consumption and an 
increase in unemployment. The economic crisis affected 
Sterling, by now a petro-currency. At the beginning of 1976 
it was worth two dollars, but in October 1976 it plummeted to 
£1= $1.55. Interest rates rocketed from the March figure of 
9% to 15% in October. The rate of profit for British industry 
for 1974-77 barelY equalled 5.5% p.a. (Clark and Williams, 
1978). The number of liquidations now reached a record 10,727 
(table B.7) and the Department of Trade continued to 
authorise a high number of investigations into corporate 
collapses and irregularities (table B.9). These now also 
included the building societies. In 1976, the Wakefield 
Building Society collapsed, soon to be followed in 1978 by 
the Grays Building Society, where the Chairman had been 
carrying out a systematic fraud totalling some £7.1 million 
over the last 40 years (Boleat, 1982). The auditors had given 
an unqualified audit report for each of the years. The 
resulting report (Registrar of Friendly Societies, 1979) was 
highly critical of auditors for their failure to spot simple 
errors and frauds and accused them of performing the audit in 
an undemanding manner . 
6.2.4: Policies of the 'New Right' in the Late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
1979 witnessed the further rise of the 'New Right'14 and 
the election of the Conservative Party under the leadership 
of Margaret Thatcher. In the field of local government, 
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education, law and order, it was highly interventionist, but 
in the field of economics it claimed to be geared towards 
deregulation {or more correctly regulation by the markets}, 
privatisation, cutting subsidies, curbing restrictive trade 
union practices and generally rolling back the state. 
Inflation had been rising, spurred on by a new oil price 
increase. from $13 a barrel to $35 a barrel in 1981 {Green 
and Sutcliffe, 1987}. Upon coming to office, the government 
abandoned exchange controls. Britain's top 200 major 
. 
companies took advantage of this and established operations 
in low cost overseas countries {OEeD, 1983, pages 18-20}, 
thus increasing pressures on the British economy. The 
abandonment of exchange controls also made the banks more 
diversified and they ventured into many other countries, 
particularly the developing nations and in the process 
loosened their reliance on revenue from the British industry. 
In accordance with the monetarist philosophies, the Thatcher 
Government immediately reduced the support for nationalised 
industries from the 1979-80 figure of £2.3 billion to minus 
£400 million in 1983-84. Grants to local authorities were cut 
by 3.5% in real terms (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1984, 
page 410). In times of recession, the private sector 
frequently relied upon the public sector to purchase its 
goods and services. This trade was estimated to be some £10 
billion per annum (Open University, 1983), but this valuable 
support was now declining. By 1981. the level of British 
manufacturing output was barely equal to that of 1967. 
Between 1979 and March 1981, the output of British factories 
fell by 17% and unemployment doubled from 1.2 million to over 
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2 million. With the disappearance of subsidies, the 
industrial costs rose and pressures for efficiency and 
rationalisation increased. Real wages and consumer spending 
power continued to fall and markets shrank. 
The British manufacturing industry's rate of return declined 
to 2% in the last quarter of 1980 (Bank of England Quarterly, 
June 1981. page 161), soon hitting an all time low of 1.7% 
(Green and Sutcliffe. 1987, page 302), and barely started to 
pick up again in 1982 (Bank of ·England Quarterly Bulletin. 
June 1983). In the face of low profits and lack of 
investment, capital markets became stagnant and in 1982, the 
debt market virtually collapsed (Samuels and Wilkes. 1986, 
chapter 6). The economic situation was summed up by an OEeD 
report. which noted that the downturn 
"was considerably stronger in the UK than 
elsewhere in the OECD area. real GDP declined 
by about 5 per cent in the three years to 
mid-1982 compared with a rise of 2 per cent 
in the OECD area as a whole. The loss of 
output and employment in manufacturing has 
been particularly severe and there has been a 
considerable contraction of the industrial 
base" (OECD. February 1983. page 7). 
Between 1979 and 1983. some £25 billion of industrial 
investment had been written-off as scrap (Bryer and Brignall, 
1986). Despite its monetarist ideology. the Government still 
had to bailout some ailing businesses. For example, ICL, the 
British flagship in the computer industry with 18% of the 
home market, had been suffering trading problems since 1979 
and had to be saved with a State-aid of £210 million (The 
Times, 20th March 1981, pages 1 and 19). It also provided 
additional funds to DeLorean Motor Company. As indicated 
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previously, this company was originally set up in 1978 in 
Belfast with £54 million of State-aid. Its objective was to 
manufac1ture 30,000 cars and create 2,500 jobs in Belfast. By 
1980, the Thatcher Government injected a further £24 million 
into the ailing business (Fallon and Srodes, 1983, page 275). 
British industry continued to use ageing plant and 
equipment. By 1982, the industrial investment in Britain had 
fallen back to the level of 1965 (OECD, February 1983, pages 
44-45). These factors resulted in further loss of 
competitiveness, loss of markets, poor returns and a further 
disincentive to invest. In order to boost demand, direct 
taxation was reduced, but the British industry was unable to 
meet increased demand on the consumers' terms (OECD, February 
1983, page 37). The government used the interest rates to 
regulate the economy; raising them from a negative 5% to a 
high of positive 9% in real terms (see table 6.4). 
Despite the high interest rates, the British businesses 
increased their reliance on banks for short and medium term 
finance. The banks provided as much as 80% of the short and 
medium term finance for businesses. In times of distress, the 
banks, up to a point, were willing to nurse and give special 
care to companies. The Barclays Bank claimed to have 600 
corporate clients of various sizes on its 'sick list' 
(Coakley and Harris, 1983) . In 1982, the major banks set 
aside £962 mill-ion to cover bad debts and were showing 
increased willingness to take appropriate steps to recover 
their loans. For the period 1970-74, the major banks 
appointed receivers to about 150 companies on average. For 
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the first 10 months of 1980, the figure was 400, but as Aris 
(1985) notes, in 1982 Barclays alone placed some 618 
companies in liquidation and Midlands was not far behind with 
510. Liquidations of some well known companies hit the 
headlines. Stone-Platt, an engineering company with declining 
profits defaulted on its gearing covenants and having been 
kept alive by its bankers was finally put into receivership 
in March 1982. The entire British tOY industry led by Airfix, 
Dumbee Combex and Marx. Lesney and Berwick Timpo was put into 
liquidation by the banks. Laker.Airways was laid to rest by 
Midland and twenty other banks. This collapse became a 
spectacular media event, as the banks exercised the charges 
over the assets by confiscating the jets in mid-air and 
forcing them to return to their departing airports. The 
collapse caught everyone on the hop as Laker's profits had 
been rising from the 1976 figure of £900,000 to £8.1 million 
in 1980. In financial circles, overgearing, touching a 
debt-equity ratio of 5:1, was cited as the main reason for 
its collapse (Financial Times. 6th February 1982). Lee (1984) 
argued that ordinary accounting with its emphasis on profits 
concealed the cash flow and liquidity problems. In January 
1982. DeLorean Motor Company established with State-aid by 
John DeLorean was experiencing a cash shortage of $50 
million. For the financial year 1981. it experienced a loss 
of £23.1 million and crashed (Fallon and Srades, 1983, page 
380) . However, the accounts audited by Arthur 
e 
Andersifn 
carried an unqualified audit opinion. Faced with increased 
costs and competition, the number of bankrupticies increased 
dramatically (see table 6.5); moving from the 1979 figure of 
9,090 to 16,893 in 1982. 
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Following the mid 1970s secondary 
Banking Act was passed in 1979. Much of 
banking crisis, a new 
the regulation was 
now on an informal basis, itself a part of wider crisis 
management mechanisms introduced to manage the continuing 
crisis of capitalism. This was soon to be tested by the 
Johnson Matthey affair and raise shadows of the earlier 
crisis. The Johnson Matthey empire consisted of two broad 
parts (Clarke, 1986), one relating to interests in chemicals, 
technology, jewellery, precious ·metals, etc. and the second 
relating to merchant banking. Johnson Matthey, in its 
capacity as a precious metal dealer, had membership of the 
prestigious and highly lucrative London Gold Ring which at 
its twice-daily meetings fixed gold prices for the world 
market. The merchant banking arm, Johnson Matthey Bankers 
(JMB) ran into difficulties in October 1984. A major cause of 
the crash was attributed to loans to third world countries 
(the result of earlier government policies) who were having 
difficulty in repaying them. At the time of the crash, 
African loans stood at £450 million. JMB had also lent monies 
to two groups of companies operating from Pakistan. Each of 
these loans amounted to more than 10% of its capital and 
further advances continued. By June 1983, the loans stood at 
26% and 17% respectively of the capital. By December 1983, 
they represented 51% and 25% of its capital and by June 1984, 
the figures reached 76% and 39% respectively. Up to half of 
the JM8's portfolio consisted of doubtful debts and losses 
were estimated to be £250 million. Under the Banking Act 
1979, loans exceeding 10% of the issued capital were supposed 
to be notified to the supervisory authorities, but this had 
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not been done either by the company or its auditors. The 
published accounts gave no indication of financial problems. 
The bank was overgeared and under-capitalised, but auditors 
Arthur Young issued an unqualified audit report. Johnson 
Matthey lost its entire £102 million investment in JMB and 
had to make available another £50 million to rescue its 
ailing arm. Many clearing banks were unwilling to rescue a 
small, and what they regarded as an imprudent secondary bank. 
The Bank of England eventually had to rescue JMB. This 
provided a field day in Parliament for the critics who cited 
the Government's refusal to rescue other ailing industries 
and pointed to its willingness to use public money to bail 
out 'finance capital' (Clarke, 1984, page 46). The Bank of 
England Governor indicated that JMB was rescued because of 
the likely impact on the Gold Ring, fearing that the downfall 
of one member could cause the demise of the whole Ring and 
could have precipitated into a major economic crisis. Having 
nursed the bank. the government quietly sold its stake to the 
private sector in 1985. In late 1984, the Government set up a 
new Committee to revise the Banking Act 1979. This Committee 
made 34 recommendations which resulted in the 1987 Banking 
Act1e • 
6.2.5: Section Summary 
Discussions of going concern in an auditing context did not 
arise in an empty space. Such discussions arose against a 
background of economic, political and social developments. 
This section has drawn attention to a number of 
interconnected episodes from this period. Whilst some 
PAGE 365 
inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, unemployment and 
liquidations are essential elements of capitalism, the period 
reviewed here differed in that it went through structural. 
adjustments to enable the system to survive. High 
unemployment, high interest rates, high liquidations, the 
rise of the financial sector and decline of the manufacturing 
base, import penetration and Britain becoming a net importer 
of manufactured goods for the first time in its history are 
all indicators of structural adjustments. Whilst much of the 
crisis also had an international dimension, the British State 
tried to manage it by contradictory policies involving 
reflation/deflation of economy, devaluation/revalutaion of 
exchange rates, tax cuts/increases, public expenditure 
cuts/increases and by controlling money supply. To cope with 
the crisis, the State also enacted new legislation, for 
example, the Banking Acts and undertook a very high number of 
investigations into British business practices, usually after 
they had ceased to be going concerns. Such investigations 
focused upon competing meanings of an audit and highlighted 
deficiencies in auditing practices. 
It is against such a background that the accountancy 
profession started devoting more attention to discussions of 
'going concern' in an'auditing context. 
6.3: CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Chapter 3 noted that references to 'going concern' in an 
auditing context were relatively scarce prior to the 1970s 
and that after this period references to it became 
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widespread. Upon becoming aware of this development, the· 
present chapter began with a question: Why did the 
discussions of 'auditor and going concern' take off in this 
period? The remainder of this chapter then set out to provide 
an answer within the theoretical framework specified in 
chapter 2. 
The 'motor' of the discusssions is provided by the economic 
developments since the 1970s. The period from the 1970s to 
1985 is noted for the end of the 'long boom', 'stagnation' 
and a massive restructuring of the British economy resulting 
in mass unemployment, falling profit rates, increasing 
liquidations, inflation, interest rates, the decline of 
Britain's manufacturing base and the rise of the financial 
sector. The massive restructuring of the period described in 
the first part ensured that many 'going concerns' just ceased 
to be going anywhere. In this climate, the profession was 
insisting that 'going concern', its 'generally accepted' and 
a 'fundamental' principle of accounting implied that the 
enterprise will continue in operational existence for the 
forseeable future. An unqualified audit opinion continued to 
suggest that the going concern assumption was appropriate. 
The economic developments came at a time when the very 
meaning of audit was being contested. In view of the 
developments in the finance and capital markets, the courts 
widened the auditors' traditional area of liability. Whenever 
a business with an unqualified audit opinion ceased its 
operations, attention focused on the legitimacy of the audit 
opinion. Some 'significant others' argued that the auditor 
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should have paid attention to corporate solvency, liquidity 
and survival. It is noticeable that discussions of 'going 
concern' were almost always accompanied by mention of rising 
litigation, corporate collapses and the views of 'significant 
others' (e.g. the State). 
The views of 'significant others' were backed by lawsuits 
and critical DTI reports. Such antagonisms gave prominence to 
one of the meanings of the concept. In banking circles, at 
least since the early part of twentieth century, the concept 
has been taken to mean "an. undertaking which is in full 
working order" (a 1921 banking dictionary quoted in Strachan, 
1975). Despite arguing that the auditor is not responsible 
for reporting on corporate solvency and survival, the 
profession now made concessions. It sought to regain mastery 
of its environment by arguing that "it was reasonable to 
expect the auditor to consider the future viability of his 
client" (APC, 1986, page 32). 
The State played an important role. Firstly, it acted in the 
long term interests of capital by urging auditors (through 
DTI reports) to devote a particular kind of attention to 
detecting going concern problems. This would have enhanced 
confidence in the published financial information and also 
enabled the 'accountancy capital' to transform and reproduce 
itself. The recommended auditing procedures had a 
contemporary flavour about them. For example, in an 
environment of a liquidity crisis, the auditor was expected 
to pay attention to liquidity and cash shortage. Following 
the Court Line and Laker Airways collapse, spotting 
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'overgearing' became an accepted 
Financing arrangements, bank letters 
the focus of attention following 
and 
the 
auditing procedure. 
overdrafts became 
Scotia Investments 
collapse. The above implications were being popularised by 
institutions such as the Accountants' International Study 
Group, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland and 
others. Such audit procedures eventually found their way into 
going concern auditing guideline (APC, 1985a). Secondly, in 
its capacity as a 'fraction of capital', the State sued 
accountancy firms for failure to perform appropriate 
procedures to highlight doubts about the ability of some 
concerns to survive. Its actions highlighted the inadequacies 
of auditing procedures and thus created opportunities for the 
firms to be socially responsive and efficient. The DTI 
reports were also cited by plaintiffs as evidence in court 
action against auditors. 
Historically, the going concern concept has been linked with 
discussions of valuation bases. Some writers have used the 
concept to justify a need for cash flow accounting, current 
cost accounting, constant purchasing power accounting, exit 
values and others, but in the auditing context such debates 
were not very prominent. Neither the DTI reports, nor the 
litigants, made any direct reference to such valuation bases 
in their arguments. The auditing discussions of the concept 
arose at a time when there was considerable debate about 
price level accounting (Whittington, 1983) and State concern 
about the variety of price level accounting (Sandilands, 
1975), but in this context there was no direct linkage 
between the accounting and auditing meanings of the concept. 
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It is as though the meanings of the concept were following a 
somewhat separate path in accounting and auditing. In an 
auditing context, it seemed to be more influenced by the 
contemporary developments relating to auditor liability, 
responsibility and litigation. 
The chapter noted that in the aftermath of a corporate 
collapse, many large and powerful firms faced lawsuits. These 
~ included firms such as Arthur Anders~n, Arthur Young, Coopers 
& Lybrand, Touche Ross, Ernst & Whinney, Deloittes, Peat 
Marwick, Robson Rhodes and others. The lawsuits were damaging 
to the economic interests of" accountancy firms. Payment of 
damages and resulting high insurance costs threatened their 
profit generating ability. Such firms had incentives to seek 
protection of their position by shaping the further 
institutional developments and meanings of the concept. 
Perhaps, they might be keen to find ways of protecting 
themselves from lawsuits through the issue of auditing 
guidelines. This could be done if they were in a position to 
control the institution (Auditing Practices Committee) 
responsible for formulating the auditing guidelines. Their 
interests could be furthered if they could control the agenda 
and the related issues. Therefore, the next chapter will 
examine the development of the going concern guideline, the 
nature of the Auditing Practices Committee and the role 
played by major firms in formulating the guideline. 
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Chapter 6 Footnotes 
1) The meaning of what is a structural change, is widely 
debated by social scientists and is open to theoretical 
interpretation. A minimal definition would relate to 
fundamental changes in the wayan economy has hitherto been 
organised. Thus major upheavals and dislocations occur. 
2) Auditing issues do not come neatly packaged and 'going 
concern' is no exception. It is a part of the wider debates 
relating to the expectations gap, auditor responsibility, 
liability, duties and social obligations. 
3) The views are attributed to an ICAEW Deputy President by 
Strachan (1975, page 68). 
4) In November 1986, it was reported that an out-of-court 
settlement of $24 million has been reached between the 
company and its auditors with Arthur Young paying $14.2 
million), Peat Marwick paying $4.8 million) and de Paula 
Turner Lake paying $5 million (Accountancy Age, 13th November 
1986, page 1). 
5) The case subsequently went to the House of Lords, where in 
1990 it was decided that an auditor did not owe a 'duty of 
care' to any shareholder in his capacity as an 'individual 
shareholder'. 
6) In December 1981, Accountancy (page 20) published APe's 
work-in-progress, but this did not include any reference to 
'going concern'. 
7) Increase in bankruptcies provided, investigation work from 
the banks (The Accountant, 6th May 1982, page 620) and income 
for the insolvency divisions of accountancy firms, yet it 
also posed a threat to the auditing arm of accountancy firms. 
8) Just to put it into perspective, the average number of 
annual investigations authorised in 1950s and 1960s was one 
or two per annum and did not exceed 10 until 1967 
(Accountancy, October 1982, page 15). However, as table 6.9 
shows, the figures have rocketed since the 1970s. 
9) London and County Securities was backed by the National 
Westminster Bank, Eagle Star Insurance Company and Keyser 
Ullman. 
10) The DTI report on the London and County affair was highly 
significant for the profession. Some aspects are discussed in 
chapter 7. 
11) Cedar Holdings was backed by Phoenix Assurance, Unilever, 
pensions funds of the National Coal Board and the Electricity 
Industry. 
12) The secondary banking crisis led to a revamping of the 
Banking regulation and the enactment of the Banking Act 1979. 
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13) For details of the Rolls Royce story, see Deeson (1972). 
14) A good discussion of the policies preferred by the 'New 
Right' will be found in Bosanquet (1983) and Hall and Jacques 
(1983). 
15) The Act swept aside the auditor's concern with the 
confidentiality of information and now explicitly requires 
them to report matters relating to a bank's liquidity. 
incompetence and fraud to supervisory authorities. without 
the knowledge of their clients. However. equivalent 
requirements are not enshrined in the Companies Acts and are 
thus not applicable to ordinary limited companies. 
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TABLE 6,1 
UK BALANCE OF TRADE (AS % of GDP) 
Period 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-82 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
a) 
Manufacturers 
Products 
+4,9 
+3.5 
+3,,2 
+1. 6 
-O,5 
-1. 1 
-O,7 
-1. 3 
a) Sales of manufactured items minus imports, 
b) 
Primary 
Products 
-5,7 
-6.2 
-4.6 
-0.4 
+O,3 
-O,3 
+0,1 
-0.9 
b) Net imports of primary products (e.g. food, industrial raw 
materials) , 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1988 edition and 
earlier, 
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TABLE 6,2 
GENERAL INDEX OF PRICES (percentage increase per year) 
Annual Rate 
1967 2.5% 
1968 4.7% 
1969 5.4% 
1970 6.4% 
1971 9.4% 
1972 7.1% 
1973 9.2% 
1974 16.1% 
1975 24.9% 
1976 16.5% 
1977 15.8% 
1978 10,8% 
1979 13.4% 
1980 18.0% 
1981 11.9% 
1982 8.6% 
1983 4.6% 
1984 5.0% 
1985 6.1% 
1986 3.4% 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics (1988 Edition). 
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TABLE 6.3 
NOMINAL INTEREST RATES IN THE UK 
April 1970 
April 1971 
September 1971 
June 1972 
October 1972 
December 1972 
January 1973 
March 1973 
April 1973 
May 1973 
May 1973 
June 1973 
July 1973 
October 1973 
November 1973 
January 1974 
Februar~' 1974 
February 1974 
April 1974 
April 1974 
May 1974 
September 1974 
January 1975 
January 1975 
February 1975 
February 1975 
March 1975 
March 1975 
April 1975 
May 1975 
July 1975 
October 1975 
November 1975 
November 1975 
December 1975 
January 1976 
January 1976 
January 1976 
January 1976 
February 1976 
February 1976 
March 1976 
April 1976 
May 1976 
September 1976 
October 1976 
November 1976 
December 1976 
December 1976 
January 1977 
January 1977 
January 1977 
February 1977 
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7% 
6% 
5% 
6% 
7.50% 
9% 
8.75% 
8.50% 
8.25% 
8% 
7.75% 
7.5% 
11.5% 
11. 25% 
13% 
12.75% 
12.75% 
12.5% 
12.25% 
12% 
11. 75% 
11. 50% 
11. 25% 
11% 
10.75% 
10.50% 
10.25% 
10% 
9.75% 
10% 
11% 
12% 
11.75% 
11. 50% 
11. 25% 
11% 
10.75% 
10.50% 
10% 
9.50% 
9.25% 
9% 
10.50% 
11. 50% 
13% 
15% 
14.75% 
14.50% 
14.25% 
14% 
13.25% 
12.25% 
12% 
March 1977 11% 
March 1977 10.50% 
March 1977 9.50% 
April 1977 9.25% 
April 1977 9% 
April 1977 8.75% 
April 1977 8.25% 
May 1977 8% 
August 1977 7.50% 
August 1977 7% 
September 1977 6% 
October 1977 5.50% 
October 1977 5% 
November 1977 7% 
January 1978 6.50% 
April 1978 7.50% 
May 1978 8.75% 
May 1978 9% 
June 1978 10% 
November 1978 12.50% 
February 1979 14% 
March 1979 13% 
April 1979 12% 
June 1979 14% 
November 1979 17% 
July 1980 16% 
November 1980 14% 
March 1981 12% 
August 1981 13.50% 
September 1981 14.50% 
November 1981 16% 
January 1982 15.5% 
April 1982 14.5% 
March 1982 15% 
June 1982 14% 
July 1982 13.5% 
September 1982 12% 
October 1982 11. 50% 
November 1982 10.50% 
December 1982 10% 
February 1983 11% 
March 1983 11. 50% 
May 1983 11% 
June 1983 10.50% 
August 1983 10% 
November 1983 9% 
June 1984 9.50% 
August 1984 10.5% 
October 1984 11% 
November 1984 11. 25% 
January 1985 10% 
March 1985 13% 
April 1985 14% 
November 1985 12% 
Sources: 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletins (Various issues). 
Barclays Bank Reviews {Va:ious issues}, 
Midland Bank Reviews (Varlous issues). 
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Ta.ble 6.4 
REAL INTEREST RATES IN THE UK 
1967 - 5.50% 
1968 - 2.3% 
1969 + 2.6% 
1970 - 0.6% 
1971 - 4.4% 
1972 + 1.9% 
1973 - 3.8% 
1974 - 4.60% 
1975 -13.65% 
1976 - 1. 50% 
1977 - 8.80% 
1978 + 1. 70% 
1979 + 3.60% 
1980 - 4.00% 
1981 + 4.10% 
1982 + 1. 40% 
1983 + 4.40% 
1984 + 6.25% 
1985 + 7.9% 
1986 + 8.60% 
Source: 
Derived from the nominal interest rates and the general index 
of prices tables. 
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I able 6,5 
Rates of retum before interest and tax at current replacement cost 
1nr:ius!M18nd COl •••• 0.1 con ..... 8nd mr&Jf8CtUring ca ...... baed on rwIJDrWII 
8CICOUr'ItS dMa PwC81t 
Industnel .-1d 
AI~end CLli'W, .. rc::u1 cam ..... Menufctunng 
CDII._CIIIA cell ..... adudmg North Sea 1 CCI'IDII_ 
V .. Grou &al _fbI Grau C., Net Cbl Groa C.I Net Ibl 
1960 11.8 13.7 11.8 
1981 10.8 11.7 10.8 
1982 9.9 10.7 9.9 
1983 10.4 11.5 10.4 
1984 10.9 12.2 10.9 
1985 10.5 11.5 10.5 
1988 9.8 10.1 9.8 
1987 9.8 10.2 9.7 
196B 9.7 10.3 9.B 
1989 9.7 10.1 9.8 
1970 8.9 8.9 B.9 
1971 1.1 1.1 9.1 
1972 9.3 9.6 9.3 
1973 8.8 B.9 8.B 
1974 6.2 5.1 e.3 
1975 5.5 3.1 5.8 
1978 5.9 4.3 5.7 
1977 8.0 7.4 7.4 
1978 8.4 7.8 7.7 
1979 8.0 7.4 e.8 
1980 7.4 e.3 5.4 
1981 7.3 e.l 4.8 
1982 8.3 7.7 5.8 
1983 9.3 9.3 6.2 
1984 10.1 10.7 8.8 
19B5 10.7 11.5 7.8 
1988 9.7 10.0 B.8 
1987 10.5 11.3 9.8 
Basis 'of estimates 
Cal Gtaa ........ rilig ~ on ux ...... bOI .... 
~ tr8ding profits ... aadt ~ pU 
f'WIt._tMd. 
(ta, Net ....... WhO ..... on UK ...... tiuI .... 
~ ........ a.'13 ~ ... c:.pat ~
• c:urNftt ........ .-11 ca& 
13,7 12.2 14.8 
11.7 10.8 12.3 
10.7 9.8 11.1 
11.5 10.2 11.7 
12.2 10.5 12.1 
11.5 10.0 11 .2 
10.2 9.0 9.7 
10.3 9.1 9.8 
10.4 8.9 9.5 
10.2 9,1 9.B 
B.9 B.O 8.1 
9.2 7.3 8.9 
9.6 8.0 8.1 
8.9 7.8 8.0 
5.3 5.3 4.3 
4.2 4.4 2.8 
4.3 4.7 3.2 
8.7 84 5.7 
7.1 8.5 8.0 
5.8 5.4 4.3 
3.8 4.7 3.0 
2.8 4.2 2.3 
4.0 5.2 4.0 
4.9 5.5 4.4 
5.8 5.9 5.1 
7.2 e.8 8.4 
B.9 7.3 7.5 
10.2 8.3 9.2 
C8puI .'!pIuyed 
, 
1.1 Gtou c:apitI6 IIDdt of fixed .-a 
(ududing lendl at a.r.n r ........ l COlt. 
_ booK v'" of aacb. in UK. 
Ib) Net ~ sax::k of fixed ~ Cacbing 
~1.-1d QJrNnt ~'.'l COlt. '*" bOok 
value of aoc:b. in UK. 
Note: The above figures are not strictly speaking comparable 
as numrous adjustments have been made by recent governments. 
There are also numerous theoretical and conceptual 
difficulties in computing rates of ret~rn. Some of these are 
summarised in Armstrong, Glynn and Harr~son (1984). 
Source: British Business, September 1988, page 32, 
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Table 6.6 
* Liquidity Ratios of British Gomoanies 
All Manufac- Non 
Survey turing Manufac 
~ ~ turing Cos. 
~ 
1st Qtr 64 41 146 
2nd Qtr 56 36 128 
3rd Qtr 53 36 112 
4th Qtr 52 36 112 
llll 
1st Qtr 50 34 106 
2nd Qtr 58 42 109 
3rd Qtr 67 51 108 
4th Qtr 80 66 110 
.1flZ 
1st Qtr 90 79 111 
2nd Qtr 103 96 114 
3rd Qtr 105 102 111 
4th Qtr 111 108 115 
llll 
1st Qtr 113 122 101 
2nd Qtr 110 119 97 
3rd Qtr 110 114 106 
4th Qtr 98 94 104 
.li.ll 
1st Qtr 83 74 99 
2nd Qtr 71 49 107 
3rd Qtr 59 39 95 
4th Qtr 52 34 86 
llll 
1st Qtr 58 38 92 
2nd Qtr 66 51 91 
3rd Qtr 75 63 93 
4th Qtr 84 75 95 
llli 
1st Qtr 91 87 97 
2nd Qtr 89 92 85 
3rd Qtr 96 104 86 
4th Qtr 89 95 80 
.lll1 
1st Qtr 101 105 95 
2nd Qtr 98 106 86 
3rd Qtr 104 112 90 
4th Qtr 119 119 118 
li1.a 139 1st Qtr 136 144 
2nd Qtr 144 134 163 
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3rd 2tr 133 118 165 4th tr 127 121 139 
.llla 
1st Qtr 110 102 125 
2nd Qtr 110 110 110 
3rd Qtr 100 97 104 
4th Qtr 79 71 93 
~ 
1st Qtr 74 71 80 
2nd Qtr 73 63 96 
3rd Qtr 72 65 87 
4th Qtr 82 69 108 
. 
.l.ae.1 
1st Qtr 78 72 91 
2nd Qtr 88 80 103 
3rd Qtr 98 94 106 
4th Qtr 91 87 99 
lll.B.Z 
1st Qtr 88 8g 87 
2nd Qtr 83 90 70 
3rd Qtr 71 71 69 
4th Qtr 82 86 76 
~ 
1st Qtr 98 105 87 
2nd Qtr 106 107 103 
3rd Qtr 124 125 122 
4th Qtr 119 118 122 
~ 
1st Qtr 115 105 126 
2nd Qtr 107 94 122 
3rd Qtr 109 91 132 
4th Qtr 102 79 132 
ll.M. 
1st Qtr 91 67 125 
2nd Qtr 96 69 134 
3rd Qtr 97 65 142 
4th Qtr 98 72 133 
* Notes: 
1) Liquidity ratios = total current assets as percentage of 
total current liabilities. 
2) Figures are not strictly comparable as numerous 
adjustments have been made by government departments. 
3) This table should only be regarded as giving a broad 
indication of the liquidity problems faced by British 
'businesses. 
Soyrces: British Business, 10th September 1982, page 35; 30th 
November 1984, page 569; 28th November 1986, page 35. 
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1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Table 6.7 
Yearly Total of Liquidations in the UK 
Compulsory 
liquidations 
1,337 
1,206 
1,189 
1,108 
1,438 
2,343 
2,602 
2,493 
2,351 
2,127 
3,078 
2,945 
3,932 
5,085 
5,551 
6,103 
5,559 
Voluntary 
liquidations 
Creditors Members 
2,568 
2,481 
2,056 
1,580 
2,450 
3,.277 
3,615 
3,641 
3,062 
2,682 
4,265 
6,188 
8,759 
8,953 
8,776 
9,443 
9,521 
4,939 
4,802 
5,022 
4,598 
4,039 
4,229 
4,510 
3,914 
3,881 
4,281 
4,251 
3,925 
4,202 
4,103 
4,066 
4,248 
4,833 
Total 
8,844 
8,489 
8,267 
7,286 
7,927 
9,849 
10,727 
10,048 
9,294 
9,090 
11,594 
13,058 
16,893 
18,141 
18,393 
19,794 
19,913 
Sources Department of Trade and Industry Annual Abstract of 
Statistics, 1988 editions and earlier. 
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1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Table 6.8 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UK 
Nymbers (000's) 
503 
542 
518 
555 
724 
804 
575 
542 
866 
1,332 
1,359 
1,343 
1,235 
1,513 
2,395 
2,770 
2,984 
3,030 
3,179 
3,229 
Soyrce: Central Statistical Office, 'Annual Abstract of 
Statistics', 1989·Edition and earlier. 
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TA:BLE fi,a 
Department of Trade Inspectors' Reports Reports 
IDY~~:tig:tiQD:;;Z R~PQl:t:;;z 
Authorised Published 
1970 76 Nil 
1971 117 2 
1972 115 2 
1973 93 2 
1974 158 2 
1975 177 6 
1976 152 8 
1977 115 3 
1978 101 6 
1979 79 7 
1980 81 7 
1981 103 9 
1982 91 2 
1983 112 1 
1984 101 1 
1985 116 1 
Soul:ces: Annual Reports published by the Department of Trade 
and Industry. 
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Table 6. 10 . 
Manufacturing Industry - Inyestment per Worker 1963-1972 
..... 
United United \\'rst 
Kingdom States Japan France Germany haly Netherlands Luxembourg BeI~um Denmark Eire 
....:. ---- -_ .. -
:963 122 330 183 283 214 184 229 222 217 159 
,964 138 385 202 304 230 156 283 229 2.53 162 
,965 153 +44 163 ·318 . 256 131 298 26t 28+ 198 
,966 166 503 191 346 257 150 347 - 307 273 20+ 
967 167 534 288 372 247 173 376 321 297 211 
'968 181 599 402 ++0 278 221 445 339 271 26+ 
'969 209 652 502 497 372 251 474 386 347 320 ~~70 239 687 555 569 490 308 623 4IH 358 
l !)71 272 713 513 623 521 339 675 508 
~72 273 759 599 537 364 703 
.......... 
Source: Trade and· Industry, 21st November 1974. 
CHAPTER 7 
UNDERSTANDING THE AUDITING GUIDELINE, 
'THE AUDITOR'S CONSIDERATIONS IN RESPECT OF GOING CONCERN' 
7,0: Introduction 
This chapter continues to provide further sociopolitical 
explanations of the meanings attached to the 'going concern' 
concept in an auditing context. The 1970s began with an 
increased interest in the goi,ng concern in an auditing 
context. Chapter 6 explained the economic, social and 
political developments which provided a cradle for the 
discussions of the concept in an auditing context. The 
heightened institutional interest eventuallY led to the 
issuance of an auditing guideline 'The auditor's 
considerations in respect of going concern' by the Auditing 
Practices Committee (APC) in August 1985. The guideline (APC, 
1985a) was summarised in Chapter 3 (see page 150). 
This chapter will now explain the manner in which the 
profession came to formulate the auditing guideline. This 
requires an awareness of the institutions which formulated 
the guideline, the parties which participated and the 
'interests' which shaped the meanings. This chapter will 
focus on such aspects. In order to do so, this chapter is 
divided into five main parts. An overview is provided by 
figure 7.1. The first section (7.1) will examine some aspects 
of the formation and development of the APe which prepared 
the guideline. 
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Figure 7,1 
An Oyerview ot the Chapter 
7.1 Context of the Auditing Practices Committee 
7.2 
Contigu-
ration 
ot Working 
Party 1---'" 
Membership 
and the 
Respondents 
7.3 
Contents 
gt the 
Auditing 
Guideline 
7.3.1 
Detinin« 
Forseeable 
Future 
7.3.2 
Symptoms 
ot Goin« 
Concern 
7.3.3 
Examinin« 
Company 
Plans 
Buditets 
and 
Forecasts 
7.3.4 
Audit 
Reports 
7.4 
UnderlYing 
Agenda 
Proteoting 
Eoonomio 
Interests 
(Minimal 
Increase in 
..... -_ Audit Work) 
Proteotion 
from Law 
Suits (Mini-
mum clarifi-
oation of 
auditor 
Responsi-
bilities 
7.& 
Passive 1---'" Appro 
to Goi 
Concern 
Section 7.2 to' 7.& foouses on the development ot the 
meanings whioh the APC assigned to the oonoept. The main 
thrust to identify the 'interests' being promoted throu«h the 
meanings of the ooncept. Section 7.2 looks at the' APC' s 
consultative process (7.2.1) and the identity of the parties 
who responded (7.2.2) to the going oonoern exposure draft. 
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After a section summary (7.2.3), the neA~ section (7.3) 
examines the details of the guideline. Much of the guideline 
is concerned with discussions of the forseeable future 
(7.3.1), symptoms of going concern problems (7.3.2), advising 
auditors to examine company plans, budgets and forecasts 
(7.3.3) and the wording of audit reports (7.3.4). This 
. 
section aims to ascertain the 'interests' which have shaped 
the details of the guideline. Section 7.3.5 summarises the 
section. Section 7.3 reveals that the profession had an 
underlying agenda in developing the guideline. Section 7.4 
examines this. It is found that in the main, the profession 
was concerned with protecting the economic interests of the 
auditing firms and using the meanings incorporated in the 
going concern guideline to protect the auditing firms from 
law-suits. The final section (7.5) shows that in order to 
protect the interests of the auditing firms, the profession 
deliberately recommended a 'passive' approach to evaluating 
going concern issues as this legitimises minimal audit 
effort. Section 7.6 concludes the chapter with a discussion 
and a summary. 
1.1: THE CONTEXT OF THE AUDITING PRACTICES COMMITTEE 
The meanings of the going concern concept cannot be 
understood without knowledge of the institutions which shape 
such meanings. The institutions represent the collective 
interests of some. groups and are a powerful influence in 
defining what is legitimate or acceptable. In keeping with 
such views, this section examines the formation ~d 
development of the Auditing Practices Committee (APC), ~ 
PAGE 387 
institution r.esponsible for formulating the going concern. 
auditing guideline in 1985 1 • This section, as figure 7.2 
shows, is divided into five parts. 
7.1.1 
Power 
and 
Politics 
in the 
Accountanc 
Profession 
7.1.2 
Pressures 
from the 
State 
7.1.3 
Press 
Criticisms 
7.1.4 
Formation 
I---~" of the 
APC 
7.1. 5 
Development 
I-----'.of the 
APC 
Figure 7.2 
Understandipg the Coptext of the APC 
The 'interests' shaping the guideline can be understood by 
focusing upon power and politics within the accountancy 
profession, pressures from the State and press criticisms of 
the auditing practices. Such developments paved the way for 
the formation and the development of the APC. It will be 
argued that since its formation, the APC has been dominated 
by major firms who have been the subject of lawsuits and 
public criticisms and further that a major aim of the APC has 
been to promote the economic interests of major firms. 
PAGE 388 
7,1,1: Politics and Power in the AccountanCY Profession 
The formation of the Auditing Practices Committee (APC) is 
shaped by the power and politics within the accountancy 
profession in which auditing and auditors have always been 
privileged and claim to be the inheritors and protectors of 
professionalism, 
Auditing firms are a major source of training and 
ideological grounding for a .vast majority of the UK 
accountants, Most UK accountants not only study auditing, but 
also at some stage of their career have practiced auditing. 
The language of the UK accountancy profession suggests that 
the auditing wing is not only privileged but it also 
exercises significant influence on the whole of the 
accountancy profession. The phrase 'entering the profession' 
is almost exclusivelY used when someone joins an accountancy 
firm and very rarely used when an accountant joins an 
industrial or a commercial concern. Historically, accountants 
training outside the accountancy firms have been considered 
to 'be almost second class (Dickinson, 1902). Bromwich (1985, 
page 22) notes that the non-practising accountants were not 
allowed to serve on the ICAEW Council until 1942. Stamp and 
Moonitz (1979, page 64) note that to become a Fellow of the 
ICAEW, the exPerience requirements were either 5 years with 
the accountancy firms 
practice. In recent 
or 10 
years, 
years outside the 
the auditing wing 
public 
of the 
profession has continued to have a considerably 
disproportionate representation on the Councils of the major 
professional bodies. For example, only round 22% of the 
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membership of the Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants is in public practice, yet according to its Royal 
Charter, 50% of the Council membership must come from the 
auditing wing. Much of the current professional regulatory 
framework also appears to be designed with the practising 
wing in mind~. All in all, the auditing wing is highly 
privileged and powerful and this forms a significant backdrop 
to an understanding of the emergence of the APC. 
Auditing practices have been examined by the State (e.g. 
through the Department of Trad~ reports) and the accountancy 
profession (for example, through the 'U' series of 
Statements, issued between 1961 and 1977). However, such 
developments did not result in the creation of a professional 
regulatory body specific to auditing. A turning point was the 
formation of the Accounting Standards Steering Committee 
(ASSe) in 19693 • The State sponsored mergers and the 
resulting concentration of capital within the forces of 
capitalism provided the particular site for a public 
examination of accounting and the auditors I role in providing 
what might be called, 'official explanations' and 
legitimation of corporate practices. For example, in one of 
the mergers involving GEC and AEI, the financial information 
produced by AEI had been approved by a leading accountancy 
firm, Deloittes Plender and Griffiths. The subsequent 
takeover of AEI by GEC cast doubts on the validity of such 
information and made the subjective and discretionary nature 
of accounting publicly visible. This was soon to be followed 
by the Pergamon affair, involving the unsuccessful merger 
between Pergamon and Leasco. In this case Price Waterhouse 
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and Chalmers Impey were pitched against each other and 
attested to vastly different figures from the same data. Such 
episodes occurred at the time when the ICAEW, had a full 
programme of issuing 'Recommendations on Accounting 
Principles' and 'Statements on Auditing'. In this context, 
The Economist (9th August 1969, page 58) accused auditors of 
passively accepting management's accounts and explanations. 
On 30th August, 1969, it accused auditors of not believing 
"in any written rules" (page 43). It added that 
"playing the game is all very well and most 
accountants do. But the system which has been 
exposed so lamentably this week in the City's 
handling of the mess-up simply is not good 
enough" (page 44). 
The Observer (31st August 1969) noted, 
"A simple 
have two 
different 
accounts; 
soul might reckon that yoU can not 
independent experts coming up with 
profit figures from the same set of 
he would be wrong". 
The Guardian (22nd October 1969, page 15), whilst referring 
to the Pergamon Press affair criticised the auditor's role in 
being passive and concluded, 
........ unless steps are taken to restore 
faith in our auditing firms by ensuring that 
they really do act as shareholders' 
watchdogs, a major row will break which will 
do the accounting profession lasting damage" 
(page 15). 
Such episodes made not only the accounting problems visible, 
but also drew attention to the nature of auditing practices. 
In his celebrated article (The Times, 11th September 1969, 
page 25), Professor Stamp, an influential academic was 
critical of the auditing practices. In his reply (The Times, 
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22nd September 1969, page 25), Hr. (later Sir) Ronald Leach, 
the 1969-70 ICAEW President and a Peat Harwick partner. 
rejected Stamp's charges against auditors and instead 
referred to the judgemental nature of accounting only. 
Although the criticisms related to accounting and auditing 
practices, the crisis was mediated by the creation of the 
ASSC to regulate accounting practices. initially under the 
control of the practising wing but subsequently allowing 
other accountants to join in. The ICAEW's 'Statement of 
Intent' (ICAEW. 1969) spoke of ~he need to narrow accounting 
choices and improving acounting standards. Despite being 
central to the credibility of published annual accounts, the 
auditing aspects did not get any mention in this document. 
The auditing aspects were clearly made to appear secondary. 
The auditing wing went on to shape the accounting standards 
by giving prominence to its 'sectional interests'. So great 
has been the power of the practising wing that most of the 
accounting standards have continued to pronounce 
" ...... what is convenient for auditors to 
audit rather than what is most useful for 
those for whom the information is intended" 
(Briston, 1981, page 59). 
Such developments whilst indicating domination and control 
of the profession, are also indicative of the political 
skills of the leaders of the profession in linking the 
profession's crisis of legitimacy not with auditing, but with 
accounting. Overall, the role of auditing in the crisis was 
obfuscated and ·an equivalent Committee to regulate auditing 
was not created. 
The pre-occupation with accounting standards suggested that 
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the legitimation problems were caused by the preparers of 
financial statements rather than the flexibilities permitted 
by auditors. By the mid 19708, the accounting standards 
programme was proceeding under the control of the auditing 
wing, but the auditing deficiencies continued to be 
highlighted by the critical DoT reports and press reports. 
Such developments constrained the profession's ability to 
blame accounting laxities alone for a crisis of confidence in 
external financial reportins. The profession had recently 
(i.e. early 1970s) played its accountins card and in the next 
publicly visible crisis of financial reporting, 'the divide 
and rule' strategy would be blunted. In the mid 1970s crisis, 
a different card, relating to auditing, needed to be played. 
This crisis was to be mediated by the creation of the APC 
under the total control of the auditing wing, even though 
almost all sections of a society are affected to some degree 
by auditing policies. The pressures to play this card were 
taking shape in the context of massive social, economic and 
political changes and the resulting scrutiny, especially by 
the State, of the unsatisfactory nature of auditing 
practices. 
7. 1. 2 : Pressures from the State 
Criticisms of auditing practices continued to appear, 
especially as the auditors are priVVY to 'inside information' 
and enjoy a statutory monopoly of the external audit 
function. In return, the auditors are expected to give an 
honest opinion on the accounts. However, there was a strong 
feeling that 
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"the auditors knew far more than 
reports actually disclosed" (Woolf 
page 511). 
their 
1986a, 
These suspicions were frequently fuelled by the DoT/DTI 
reports which in the wake of scandals and corporate collapses 
scrutinised auditing practices and found them to be deficient 
(also see chapter 6). Such criticisms created conditions for 
the formation of the Auditing Practices Committee. 
After the publication of the critical report relating to the 
collapse of the Pinnock Finance Group (DoT, 1971b), the 
Secretary of State came under pressure and stated that he 
"must rely upon auditors to satisfy 
themselves as to the value of assets shown in 
company balance sheets ....... These events 
raise important questions. The 
Government are not satisfied on either of 
these matters, and I intend to discuss them 
with the professional bodies concerned in the 
near future, with a view to possible action". 
(Hansard, 28th May 1971, col. 773-787). 
Further pressures continued to come in the aftermath of 
increasing corporate collapses. The standards of auditing 
continued to be criticised in the reports relating to E.J. 
Austin (DoT, 1972) Pergamon Press (DoT, 1973), Roadships 
(DoT, 1976b), Lonrho (DoT, 1976c) and Vehicle and General 
(DoT, 1976e) amongst others. A major concern with the 
auditing practices arose in the aftermath of the secondary 
banking crisis and the related collapse in the property 
market (see chapter 6 for more details). The collapse of the 
London and County Securities is regarded as a 'crisis point' 
for the profession (Davison, 1976; Hopkins, 1980). The 
episode also attracted particular public attention, as the 
then leader of the Liberal Party, Jeremy Thorpe was a 
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non-executive director of this bank. Significantly, London 
and Counties (L&C) had recently been audited by Harmood 
Banner4 • in which David Richards (who was to become the first 
APC Chairman) was a partner. 
The Department of Trade report (DoT 1976a) noted that in 
order to conceal its worsening trading position and 
prospects, the bank since 1972 had been supporting its share 
price by entering into illegal transactions involving 
directors and their families. The inspectors concluded that 
the loans were not in the. ordinary course of trade and 
contravened the Companies Act 1948. In addition. the bank 
entered into 'bed and breakfast' transactions, sometimes 
recording false transactions. For example, just before the 
year-end. one of the bank's subsidiaries took in a loan of 
£14 million from the money market and repaid it within the 
first week of the new financial year, enabling the bank to 
improve its ratios. The parent company also took another £7 
million overnight from the money markets and gave it to its 
subsidiary. Such transactions were entered into with the 
support of other institutions. Winstrust (another secondary 
bank) audited by Spicer & Pegler placed £4 million with L&C 
onlY four days before 
deposited £2.5 million 
finance the purchase 
its year-end and L&C straight away 
back with Wintrust who helped to 
of L&C's shares. Such arrangements 
helped to improve the company's liquidity ratio of cash to 
deposits from 13% to 43%. At the date of its collapse, L&C 
boasted deposits of £80 million or so, but £10-12 million was 
due to fictitious transactions. The inspectors concluded that 
"the auditors should not have signed the 
PAGE 395 
unqualified audit report on the accounts 
....... at 31st March 1972. The main extent of 
inflation of the cash balances was known to 
the audit partner ........ and it was so 
serious as to make the accounts misleading to 
a material extent ..... Some at least of the 
ways in which this was done should have been 
apparent had the audit work been more 
penetrating and effective. The accounts for 
1973 were unsatisfactory and misleading." 
(page 234). 
Questions about the role of auditors were also raised in the 
HOllse of Commons. On 9th February 1976, responding to an 
observation that one of the, ....... . worst features of the 
affair ...... is the fact that the auditors passed the 
accounts of this organisation",' the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry said that he would 
"certainly consider much more carefully the 
whole role of auditors in this matter" 
(Hansard, Vol. 904/905, Issue no 1024, pages 
10-11) . 
Throughout the L&C and other previous investigations, the 
number of meetings between DTI senior civil servants and the 
leaders of the profession increased. The Ministers also 
regularly met senior figures from the profession to express 
concerns about audit failures. The junior Ministers at the 
DTI were spending as much as 25%-30% of their time dealing 
with the fallout from the criticisms of accounting and 
auditing practices and hearing concerns aired by some company 
directors and institutional investors. Such criticisms posed 
a serious threat to the legitimacy of corporate disclosures 
and with it the workings of the already seriously weakened 
finance and capital markets. This at a time when the 
government was alreadY struggling to introduce some order 'to 
the financial sector (see chapter 6). 
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The DoT seriously considered the creation of an independent 
body to promulgate auditing standards and to take action 
against accountancy firms criticised in the inspectors' 
reports. However, in view of the deep economic crisis, the 
overstretched State had little capacity to either set up a 
new regulatory body or to take lengthy legal action against 
accountancy firms. The DTI was already involved in managing a 
record number of corporate investigations and was fully 
occupied with rescuing major companies and dealing with the 
property and secondary banking crisis. The government was 
particularly concerned with restoring confidence in the 
financial and insurance sectors, major earners of foreign 
revenues. In the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, inflation 
and unemployment were sharply rising and Britain was still 
reeling from the effects of the miner's strike and the three 
day week. With falling profitability and investment, the DoT 
was devoting its attention to a revival of the British 
economy by devising regional grants, subsidies and reliefs. 
The government was operating a prices and incomes policy and 
was considering approaching the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for loans. In such circumstances, the announcement of 
any new public expenditure on the creation of a new 
regulatory body was considered to be politically undesirable. 
Within the DTI, there was also a strong belief that by 
directly becoming involved in auditing, the Department may 
become implicated in the crisis and thus create further 
problems for tqe government. The age old ideology that 
auditing is best regulated by the assumed 'experts' also 
carried a strong weight. What the Investors Chronicle (27th 
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February 1976) called "behind the scenes education and 
conciliation" (page 564) followed. In the final analysis. a 
statutory body to regulate auditing was not set UP. but a 
consensus for the need for a Committee to promulgate auditing 
standards was established. 
Further pressures from the government continued. In the 
autumn of 
to carry 
CACA) were 
1976. Presidents of the four Institutes permitted 
t 
out stautory company audits {ICAEW. lCAS. lCAI and 
l' . 
summoned to jointly see the Secretary of State for 
Trade and a wide and frank discussion took place. A former 
Secretary of State for Trade explainede that he 
"was certainly concerned about the failings 
of the accountancy profession and made them 
very well aware of my concerns. Their 
failings were brought home in the successive 
reports ......... I told representatives of 
the profession that either they regulated 
themselves effectively or I would ask 
Parliament to do it for them. But, 
irrespective of the action they themselves 
then took, there would not have been 
Parliamentary time for legislation". 
The Ministers themselves were being pushed by backbench MFs. 
Indeed. an attempt was made by Ivor Clemitson (MF for Luton 
East) to introduce a public board for regulating auditors, 
but on a 'free vote'. his proposals were defeated by 35 votes 
(Hansard, 22nd March 1977, cols. 1081-1088). In behind the 
scenes discussions, the Ministers were frequently placating 
MFs by referring to the agenda for reform which was being 
ushered in by the critical reports of the inspectors. 
These reports were critical of the standards of auditing and 
related to companies such as the London and Capital Group 
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Limited (DoT, 1977b), Edward Wood & Company Limited (DoT, 
1977d). Electerminations Limited (DoT. 1978), Court Line 
(DoT, 1978b). Burnholme and Forder (DTI, 1979a), Peachey 
Property Corporation (DoT, 1979c), Ashbourne Investments 
(DoT, 1979b), Grays Building Society, (Registry of Friendly 
Societies, 1979), Scotia Investments' auditors (DTI, 1980a), 
Gilgate Properties (DTI, 1981c), Orbit Holdings (DTI, 1981b), 
Norwest Holst (DTI, 1982) and Ramor Investments (DTI, 1983). 
The general drift of such reports was known to the profession 
throughh two channels. Firstly, 'through the regular meetings 
with senior servants and the government Ministers and 
secondly, through the senior figures within the profession 
who had been acting as inspectors for the Department of 
Trad~. From their very special positions, such individuals 
were in a position to alert the profession of the dangers 
ahead. For Woolf (1983). most of the auditing crisis was due 
to 
"the ease with which eminent firms of 
auditors turned a blind eye on the wholesale 
abuse by client company directors of [legal] 
provisions. [The directors] operated these 
public companies for the principal benefit of 
themselves and their families; and most 
regrettable of all, on the virtual complicity 
of their auditors, whose efforts are seen to 
have amounted to a whitewash at best. and a 
fatuous charade at worst" (Woolf. 1983a, page 
112) . 
The DoT reports were critical of the major firms and the 
prevailing professional standards in particular. Such a 
crisis of confidence could only be managed by creating new 
institutions. In case the profession was not convinced, the 
prevailing press opinion provided a foretaste. 
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7.1.3: Press Criticisms 
By the late 1960s, spurred by the State sponsored merger 
booms and the increasing importance of finance and capital 
markets, the wider press had begun to take a greater interest 
in accounting and auditing matters (Zeff, 1972). It 
criticised contemporary auditing practices. For example, the 
Daily Telegraph (27th July 1968) commented that the 
"true state of a company's affairs bear 
little resemblance to its audited accounts". 
The auditors role in the GEC/AEI affair (see Stamp and 
Marley, 1970) also attracted considerable adverse comment 
(The Observer, 31st August 1969; The Times, 11th September 
1969; The Times, 25th September 1969; The Guardian, 22nd 
October 1969). The Economist (30th August, 1969) accused 
auditors of not believing "in any written rules" (page 44). 
The Guardian (22nd October 1969) called for action to ensure 
that the auditors 
" . . . . . really do act as shareholders' 
watchdogs" (page 15). 
However, at this juncture an APC was not formed. But the 
auditing deficiencies continued to be made visible by the DTI 
reports and the related press comment. Together these created 
an environment for the formation and development of the 
Auditing Practices Committee and the formulation of auditing 
standards. 
Amidst the secondary banking crisis and the related property 
collapse, The Economist (14th February 1976) carried a 
headline, 'Britain's auditors are not doing their job' and 
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went on to state that, 
"Civil servants, politicians. and even City 
folk are beginning to wonder whether the 
accountancy profession is capable of policing 
itself ...... What shareholders think they 
are paying for, what creditors, depositors, 
the City. government and the informed public 
want, should be better: professionalism and 
judgement. . ...... unless the profession 
improves its auditing standards someone else 
will" (pages 79-80). 
The same article criticised Spicer and Pegler for the audit 
of Wintrust; Arthur Young for the audit of Slater Walker and 
Touche Ross for the audit of First National Finance 
Corporation, all secondary banks. It also singled out Binder 
Hamlyn, Robson Rhodes, Moore Stephens and Price Waterhouse 
for specific criticisms. The Investors Chronicle (13th 
February 1976) under the headline 'Watchdog, bloodhound or 
lapdog' argued that 
"In the case of London and County Securities 
there is not the slightest doubt that the 
1972-73 accounts gave a highly misleading 
view of the group's situation ....... the 
normal safeguards clearly failed ...... the 
publicised failures pose the question of how 
many remain to be discovered ....... [the 
ICAEW] will need to show rapidly that it can 
promote higher standards if the accountancy 
profession is to be allowed to remain a 
totallY self-regulating body" (page 419). 
On 28th February 1976, The Economist scrutinised some 
published accounts and criticised Coopers & Lybrand and 
Touche Ross by concluding that 
"the interesting items are the ones the 
auditors do not mention" (page 90). 
On 13th March 1976, The Economist (page 68) further examined 
published accounts and criticised auditors for accepting 
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novel and questionable treatments. The Investors Chronicle 
(27th February 1976, page 564) carried a headline 'Auditors: 
why the watchdog needs a closer watch' and noted the market, 
poitical and institutional pressures for a stricter 
regulation of auditors. The Financial Times (10th July 1976) 
doubted the profession's ability 
"to exercise control over the activities of 
large accountancy firms" (page 26). 
The Times (23rd September 1976, page 19) felt that 
"the much more serious of the issues for the 
moment is auditing" (page 19). 
Even the ICAEW President acknowledged that 
"public confidence in the standards of our 
performance has been badly shaken by a number 
of well publicised cases" (Accountancy, 
November 1976, page 4). 
With the accounting standards programme in full swing, the 
profession could not easily continue to blame accounting 
laxities. Spurred by critical DoT reports, the press was 
critical of auditing practices and more were on the way. The 
Economist (16th February 1976) reminded of such pressures by 
noting that, 
"Of a long list of 16 Department of Trade 
inspectors' reports in the pipeline at least 
two are expected to be extremely scathing 
about the auditors concerned" (page 75). 
Whilst the Investors Chronicle (27th February, 1976) felt 
that 
"several [DoT reports] will criticise 
auditors more or less heavily" (page 564). 
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Through its informal links with the DoT and appointment of 
senior professional figures as inspectors, the professional 
bodies and major firms were well aware of the nature of such 
impending public criticisms and the damage they could do to 
accountancy firms. Therefore, an Auditing Practices Committee 
representing the interests of the major professional bodies 
was formed. 
7.1.4: Formation of the Auditing Practices Committee 
Between 1961 and 1977, the ICAEW issued 'Statements of 
Auditing# ('U' series in the handbook), but these were not 
backed by any organisation which represented the collective 
interests of the various accountancy bodies. However. from 
the early 1970s the situation began to change. 
In the face of increasing corporate failure# related 
litigation, critical DoT reports and press comments, the 
ICAEW decided to devote greater attention to the formulation 
of auditing standards. Investigations into E.J. Austin (DoT. 
1972). Pergamon Press (DoT# 1971a. 1973) and other affairs 
continued. The auditors were particularly criticised for 
their role in the collapse of the Pinnock Finance Group (DoT. 
1971b). Faced with pressures from the government (Zeff. 1972) 
and a possible loss of legitimacy and credibility# the 
ICAEW's 1970 annual report (published. April 1971) responded 
by stating, "A comparable programme on auditing standards 
will be taken as soon as resources permit"7. The ICAEW#s 1971 
report noted that the "Professional Standards Committee has 
continued to consider cases of apparently unsatisfactory work 
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by members which have been referred to the Institutee . 
Further pressures continued to come via the DoT 
investigations and meetings with senior civil servants and 
ministers. The ICAEW eventually responded to such pressures 
by the formation of an Auditing Practices Committee (APC). 
This APC had four members. They came from Harmood Banner, 
Coopers and Lybrand, Peat Marwick and Kidsons and had its 
first meeting in October 1973 under the chairmanship of David 
Richards, an ICAEW Council member~. At that time, the control 
of inflation was a major political issue and not 
surprisingly, the APC's "major concerns at the time were the 
Counter-Inflation Act 1973 and the audit of inflation 
adjusted accounts" (APC, 1986, page 8). Despite such 
concerns, the APC did not produce any auditing standards or 
guidelines and generally kept a very low profile. 
Meanwhile, following the failure of the professional bodies 
to integrate, there was a recognition that on major issues of 
common interest, the professional bodies should co-operate 
and present a united front. From such a logic, the 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies (CCAB) was born 
in 1974 (Willmott, 1986). By this. time, some co-operation was 
evident. For example, the membership of the ASSC had been 
extended to cover representations not only from the ICAEW but 
also the other professional bodies. However, at this 
juncture, the professional bodies had not sought co-operation 
on auditing matters and the APC was not made a Committee of 
the CCAB. In fact, in July 1975, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountant of Scotland (ICAS) set up its own Auditing 
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Practices Committee to guide its members. But the position 
was soon to change. 
The profession was already reeling from the critical DoT 
reports on Blanes Limited (DoT, 1975) and Roadships Ltd (DoT, 
1976b). Then came the revelations relating to the London and 
County Securities (DoT, 1976a). Significantly, the company 
was audited by Harmood Banner and David Richards (the APC 
Chairman) was the partner responsible for the audit. The DoT 
investigation into L&C was a~thorised on 11th January 1974 
and by 9th September, David Richards was one of the 61 
witnesses examined by the inspectors. The questions posed 
must have reflected wider public and DoT concerns about the 
nature of auditing practices. 
In view of the widespread criticisms, the maintenance of the 
old APC became politically undesirable and impossible. The 
ICAEW backed APe had its final meeting in January 1976 and 
David Richards 1m resigned his Chairmanship of the APC 
(Accountancy, March 1976, page 13). This APC was disbanded 
without issuing a single auditing standard. 
By 1976, major firms such as Arthur Young, Deloittes, 
Coopers & Lybrand and others had also received negligence 
law-suits and more claims lingered on the horizon. The 
falling rate of profits and liquidity and an ever increasing 
rate of inflation and liquidations (see chapter 6 for some 
evidence), provided additional incentives for the creation of 
a new body for promoting auditing standards and protecting 
the interests of auditing firms. In the face of DoT and press 
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criticisms, a new CCAB backed APC was set up and had its 
first meeting on 29th March 1976. One of the major reasons 
behind the formation of the APC was the belief that a 
"codification of good auditing practice into 
a set of auditing standards will ...... ~ 
to satisfy our critics in political circles 
and outside (emphasis added) ...... " (APC, 
1978a, page 50). 
The newly constituted APC consisted of 14 members (8 ICAEW; 2 
ICAS; 2 ICAl; 2 CACA), with a proviso that the majority of 
its members shall be in public practice exercising the audit 
function. The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
(ClMA) was denied any voting representations on the grounds 
that its members are not permitted to carry out statutory 
audits. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (ClPFA), whose members can carry out local 
authority audits, was initially granted an 'observer' status 
on the APC (Cranmwell, 1979), but since 1982 has been granted 
two seats and a full membership status. Thus, despite the 
claims that audits are a social activity whose consequences 
affect almost all individuals (Shaw, 1982), the standard 
setting institution consisted entirely of auditors. 
Firms criticised by the Department of Trade inspectors, the 
press and facing lawsuits came to be the first nominees for 
seats at the APC. These included Price Waterhouse, Peat 
Marwick, Spicer & Peglar and Coopers & Lybrand, and 
others11 • Such firms were well represented on the working 
parties of the newly constituted APC and its working parties 
(see APC, 1976 for a list). 
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The formation of the APC helped to placate criticisms and 
the fruits of it labour were now awaited. Such fruits 
depended upon its domination, control and development. The 
next section examines the development of the APC. 
1,1,5: Development of the APC 
Up to 1985, the membership of the APC had not been elected. 
It continued to be appointed by the directors of CCAB (major 
professional bodies)12. The individuals serving on the APC 
operated in a part-time capacity and are paid by the 
seconding firms. They do not sever their connections with 
their firms and indeed their long-term career prospects lie 
with such firms. Since its formation. as figure 7.3 shows, 
the APC has been populated by the major firms. 
This includes the very firms which have been criticised by 
the DTI, the press and have been facing law-suits by other 
fractions of capital. These include Price Waterhouse. Arthur 
Anders~n, Coopers & Lybrand. Thornton Baker, Peat Harwick, 
Thomson McLintock, Delittes, Robson Rhodes, Ernst & Whinney. 
Arthur Young and others. Through their control of the APC, 
such firms are in a dominant position to shape the meanings 
of auditing standards and guidelines. A ministerl~ has 
claimed that the 
"major firms do not make audit policy or 
unduly influence the work of the APC ..... . 
[Its] members are appointed on the basis of 
contribution they can make as individuals, 
regardless of the firms to which they belong . 
..... it is not surprising that people of the 
right calibre. who can freely commit their 
time to professional activities are found 
more easily in the larger firms"14. 
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Figure 7,3 
HAJOR ACCQUNTANCY FIRMS AND THEIR noMINATIQN OF THE APC 
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Wider social constituencies did not have a voting 
representation on the APC. The Department of Trade sent a 
'non-voting observer'le. The powerful and influential 
position of the Chairman, considered to be a "plum 
professional job" (The Accountant, 25th March 1982, page 
406), has been consistently filled by individuals drawn from 
giant multinational firms (see figure 7.3). Many of the 
topics upon which the APC pronounces are selected by the 
Chairman who can also exercise considerable influence on the 
basic terms of reference of wor~ing parties. It should be 
noted that the Chairmen have come from the very firms 
implicated in the crisis of confidence in auditing. The 
government does not make any financial contribution towards 
the running of the APC. However, for the period under review, 
the extent of financial resources available to the APC are 
not known1b • Another aspect of the APC's development has been 
that it gives internal documents to major firms. something 
which is not available to others (Sikka, Willmott and Lowe, 
1989). This unequal access to information means that some 
parties would be able to comment on the issues 
effectively than others. 
more 
With the professed aim of restoring "the public's confidence 
in the auditing profession" (APC, 1986, page 61), the APC was 
asked to develop personal. operating and reporting standards. 
However. very soon the matter of personal standards was taken 
out the APC's re~it and given to a Joint Committee on Ethics, 
leaving the APC to concentrate on the remainder. Auditing 
standards and guidelines as figure 7.4 shows are best 
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conceptualised at three interrelated levels. 
Auditing 
Standards-
Auditing 
Guidelines 
Figure-7,4 
Understanding Auditing Standards and Guidelines 
The first tier consists of over-riding auditing concepts 
such as the meaning of an audit, auditor independence, 'true 
and fair', etc. These issues are highly contentious and are 
not addressed by the APe. The remaining two tiers are within 
the scope of the APe's work. The second tier consists of 
auditing standards which "prescribe the basic principles and 
practices" (APe, 1980b, para 3). The third tier consists of 
auditing guidelines which relate to "procedures by which the 
auditing standards may be applied ..... [to] specific items 
appearing in the financial statements, techniques 
currently beind used ..... " (APe, 1980b, para 5). 
After its formation, the APe set about producing draft 
auditing standards and four individuals from four major firms 
spent "two weeks of concentrated effort at the end of June 
[1977] producing drafts" (APe. 1986. page 20). The first 
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draft auditing standards and guidelines were released in June 
1978. eventuallY leading to the publication of Auditing 
Standards and Guidelines in April 1980. These related to 
matters such as the auditor's operational standard. audit 
reports. guidelines on planning. controlling and recording 
accounting systems. audit evidence internal controls and 
review of financial systems. Such guidance ,whilst taking 
account of much of the criticisms by the Department of Trade. 
also introduced a considerable amount of American jargon to 
the UK. For example. the audit reports now contained phrases 
such as 'subject to' and 'except' type of opinions. Rather 
than referring to vouching and verification. the audit tests 
now spoke of 'walkthrough tests', 'compliance tests' and 
'substantive tests'. 
Commenting on the APC's role. A Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry stated. "The Auditing Practices Committee 
......... plays a useful role. The Companies Act is lengthy 
and detailed. Even so there is frequently scope for applying 
the law in a number of different ways. The Auditing Practices 
Committee gives guidance to accountants on what is regarded 
as best practice in their respective fields ....... 17. Since 
't formation. a major aim of the APC has also been to 1 S 
"assist the auditing profession in defending 
itself against unnecessary and inappropriate 
claims" (APC. 1986. page 61). 
Under this, attempts are made to narrow auditor 
responsibility. In pursuance of this. the guideline on 
Engagement Letters (APe, 1984) states that an audit "should 
not be relied upon to disclose irregularities and fraud which 
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may exist" (para 14). Auditing guideline on 'Events after the 
balance sheet date' (APC. 1982) advocates a 'passive 
approach'. For example, under the Companies Act 1985 (section 
384), an auditor is appointed to hold office from one AGM to 
the next but the guidance states that "after the date of the 
audit report the auditor does not have a duty to search for 
evidence of post balance sheet events" (para 7). This is part 
of the overall philosophy of defending the 'economic 
interests' of auditing firms. Such a 'passive' approach is 
not extended to arenas where the auditor's may have to rely 
upon the evidence generated by others. In its advice on 
'Reliance on other specialists'. the APe argued that "the 
auditor should not passively accept evidence" (APC, 
1986. page 32). 
7.1.6: Section Summary 
This section referred to the formation and development of 
the APC. It has been noted that the auditing wing of the 
profession has been highly privileged and has considerable 
influence on accounting and auditing discourses. In the face 
of increasing criticisms from the DoT and the press, the 
ICAEW reluctantly set up the APe. However, this APC did not 
produce any auditing standards and did not last very long. 
One major reason is that its Chairman David Richards came 
from Harmood Banner, the firm responsible for auditing the 
London and County Securities. The adverse publicity 
surrounding this affair may have forced him to resign and 
persuaded the ICAEW to disband the APe. 
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Amidst the 1970s economic crisis, the State was unable to • 
create an independent body to promulgate auditing standards. 
This gave the profession a further opportunity and a new CCAB 
backed APC was set up in 1976. This consisted entirely of 
auditors, even though the consequences of auditing fall upon 
all sections of a society. Ever since its formation, the CCAB 
backed APC has been dominated by major firms who have 
continued to be implicated in law-suits and critical DoT 
reports. Through their domination of the APC and its working 
parties, such firms may be in a position to promote their 
particular ' interests' . The '.users' of financial statements 
do not have any voting representation on the APC. The APC's 
minutes etc. are circulated to major firms, but are not 
available to other interested parties. One of the APC's aims 
has been to protect the auditing firms from lawsuits even by 
reducing auditor responsibility. 
The remainder of this chapter now examines the way the APC 
formulated the meanings and implications of the going concern 
concept. 
2.2: CONFIGURATION OF THE WORKING PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND THE 
RESPONDENTS 
In order to understand the institutional meanings of the 
going concern concept, it is important to be aware af the 
various players who helped to shape the going concern 
guideline. Such an awareness will help in understanding the 
'interests' being advanced through the meanings of the 
concept. In view of such aims, this section will focus on the 
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APC's consultative processes and the parties who responded to 
the going concern exposure draft (APC, 1983a). 
7.2.1: The Consultative Process 
The auditing standard setting process, like many other 
policymaking processes, is legitimised by a 'consultation 
process' through which policymakers mobilise support for some 
preferred alternatives. 
an important stage in 
literature, 
The formation of a working party is 
such a process. According to the 
it "considers background material, official 
develops ideas and produces draft Auditing 
standard/Guideline" (APC, 1986) 
In the case of 'going concern', a working party was formed 
in Spring 1982, a time of deep economic crisis in Britain. In 
view of the worsening economic situation, manifesting itself 
through falling profitability, high interest rates, 
liquidations and negligence lawsuits (see chapter 6 for 
evidence) against auditors, the topic of going concern had 
become important and a working party was thus formed. 
As the aim of this thesis is to advance an understanding of 
the relationship between accounting and society, it was 
thought that discussions with the members of the working 
party would be beneficial. A literature search revealed that 
the professional. bodies (for example, CIPFA, 1977; ICAEW 
1985, 1986, 1987, 1988) and the APC has published a list 
showing membership (for example see, APe, 1976, 1978c, 1986) 
of its working parties. According to the APC1e , the going 
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r:~oncern working party last met in July 1984 and was formally 
stood down in September 1985, but for some reason its 
membership details had not been published. Therefore, a 
request for the appropriate information was made. This was 
also influenced by the APe's stated policies which encouraged 
communication with the working party members. For example, in 
1976, it wrote, 
" .... we give below the names of the APe and 
sub-committee members and hope that readers 
won't hesitate to contact their nearest 
members if they have any helpful comments or 
suggestions" (APe, 1976, page 8). 
Thee APe did not provide a list of the working party 
members, even though its then Chairman was calling for 
research into the going concern issues (Patient, 1983). At 
one stage, the APe Secretary offered to reveal 
composition of the working party by saying, 
"r have 
Chairman] 
names of 
condition 
...... agreed with Mr. Patient [the 
that I will provide you with the 
the working party members on the 
that you do not contact them"1"". 
the 
However, in view of the purpose of this thesis, such an 
undertaking could not be given and the professional bodies 
refused to reveal the identity of the members (Sikka, 
Willmott and Lowe, 1989). 
As regards the aims of the going concern working party, the 
APC exPlained that 
"The working party does not have the 
responsibility for the auditing guideline. 
The responsibility for preparing (emphasised 
in the original) the document rests with the 
APC ....... "~IZI 
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Whilst the ICAEW wrote, 
....... 
role in 
produces 
1I~1 
a working party plays an important 
a project as a whole, it neither 
nor approves the final draft 
The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants, one of 
the APC's governing bodies, emphasised the authority of the 
working party by stating, 
II it is the final document which members are 
appointed to produce; how this is arrived at, 
what weight may have been attached to which 
argument, is a matter for the members of the 
committee or working party .... "22. 
According to the official literature, the working parties 
"vote" (APe, 1986, page 24), but the going concern working 
party's voting pattern has not been published. When asked, 
the APC replied that 
"the voting pattern of the working party is 
irrelevant"2::5. 
Despite the profession's secrecy, the identity of the 
working party members was learnt through interviewees from 
major multinational firms, who had been given lists of all 
working party memberships as a matter of routine. 
Subsequently, discussions were held with two members of the 
going concern working party. These were the the working party 
chairman and Arthur Anderson partner Ray Hinton and Martyn 
Jones, a partner in Touche Ross. In addition, discussions 
with recent Presidents of the professional bodies, members of 
the APC and partners from some firms provided useful insights 
into the politics of interpreting the going concern concept. 
Those interviewed were certain that they were responsible for 
developing the guideline and making recommendations to the 
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APC. 
It is significant that during the development period of the 
guideline, both Arthur Anders~n and Touche Ross were involved 
in litigation. Arthur Andersbh were sued by the government, 
I)ver the co llapse of the DeLorean Motor Company and Touche 
Ross were facing legal action by Caparo over the collapse of 
Fidelity (see Chapter 6 for further details). As the 
subsequent sections will show, these and other firms used the 
going concern auditing guideline to articulate a particular 
meaning of going concern. The main aim was to protect the 
auditing firms from lawsuits. restore public confidence and 
create conditions for further growth of accountancy firms. 
Such aims cannot be achieved without mobilising major firms 
and making 'significant others' feel that their concerns are 
also being addressed. How was this done? 
The manner in which individuals are nominated to a working 
party has not been eA~lained by the profession. One 
explanation might be that in view of their considerable 
experience, senior members of the profession from major 
firms, are invited to provide an input to policy-making. Such 
an explanation does not give any indication of 'interests' 
and is unsatisfactory. An alternative explanation is that the 
"auditing practices committee is dominated by 
the major firms ...... [such firms] can 
afford to provide part-time members [and can 
thus] effectively dominate decisions on the 
running of a profession in which they have a 
vital economic interest" (House of Commons. 
Official Report. Standing Committee DJ 
Companies Bill, 13th June 1989, col. 310). 
In any policy-making process. there are numerous formal and 
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informal procedures which enable a power bloc to exercise 
disproportionate influence. In view of the "closed way in 
which the [audit policy-making] is handled in this country" 
(House of Commons, Official Report, Standing Committee D, 
Companies Bill, 13th June 1989, col. 311), many such 
arrangements cannot be identified. One way in which a power 
bloc might maintain its hegemony is through control of 
information, making it freely available to some and denying 
the same to others, thus ensuring that the economically 
powerful can make informed choices. It has been stated that 
the APC has a policy of 
"providing information on its activities and 
decisions to the large firms that dominate 
its proceedings and denying the same 
information to the rest of the profession -
the small accountancy firms ........ [The 
APC] also gives internal documents to major 
firms information that is denied to 
ordinary accountants" (House of Commons, 
Official Report, Standing Committee D, 
Companies BilL 13th June 1989, col. 
311-313). 
The unequal information dissemination policies mean that 
some groups are in a better position to tailor the issues and 
the agenda to their advantage. As part of this research, it 
was learnt that major firms do indeed receive 'inside 
information', both orally and in writing as a matter of 
routine (for further details see Sikka, Willmott and Lowe, 
1989). Later parts of this chapter, with the full approval of 
an interviewee, will make references to some of these 
documents. 
Having noted some aspects of the consultative process, the 
next sub-section focuses upon the parties who commented upon 
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the draft auditing guideline. 
7.2.2: The Respondents 
Following its deliberations, the working party formulated an 
eh~osure draft (APC, 1983a) and the professional bodies 
formally issued it for comments in 1983. The exposure draft 
attracted 26 responses. The parties making submissions to the 
APC are' identified in figure 7.5. 
Some features of figure 7.5 should be noted. 21 of the 26 
respondents had prior connections with the APC, either 
through full membership or participation in various working 
parties. These included four responses from the APC's 
governing bodies. In view of the APC's information 
dissemination policies, this privileged circle would have 
been able to make informed comments. Only two of the top 15 
firms, Arthur Anderson and Binder Hamlyn did not make a 
written submission. However, Arthur Anderson partner Ray 
Hinton was the chairman of the working party and would have 
been able to represent his firm's interests. Whether Binder 
Hamlyn used any informal lines for making representations is 
not known. 
Chapter 6 noted that discussions of the going concern 
concept in an auditing context became widespread from the 
1970s onwards because . of the involvement of many firms in 
litigation and the pressures generated by public criticisms 
of auditors, especially through the DT! inspectors' reports. 
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Figure 7.5 
Respondents to the Draft Auditing Guideline 
Respondents 
1) Ernst & Whinney 
(Ireland) 
2) B.R. Addison of 
Hays Allan(*) 
3) Deloittes, Haskins 
& Sells 
4) Arthur Young 
McClleland Moores & Co. 
5) The Chartered Association 
of Certified 
li.t:m 
Ranking 
5 
28 
4 
6 
Criticisms. 
by the DT! 
or Law-suit 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Accountants ( **) . ? 
6) Spicer & Pegler 11 
7) Neville Russell & Co. 17 
8) Clark Whitehill. 14 
9) Thornton Baker & Co. 
10) Coopers Lybrand 
11) Thomson McLintock 
12) Pannell, Kerr Forster 
13) Ernst Whinney (London) 
14) Peat Marwick 
15) Dearden Farrow 
16) Price Waterhouse 
17) Touche Ross 
18) Kingston Smith & Co. 
19) The Royal Institute 
of Chartered Surveyors 
20) Mr. Julian Mason (***) 
8 
1 
10 
13 
5 
2 
15 
3 
7 
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Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
N/A 
N/A 
Prior 
AEQ 
Connections 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Respondents 
21) The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 
of Scotland (**) 
22) The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland (**) 
23) Buzzacott & Co 
24) Wickens Building Group 
(****) 
25) Chalmers Impey 
26) Technical Advisory 
Committee of ICAEN (**) 
Ell:m 
Ranking 
40 
18 
* Writing in private capacity. 
** APC's Governing Bodies 
*** Lecturer 
Criticisms 
by the DT! 
or Law-suit 
? 
? 
NIA 
Yes 
? 
Prior 
AfQ 
Connections 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
**** A letter, dated 1st November, 1983 from Mr. Alan Orme, 
financial director of the company. He is not directly 
commenting on the draft auditing guideline but replying to 
seven questions posed in APC's bulletin "True & Fair"; 
Issue No. 25. Autumn 1983. 
Notes 
1) Firm classification is based on information published in 
The Accountant, 26th June 1986, pages 14-16, which gave 
indication of 1984 and 1985 positions. 
2) The only non London firms to respond were Ernst Whinney 
(Dublin, Ireland) and Thomson McLintock (Edinburgh, 
Scotland) . 
3) Analysis of responses 
* 
Top 15 firms 
outside top 15 
APC's Governing Bodies 
Finance Director 
Lecturer 
RICS 
Total 
14 
5 
4 
1 
1 
-L 
~ 
* There were two responses from Ernst Whinney. Missing firms 
are Arthur Anderson (9) and Binder Hamlyn (12). 
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It is significant that a large number of written responses 
came from the firms which had been implicated (see chapter 6) 
in major reported lawsuits and who have been the subject of 
critil~isms by the DTI inspectors~q. For example, Ernst and 
Whinney made an out-of-court settlement in the Hedderwick 
affair and were facing fresh litigation from Ruberoid and the 
Allied Irish Bank. Deloittes had made an out-of-court 
settlement over the collapse of London and County Securities 
and Power Dynamics. Arthur Young had faced major lawsuits 
from Tremletts and were implicated in the Johnson Matthey 
affair. Thornton Baker were criticised by the Gilgate 
inspectors (DT!, 1981a). Coopers & Lybrand had faced major 
litigation over the collapse of Burnholme and Forder. Thomson 
McLintock were criticised in the DoT report on Roadships Ltd 
(DoT, 1976b). Peat Marwick were criticised by the DoT 
inspectors in their reports on Lonrho (DoT, 1976c), Court 
Line (DoT, 1978b) and Orbit Holdings Limited (DT!, 1981b). 
Price Waterhouse were criticised in the DT! reports on 
Norwest Holst (DTI, 1982) and Ramor Investments (DTI, 1983). 
Touche Ross were facing a lawsuit from Caparo. Chalmers and 
Impey were criticised in the Pergamon report (DoT, 1971, 
e the firm of the 1973) . Arthur Anders¢n, working party 
chairman, made an out-of-court settlement over the Media 
Electronics affair and were facing a lawsuit over the 
collapse of PRISM and the DeLorean Motor Company. In 
addition, the auditing procedures of Pannell Kerr Forster 
were being scrutinised by DT! inspectors, appointed on 6th 
April 1983 to investigate the affairs of the Greenbank Trust 
(DTI, 1988). In view of the rather close relationship~e 
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between the DTI. civil servants. professional bodies and 
major firms. it is quite likely that the preliminary 
conclusions would have been known to the firm. The crisis of 
confidence in auditing made visible by the DoT reports. the 
collapse of many companies and press criticisms also affected 
the professional bodies. who represent the interests of their 
members. They could not remain immune from the general 
criticisms and their own legitimacy was being threatened. As 
the APe'S governing bodies. they also made comments on the 
exposure draft and influenced matters through behind the 
scenes discussion. 
The submission by Wickens Building Group (respondent 24) is 
written by Alan Orme. financial director of the company. His 
comments are not directly addressed to the exposure draft. 
Instead, he is responding to the five questions posed in the 
Autumn 1983 issue of the APe's bulletin 'True & Fair'. 
Another feature is the relative scarcity of comments from any 
'users' of financial statements. The APe was asked whether in 
developing the going concern guideline, it consulted any 
users of financial statements? It replied that, "No special 
consultation took place"2b. In other words, the auditing 
guideline was seen as the exclusive domain of the auditor, 
even though almost every citizen through his shareholding, 
pension plan, insurance polioies. unit trust investment, eto. 
is affected by the consequences of auditing. 
2,2.3: Section SummarY 
In order to understand the meanings of the going concern 
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concept, this section has provided further information. The 
parties populating the APC and the going concern working 
party came from the firms facing law-suits and criticisms. 
The respondents to the exposure draft came predominantly from 
the firms with prior connections with the APC and/or facing 
law-suits. The auditing wing had not permitted non-auditing 
interests to have a voting representation on the APC and the 
'users' were not consulted for the development of the going 
concern guideline. 
The next section examines the way in which the APC went 
about developing the detailed contents of the going concern 
guideline. 
1.3: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENTS OF THE AUDITING GUIDELINE 
This section examines the detailed contents of the going 
concern guideline. Most of the guideline covers the meaning 
of foreseeable future, symptoms of going concerns problems, 
suggestions that auditors examine corporate plans and budgets 
and the wording of the audit report. This section will focus 
on these aspects with a view to understanding the underlying 
agenda or the 'interests' being advanced by the particular 
meanings of the concept. 
1. 3 . 1.: Meaning of the Foreseeable Future 
Discussions of going concern are frequently accompanied by 
the notion of a 'foreseeable future'. The meaning of the 
phrase can have serious consequences for auditor liability 
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and perceived responsibility. In the event of litigation, any 
institutionalised meaning can be invoked by 'significant 
others' to argue that the auditor owed them a duty for the 
defined period. Therefore, the meaning of the phrase is 
important. 
Figure 3.3 noted (page 139) that a number of competing 
meanings have been assigned to the phrase 'foreseeable 
future'. These refer to 'twelve months from the balance sheet 
date', 'twelve months from the ~udit report date' and other 
variations. However, SSAP 2 (ASC,1971) has not defined the 
phrase. In formulating the auditing guideline, the APC could 
also have chosen not to define it, but it stated that 
"While the foreseeable future must be judged 
in relation to specific circumstances. the 
auditor should normally consider information 
which relates to a m1n1mum of six months 
following the date of the audit report or one 
year after the balance sheet date, whichever 
period ends on the later date" (APC 1985a, 
para 8; also APC, 1983a, para 5). 
Alan Orme, a company director wrote to the APC to oppose its 
formulation. He argued that 
"The auditor should look as far ahead as is 
necessary to give confidence that the company 
will trade adequately, and remain solvent, 
until the following accounts have been filed 
at the Companies House". 
In sharp contrast, the Thames Valley TAC welcomed what it 
regarded as the "shortening of the period", However. neither 
the profession's preferred definition nor any explanation of 
its logic could be found in any prior literature. Indeed. the 
South Western Technical Advisory Committee sought references 
to the origins of the APe formula. Of the 12 TACs commenting 
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on the draft guideline, 3 supported the APC position, four 
felt the period to be too short, two considered it to be too 
long and 3 were uncertain. The range of meanings advocated by 
the respondents is shown in figure 7.S. 
Figure 7.6 
Adyocacy of Foreseeable Future in Submissions to the APC 
Option 
The APC position 
One year from the date 
I)f the audit report 
Minimum of six months 
from the date of the 
audit report 
One year from the date on 
which the directors sign 
the financial statements 
Upto the date of the 
aud!t report or one year 
after the balance sheet 
date, whichever is the 
earlier 
Next trading year or six 
months from the audit 
report date whichever is 
the maximum 
Two to three months after 
the audit report date 
No specific period 
Supported by 
Coopers & Lybrand,Thornton 
Baker, Price Waterhouse, Peat 
Marwick, Arthur Young, Neville 
Russell and Thames Valley, 
Sheffield and Manchester TACs 
Deloittes, Thomson McLintock 
Spicer & Pegler and Liverpool, 
London and South-Eastern TACs 
CACA 
Pannell Kerr Forster 
Northern TAC 
Ernst & Whinney (London) 
Deardon Farrow 
Hays Allan, Touche Ross, 
Chalmers Impey, Kingston Smith, 
Wickens Building Group; Beds 
Bucks Herts, Leicester and West 
Yorkshire TACs 
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It is interesting to note that the APC definition was 
supported by major firms, such as Thornton Baker, Arthur 
Young, Price Waterhouse and Peat Marwick, all involved in 
litigation and/or DTI criticisms in the aftermath of a 
business ceasing to be a going concern, Arthur Young drew 
attention to the 
"obvious danger that any time limit suggested 
by APC will be seen as a guarantee period 
[and agreed to ~ccept the guidance] 
"only if this is accompanied by a clear 
statement that it is not the auditors 
responsibility to guarantee the solvency of 
the enterprise for that period", 
Ernst & Whinney (London) objected on the grounds that any 
definition would be 
"interpreted as placing on auditors a 
responsibility to attest to the ability of 
their clients to continue as going concerns", 
Some firms, such as Hays Allan were opposed 
specification of any period on the grounds that 
"these time factors could be used against the 
auditor" . 
to the 
The concern with liability persuaded Deardon Farrow to 
suggest that 'the foreseeable future' should be defined as "a 
period of two to three months after the date of the audit 
report", The CACA favoured the option of six months from the 
audit report date on the grounds that this would "reduce the 
review of the foreseeable future period to a minimum", Firms 
such as Deloittes were concerned that too short a definition 
would attract public criticism and instead suggested that the 
profession favour a much more traditional meaning, such as 
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one year from the audit report date. 
A working party member explained that the issue of 
'foreseeable future' was widely discussed with partners from 
selected major firms. After such discussions, the 'twelve 
months after the audit report' option was soon rejected as it 
presented required auditors to do extensive work. The APe 
felt that in the case of a private company which took the 
maximum legal time allowed (at the time, ten months after the 
balance sheet date) to file accounts, auditors may have to 
look at, and consider, events for nearly two years after the 
balance sheet date. This was considered to be too onerous for 
auditing firm profitability and liability and thus rejected. 
Some APe members were keen to specify a period of only three 
months after the audit report date, but were concerned that 
the press and public may have regarded this as too short. The 
profession was advised not to opt for too short a period 
because this might become the focus of litigation. As a 
member of the going concern working party put it, 
"someone might even be tempted to test it in 
the courts, if an opportunity arose", 
The APe was not aware of any case law on the subject matter 
and wanted the Accounting Standards Commmittee to innovate, 
but this was not to be the case. The APC did not wish to 
leave the definition open-ended, as this would have been 
counterproductive. In view of the professional pronouncemnts 
beinit used as 'benchmarks' in litigation and DTI 
investigations, the APC felt that the term should be defined, 
as this could help auditors. A deep seated fear was also that 
empty space would invite users, courts or leitislation to an 
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fill it and that this may not be too helpful to auditors. 
Ultimately, the APC had to decide on a definition which 
various parties felt would protect auditors. Under the 
circumstances, six months after the audit report date seemed 
a reasonable compromise, with the 'common sense' and 
traditional interpretation of twelve months from the balance 
sheet date. An influential partner from a major multinational 
firm explained that the choice was also influenced by 
contemporary banking practices. as he knew them. Apparently. 
many banks were only willing ·to help some ailing companies 
for only six months at a time. 
In a document distributed to major firms. the APC noted the 
following and the original formulation remained in the 
guideline. 
points of Principle 
A variety of views were 
exPressed regarding the 
period suggested in paragraph 
5 of the exPosure draft 
as the normal minimum for the 
"foreseeable future", and a 
number of alternatives were 
suggested (for example. 3 
months, 6 months or 1 year 
after the date of the audit 
report) 
Response 
Noted. The guidance 
as stated by the 
exposure draft is 
considered to 
represent adequately 
the consensus of 
opinion. No change is 
therefore proposed 
(see new paragraph B) 
In summary, this section has shown that the accountancy 
firms were nervous about the definition of the term 
'foreseeable future', in case it could be used against them 
in a lawsuit. They rejected the definitions which might have 
imposed additional work upon them. The eventual definition 
was the result of discussions with highly privileged 
individuals. 
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The next section continues to examine the development of the 
going concern auditing guideline by focusing on the 
refinement of the auditing procedures advocated by the 
guideline. 
1.3.2: SYmptoms of Going Concern Problems 
The normal auditing procedures adopted by the auditors are 
expected to alert them to Symptoms of going concern problems. 
These are listed in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the guideline. 
Broadly, they ask the auditors to take note of any adverse 
accounting ratios, financial difficulties and unfavourable 
market and political conditions (also see figure 7.7 on page 
433). How did the APC come across such indicators? 
Most of the respondents had little to say on such matters 
and their suggestions in the main related to presentational 
aspects. Thornton Baker and Buzzacott wondered how the APC's 
recommendations could be applied to small enterprises, but 
such aspects did not receive adequate attention in the 
eventual guideline. Some firms, such as Spicer and Pegler, 
wanted "more emphasis" on "consideration of the financial 
support available and confirmation where possible of such 
support". Clark Whitehill wanted to see emphasis on 
"mana4tement responsibility" for identification of going 
concern problems. To clarify the nature of the auditing 
guideline and the circumstances listed as 'symptoms of going 
concern problems', the working party members explained that 
"the auditor should look out for the 
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circumstances mentioned in the guideline. All 
we are saying is that the auditor should be 
aware. we do not ask him to go and perform 
specific tasks". 
However. there is an endless list of factors (both positive 
and negative) which one could focus on. What is the logic 
between distinguishing paragraph 10 and 11 factors? The reply 
was that 
"Liquidations, insolvency..... do not 
happen overnight. They gather momentum and 
arise over a period of time invariably 
relating to product, persdnnel, manufacturing 
problems which invariably manifest 
themselves in some sort of an earnings 
related problems bad debts ..... 
obsolescence problems eventuallY leading to a 
funding problem. What the auditor needs to do 
is to recognise the basic problems. Paragraph 
10 attempted to summarise such factors, but 
the list is not exhaustive. Paragraph 10 is 
about funding. Paragraph 11 identifies 
matters which may not immediately relate to 
funding, but will eventually relate to 
funding" . 
One problem is that the factors such as low liquidity 
ratios, overgearing, excessive stocks, etc. need not 
necessarily be a sign of weakness. In addition to requiring 
assumptions about normal or optimal corporate behaviour, in 
many circumstances they may actually be thought of as signs 
of strength and prudent financial management. Perhaps, the 
APC could have been more specific in identifying the factors 
which cause a company to cease to be a going concern. A study 
of failed companies might have been helpful in identifying 
the danger signals. A working party member exPlained that the 
APC 
"did not carry out any analytical review of 
companies that had gone into liquidation to 
see whether some of the factors we identified 
were present. History may be of interest to 
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you academics, but we do not have the time -
I am not sure whether history is of any great 
use. We have to deal with the here and now 
problems":.;!!?'. 
Whilst another recalled that the appropriate paragraphs (10 
and 11 of the guideline) were sent to some liquidator(s) for 
comment. who considered them to be suitable. Overall. the 
final list was developed as a result of comments and personal 
exPeriences of a few partners rather than any systematic 
research or a study of company histories. Given the extensive 
experience of partners from acc.ountancy firms. the APC could 
have possibly ranked the 'going concern symptoms' in order of 
their ability to predict problems. Such a ranking might have 
enabled some auditors to direct their work to key audit 
areas. A working party member explained that the APe did not 
want to be too specific as 
"in the event of a corporate failure. a smart 
lawYer may use the guideline for litigation". 
Most of the accountancy firms represented on the APe are 
multinational and have considerable business interests in the 
USA (a major market for accountancy services). In order to 
minimise their training and other costs, it would be helpful, 
if identical professional vocabularies, techniques. standards 
and procedures could be established in various countries. 
S tl.·on 7 1 noted that the UK profess1'on had ec . already 
introduced considerable USA terminology in the UK. In this 
context, it is interesting to note that the APe appears to 
have influenced by the going concern symptoms listed in the 
American standard 34 (AICPA, 1981). Figure 7.7 shows a 
considerable similarity between the two documents. 
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Figure 7.7 
Going Concern Problem Indicators 
A Comparison of the American and British Pronouncements 
Ai Information that may indicate solvency problems (para l~l 
AICPA (SAS 341 
1) Recurring operating 
losses. 
2) Working capital 
deficiencies. 
3) Negative cash flows from 
operations. 
4) Adverse key financial 
ratios. 
5) Default on loan or 
similar agreements. 
6) Arrearages in dividends. 
7) Denial of usual trade 
credit from suppliers. 
8) Noncompliance with 
statutory capital 
requirements. 
9) Necessity of seeking 
new sources or methods 
of finance 
1) Recurring operating 
losses. 
2) Working capital 
deficiencies. 
2a) Financing to a 
considerable extent out 
of overdue suppliers and 
other creditors. 
2b) Heavy dependence on 
short-term finance for 
long term needs. 
2c) Excessive or obsolete 
stock. 
2d) Long overdue debtors. 
4) Low liquidity ratios. 
4a) Over gearing in the 
form of high or increasing 
debt to equity ratios. 
4b) Under capitalisation. 
5) Default on loan or 
similar agreements. 
5a) Borrowing in excess of 
limits imposed by debenture 
trust deeds. 
6) Dividends in arrears. 
7) Restrictions placed on 
usual trade terms. 
8) Non-compliance with 
statutory capital 
requirements. 
9) Necessity of seeking 
new sources or methods of 
obtaining finance. 
9a) Significantly increasing 
stock levels. 
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AICPA (SAS 34) 
9b) Deterioration of 
relationship with bankers. 
9c) Continuing use of old 
fixed assets because there 
are no funds available to 
replace them. 
al Information 
existence without 
that maY raise a question aboyt continued 
necessarily indicating potential solvency 
problems (para 11) 
10) Loss of key management 
or operations personnel. 
11) Work stoppages or other 
labor difficulties. 
12) Substantial dependence on 
the success of a particular 
project 
13) Uneconomic long term 
commitments. 
14) Legal proceedings, 
legislation or similar 
matters that jeopardize 
an entity's ability 
to operate. 
15) Loss of a key franchise, 
license or patent. 
16) Loss of a principal 
customer or supplier. 
17) Uninsured catastrophes 
such as drought,·earthquake 
or flood. 
10) Loss of key management 
or staff. 
11) Work stoppages or other 
'labour difficulties. 
12) SUbstantial dependence 
. on the success of a 
particular project or on a 
particular asset. 
13) Excessive reliance on the 
success of a new product and 
uneconomic long term 
committments. 
13a) Size and content of 
the order book and potential 
losses on long-term 
contracts. 
14) Legal proceedings or 
similar matters that may 
jeopardise a company's 
ability to continue in 
business. 
14a) Frequent financial 
failures of enterprises in 
the same industry. 
15) Loss of a key franchise 
or patent. 
16) Loss of principal 
supplier or customer. 
17)Undue influence of a 
market dominant customer. 
17a) Political risks. 
17b) Technical developments 
which render a key product 
obsolete. 
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Did the policy-makers pay sufficient attention to the 
problems of small companies and the traditional meanings of 
going concern, where the concept is frequently associated 
with discussions of valuation bases? The next section 
examines these matters by focusing upon the policy-makers 
views on the development of additional auditing procedures. 
7,3.3: Additional Auditing Procedures 
Having been alerted to the problem factors and noted the 
mitigating factors, the guideline asks the auditors to 
perform some additional tasks. These include examination of 
company plans, budgets and forecasts. Even small companies 
are exPected to develop plans and forecasts. These aspects 
are listed in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the guideline. The APC 
did not wish to rank any of the factors identified in 
paragr,aphs 12-13 as this, according to a working party 
member, could give the appearance of the factors being 
"definitive" and 
The 
"could be a very damaging weapon in the hands 
of a smart lawyer". 
working party members interviewed felt that the 
auditor's examination of forecasts and budgets for small 
companies could be problematic. In many cases, the auditors 
would be preparing and then examining the same forecasts. 
Such actions might suggest that the forecasts have been 
effectively authenticated by the auditors. This had serious 
implications for auditor liability and result in lawsuits. 
Since the 1970s, auditors have been urged to examine 
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forecasts (for example, Strachan, 1975j AISG, 1975j 
Blackwood, 1976), but some APC members wanted to ignore them 
as these were regarded as highly subjective and thus prone to 
errors. The feeling was that any association with such data 
could become a source of litigation in the future. However, 
the members were also aware that much of the press and DoT 
criticisms related to situations where the auditors had 
ignored profit and cashflow forecasts. This meant that the 
importance of forecasts, budgets and plans in making going 
concern evaluations had to be acknowledged. Such a public 
acknowledgement did not necessarily follow that the auditors 
would use such data. As an APC member put it, 
"Whether auditors will use such information 
is up to them, it is a matter of judgement". 
Hinton (1985), chairman of the working party explained that 
the guideline will only have a minimal impact on audit work. 
He stated that the auditing procedures mentioned in the 
guideline will "not normally involve detailed considerations 
of budgets, plans etc. It involves no more than an awareness 
for the future". A related question is whether small 
companies prepare plans and forecasts? When pressed, a 
working party member said, 
"r cannot imagine why smallness goes with 
uncertainty and why small businesses will not 
have plans .... in the vast majority of cases 
the auditor can do a number crunching job and 
come up with something based on management's 
assumptions anyway". 
However, firms such as Kingston Smith drew attention to the 
verY limited value of forecasts in resolving going concern 
uncertainties. This is because the "financial forecasts and 
budgets will in the vast majority of cases be prepared on a 
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going concern basis". 
The guideline seems to suggest that the going concern 
problems are primarily related to finance and that the 
auditors could protect their litigation position by seeking 
'comfort letters' from bankers and group members. The theme 
of minimising the audit work and protection from litigation 
continues throughout the guideline. Auditor responsibility 
remains somewhat ambiguous. 
According to the guideline, if the auditor has serious going 
concern doubts then recoverability and classification of 
assets and liabilities needs to be considered. Such logic 
suggests that a different kind of accounting is appropriate 
for 'going' and 'non-going' concerns. How will the auditor 
cope with the various valuation bases? A working party member 
explained that it is up to the directors to make accounting 
choices and for auditors to form an opinion thereon. But does 
this not mean that the auditor still needs to be familiar 
with the various bases of valuation? The reply was that 
"the auditor only forms an Opln1.0n. We are 
not concerned with the valuation ...... " 
Earlier it was noted that the auditing guideline has a 
considerable similarity with the equivalent American 
pronouncement. Such similarities were thought to be 
beneficial to larger firms as it enabled them to make savings 
on training and exchange of personne 1. Following such 
thinking, a further comparison has been taken in relation to 
the mitigating circumstances mentioned in paras 12 and 13 of 
the guideline. The results are shown in figure 7.8. 
PAGE 437 
Figure 7,8 
Mitigating Factors 
Comparison of the American and British Pronouncements 
AICPA (SAS 34) 
1) Disposability of assets 
not operationally 
interdependent. 
2) Capability of delaying 
the replacement of assets 
consumed in operation or 
of leasing rather than 
purchasing. 
3) Possibility of using 
assets for factoring, sale 
leaseback, or similar 
arrangements. 
4) Ability to replace assets 
which have been destroyed. 
5) Availability of unused 
lines of credit or similar 
borrowing oapaoity. 
6) Capability of renewing 
or extending the due dates 
of existing loans. 
7) Possibility of entering 
into debt restruoturing 
agreements. 
8) Separability of operations 
producing negative oash flows. 
9) Capability of postponing 
exPenditures for suc~ matters 
as maintenance or research 
and development. 
10) Possibility of reducing 
overhead and administrative 
exPenditures. 
11) Variability of dividend 
requirement. 
12) Capability of obtaining 
additional equity capital. 
1) Ability to dispose of assets 
or to postpone the replacement 
of assets without adversely 
affecting operations. 
2) To lease assets rather than 
purchase them outright. 
5) To obtain new sources 
of finance 
6) To renew or extend 
loans. 
7) To restructure debts 
12) To raise additional share 
capital. 
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AICPA (SAS 34) 
13) Possibility of inc rea 
sing cash distributions 
from affiliates or 
other companies. 
14) Availability of quali-
fied persons to fill 
a vacated key position. 
15) The likelihood of 
suitably substituting for 
a lost principal customer 
or supplier. 
16) The possibility of 
adequately replacing assets 
seized or destroyed. 
17) Capability of operating 
at reduced levels or of 
redeploying resources. 
13)To obtain financial 
support from other 
group companies. 
14) Availability of suitable 
persons to fill key positions. 
15) The likelihood of finding 
alternative sales markets when 
a principal customer is lost. 
16) The ability to replace 
assets which have been 
de~troyed. 
17) The possibility of 
continuing the business by 
making limited reductions in 
the level of operations or by 
making use of alternative 
resources. 
A considerable similarity between the two pronouncements 
should be noted. Commenting on the similarities between the 
Americcn and the British guidelines, an APC member suggested 
that the 
"Americans lead in auditing standards and we 
follow ........ in the long run it is cheaper 
........ there is no point in reinventing the 
wheel, is there? Besides, we have to operate 
on a very short time horizon and there is no 
time to start afresh .... n. 
To sum up, the guideline advocated additional auditin~ 
procedures mainly by focusing upon the interests of large 
firms. The APC also borrowed from the American Standard. The 
guideline had little to say about questions of valuation or 
the problems faced by smaller firms. Such issues were not 
considered to be major by the policy-makers. 
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The next section examines the advice given on audit reports, 
which is influenced by the \economic interests' and deeply 
rooted auditing practices. 
7.3.4: Audit Reports 
According to the guideline, if the mitigating factors and 
the additional audit evidence suggests that the auditor has 
no material doubts about the ability of an enterprise to 
remain in existence, then an unqualified audit opinion should 
be given. If he is uncertain then assets/liabilities may need 
to be reclassified. The guideline suggested (paragraph 24) 
the use of an \emphasis of matter' type of audit report, 
which is meant to highlight some situations, but according to 
the auditing standards (APe, 1980a) it is not meant to be a 
qualification. In their written submission, Coopers & Lybrand 
were concerned that \ emphasis of matter' may be 
misinterpreted by readers as a qualification. Touche Ross 
strongly opposed the need for an \emphasis of matter' type of 
audit report for the same reason. 
During interviews some partners were apt to see the 
\ emphasis of matter' report as a 'soft option' and indeed 
viewed it as a kind of a qualification. The working party 
members acknowledged that small practitioners may use it as a 
"cop out", but felt that such a report had to be included as 
it gives the auditor opportunities to protect himself. Some 
additional points should also be noted. The British auditing 
standards introduced in April 1980 treated \going concern' as 
a 'material but not fundamental' uncertainty and suggested a 
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'subject to' type of audit opinion though a 'disclaimer of 
opinion' was not ruled out in exceptional circumstances. The 
'subject to' type of audit opinion is of American origins has 
a chequered history (Carmichael, 1972). In the USA, its use 
has been criticised by the Cohen Commission (AICPA, 1978) who 
described it as 'misleading' and ·confusing'. The Canadian 
position is that the uncertainties should be disclosed in the 
notes to the accounts. If the notes are satisfactory then 
there is no need for the auditor to issue a qualified report 
as a qualification may prove to·be misleading and confusing. 
Amongst the respondents, Touche Ross favoured the Canadian 
position. The working party members explained that the 
Canadian alternative was discussed and rejected, because the 
major firms felt that the auditor should have opportunity to 
issue qualified audit opinion. The working party members 
e~~lained that some firms were also opposed to the Canadian 
position because in their view 
"such an approach would make the accounts too 
voluminous and thus reduce their usefulness". 
A senior partner from a Big-Eight firm doubted whether 
British companies would be willing to disclose the necessary 
uncertainties and added, 
"we [auditors] are only at a company for a 
very short time. The public has a very 
incorrect impression of what we can do in 
that period. We cannot push the management 
into disclosure they don't want to make". 
The original going concern specimen audit report (APe, 
1980a), drafted at a time of a liquidity crisis, related 
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going concern problems to lack of finance, but the new 
version (APC, 1985a) related to losses and finance. Why the 
shift? The new wording reflected the contemporary concern 
with falling profitability. A working party member eA~lained 
that the new report emphasised earnings because, 
"obtaining finance was not usually a problem 
for many companies. What was difficult was 
the ability to generate sufficient earnings 
to pay the loans. The working party and the 
APC decided that earnings should be the focus 
as the ability to raise finance is dependent 
on earnings ". 
However, Spicer and Pegler felt that going concern is 
frequently related to financial support and for this reason 
preferred the original going concern qualification report. A 
view echoed by Coopers & Lybrand. Nine TACs opposed the 
proposed audit report and were concerned that either it was 
too vague or invited a bank manager to cancel financial 
facilities. Deardon Farrow and Price Waterhouse also wanted 
the new specimen audit report to be withdrawn. Some, such as 
the Leicester TAC, referred to the audit report as 
"torturous" and "incomprehensible". Deloittes referred to the 
proposed audit report as "long winded". Deardon Farrow also 
thought that the proposed report could be damaging to a 
client. Hays Allan wanted to retain the old report. 
The respondents were concerned with the impact of the audit 
report on client companies and firm responsibilities. With 
this in mind, Peat Marwick and the South Western TAC wondered 
whether a 'disclaimer of opinion' was more appropriate than 
the 'subject to' opinion. Coopers & Lybrand and Pannell Kerr 
Forster considered the 'disclaimer of opinion' to be 
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inappropriate as this can lead to serious consequences for 
client company's finance and suvival. The working party 
members explained that the guideline does not rule out the 
use of a 'disclaimer'. From the written submissions it is 
clear that the firms were concerned with the self-fulfilling 
nature of a going concern qualification. Touche Ross felt 
that going concern qualifications do cause financial 
difficulties for the companies. It wrote, 
"it is the duty of those who assume 
responsibility for setting auditing standards 
to avoid imposing on auditors an unnecessary 
obligation to issue reports which have such 
potentially damaging results". 
The firm wanted to protect the auditing firms and suggested 
that the guideline should state that 
"the reader of financial statements is not 
entitled to rely on either the fact that the 
financial statements are prepared under the 
presumption of going concern, or that the 
auditor's report is unqualified. as evidence 
that the enterprise will in fact be able to 
carryon business as a going concern". 
Spicer & Pegler were concerned that a qualification. if 
inappropriate. could still land the auditor with a lawsuit. 
In order to protect auditors. Thornton Baker felt that the 
banks ought to be persuaded to issue guarantees to the effect 
that 
"bank facilities will not be withdrawn under 
current circumstances provided the company 
continues to fulfill its obligations". 
A working party member was asked whether the readers would 
understand the audit report? The reply was that "one hopes 
they do". The APe did not undertake any research to ascertain 
the users' views. 
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To sum up, the audit reports were devised without any 
research and in the main were based upon the personal 
perceptions of the working party and APC members. Within the 
constraints of traditional practices, the formulation is 
concerned with protecting the auditors' liability position. 
The Canadian position was seen as contrary to the deeply 
rooted British practice of qualifying accounts and was 
rejected. The 'subject to' opinion originally imported from 
the USA in the 1980 auditing standards was retained, but 
auditors were left with an option to choose an 'emphasis of 
matter' report, something which the working party was aware 
may"be used by some firms as a 'soft option' to protect 
themselves. 
1.3,5: Section SUmmary 
This section examined the manner in which the APC formulated 
the details of the going concern guideline. 
Despite the official position that the "APC does not limply 
accept overseas solutions" (APC, 1986, page 49), it is found 
that the 'subject to' audit report is of American origin. The 
evidence presented suggests that the APC borrowed heavily 
from the American standard for examples of indicators of 
going concern problems as well as the mitigating 
circumstances. 
The guideline was developed by 
e~~eriences of some partners 
relying upon the personal 
from large firms rather any 
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systematic research, for example, relating to the symptoms 
displayed by failed companies. Throughout the development of 
the guideline, the 'user' and other interests had not been 
consulted. The interests of the small firms appeared to have 
been inadequately addressed. 
Another major aspect is that the APC wanted to produce a 
guideline which would reduce the incidence of litigation 
against auditors. In addition. it wanted to protect the 
economic interests of the firms.by controlling the amount of 
audit work they might have to do. This suggests that an 
underlying agenda was shaping the meanings of the going 
concern concept. The next section examines this agenda. 
7.4: THE UNDERLYING AGENDA: PROTECTION FROM LAWSUITS AND 
SAFEGUARDING THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF AUDITORS 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, accountancy firms were 
facing massive lawsuits. These frequently arose in the 
aftermath of a client company with a clean audit report 
ceasing to be a going concern. For a considerable time, the 
profession argued that an auditor does not comment on 
business solvency and viability, but the contemporary 
pressures were forcing the profession to be sympathetic to 
such audit objectives. The profession sought to reconstruct 
its identity by accepting a competing meaning of an audit. It 
noW acknowledged that "it was reasonable to exPect the 
auditor to consider the future viability of his client" (APC, 
19S6, page 32). The acceptance of such a meaning, however, 
had serious implications for auditor liability. 
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This section shows that the going concern guideline was 
shaped by sectional interests. The interviews and written 
submissions to the APC show that accountancy firms were keen 
to articulate an audit approach. an interpretation of going 
concern which would minimise their liability. protect them in 
lawsuits and dampen public expectations from an audit, 
without any additional audit work. 
The written submissions show that the draft auditing 
guideline was opposed by Touche, Ross, Chalmers Impey and six 
of the sixteen ICAEW TACs. Touche Ross wrote. 
" ...... the effect of this exposure draft in 
its present form is to create a presumption 
of negligence on the part of the auditor in 
any case where a company goes into 
receivership or liquidation and the last 
audit report did not contain a going concern 
qualification ......... these consequences 
are clearly not in the interests of the 
profession: it is our contention that they 
are not in the interests of the public 
....... it is the duty of those who assume 
responsibility for setting auditing standards 
to avoid imposing on auditors an unnecessary 
obligation to issue reports which have 
potentially damaging results". 
We are very concerned that the exposure 
draft in its present form imposes 
responsibilities that go far beyond those 
that are desirable in the interests of the 
auditing profession or their clients ..... it 
will encourage unreasonable public 
exPectations and result in a vast increase in 
going concern qualifications and in claims 
against auditors II • 
Many of the approving firms were also nervous about a 
document which sought to discuss the auditor responsibility 
in anY detail. Peat Marwick argued that 
"regarding 
guideline 
the 
and 
content of the proposed 
bearing in mind the potential 
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legal effects ...... whether such a complex 
subject is suitable for a guideline at all. 
...... It is not an issue which can be 
addressed in abstract and generalised terms, 
as the nature of an auditing guideline 
generally requires". 
Price Waterhouse expressed reservations on the draft because 
it implied that 
"the auditor has a responsibility to undergo 
an active search for indications of possible 
going concern problems". 
Pannell, Kerr and Forster objected on the grounds that the 
draft 
"lays too much emphasis on the auditor's 
responsibility to identify the problems". 
Kingston Smith objected on the grounds that the guideline 
"seeks to extend the responsibility of the 
auditor to an unacceptable extent ........ . 
Firms such as Deloittes and Thornton Baker, first wanted the 
directors' responsibilities clarified and preferred the 
matter to be dealt with via a SSAP, whilst others expressed 
their reservations on certain aspects. Ernst & Whinney 
(Ireland) argued that the 
"guideline needs to be carefully balanced and 
worded so as not to impose on the auditor 
unnecessarily heavy requirements, with 
particular reference to avoid the need to 
refer to going concern concept ........ . 
Arthur Young objected on the grounds that the guideline 
"appears to add strength to the view of some 
users that, when an unqualified audit report 
is signed, the auditor is issuing a guarantee 
that the entity will continue in business for 
a certain period". 
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Coopers & Lybrand were concerned with the 
"danger that accounts users will 
misunderstand the auditors I role and be 
encouraged to seek redress against the 
auditors where a company ceases to be a going 
concern" . 
Ernst & Whinney (England) criticised the draft by concluding 
that it 
"does not strike 
could leave the 
exposed" . 
the correct 
auditor 
balance and 
unreasonably 
Chalmers Impey objected on the grounds that the guideline was 
unworkable and impractical. 
Overall, the firms were concerned with litigation and 
protecting their economic interests. The profession had to 
decide whether the concept justified an 'active l approach or 
a 'passive l approach to audits. Each approach has economic 
consequences for the firms, their clients and other social 
groups. 
Under the 'active' approach, auditors would be required to 
specifically search for symptoms of signs or matters which 
might suggest that a business may cease in the near future. 
In contrast, the 'passive' approach does not require the 
auditors to specifically search for any specific audit 
evidence. An auditor is only required to carry out additional 
auditing procedures, if and only if, the normal audit. work 
reveals some contrary evidence (also see chapter 3). The 
eventual official interpretation can have real consequences 
for auditor liability, especially as following cases such as 
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Lloyd Cheyham & Co v Littlejohn & Co (1985), professional 
pronouncements can provide benchmarks in deciding questions 
of negligence. In such a context, the meaning of the going 
concern concept, invoked in professional statements is of 
considerable significance. The next section shows that the 
APC responded by legitimisng the 'passive approach' to 
auditing going concern issues. 
7.5: PASSIVE APPROACH TO GOING CONCERN 
This section shows that the profession had set out to adopt 
a 'passive approach' to going concern as this minimised audit 
effort and gave the best protection from lawsuits. 
From the literature reviewed in chapter 3, it is not always 
clear whether the APC was recommending an 'active' or a 
'passive' approach2B • Hinton (1983, 1985), Jones (1985) and 
APC (1976) appear to be advocating an 'active' approach, but 
Woolf (1983b) and Charlesworth (1985) claimed that the APC 
had recommended a 'passive' approach. Even the respondents to 
the exposure draft were confused. For example, the Liverpool 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) felt that the exposure 
draft recommended an 'active approach' whilst Thornton Baker 
thought that the earlier parts of the guideline suggested an 
'active approach', and the later parts emphasised the 
'passive approach' and in general failed to clarify "auditor 
responsibility" .• Overall. the ICAEW TACs felt that the 
'passive' versus 'active' dilemma was not resolved and that 
the draft appeared to be confusing and unclear on its general 
approach. In view of the confusing and contradictory 
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messages, the APC was asked2~ to clarify the messages given, 
In a reply dated 26th September 1976, the APC explained that 
the articles by Charlesworth and Hinton were not "in conflict 
with each other to any significant extent", Some conflict 
with the APC (1976) was acknowledged, but the letter added, 
"it is not particularly surprising that an article written 
several years before the going concern project was begun, and 
nine years before the guideline was finished. should be 
reflecting slightly differing views", The same letter now 
considered the previous thinking to be "ephemeral", 
Alan Orme (respondent 24). one of the few non-auditors to 
write to the APC argued that 
"the auditor most certainly should have a 
duty activelY to look for going concern 
problem indicators. It is as much a 
dereliction of duty for him to wait for them 
[problem indicators] to be presented to them 
as for him not to investigate historical 
facts as part of the normal audit", 
Amidst such concerns. what did the working party originally 
set out to achieve? A working party member explained that the 
APC was very conscious of the 'expectations gap' and a major 
purpose of the guideline was to try to narrow this gap, It 
waS also explained that the issue of 'passive' versus 
'active' approach was almost the very first item on their 
agenda for the very first meeting, The working party had 
rejected the Canadian approach (see chapter 3 for a summary) 
and was aware of the 'passive' advocacy of SAS 34 (AICPA. 
1981), The recurring question was how to import it to Britain 
within the possible constraints of SSAP 2 and the Companies 
Act 1981. An interviewee recalled that throughout the 
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development period, the major topic of discussion was 
"How do we do it in such a way that we do not 
put an onus on the auditor to go searching, 
in other words to make a whole range of 
inquiries that he would not have made 
otherwise" . 
In addition there was also a pressure from major firms who 
felt that 
"anything 
articulates 
....... is 
said" . 
which in this 
the auditors' 
desirably not 
particular area 
responsibility 
said rather than 
Despite some reservations, on balance there was a feeling in 
the APe that the guideline protects the auditor rather than 
exPosing his position. According to a working party member, 
the solution adopted is that 
"we don't actually have him [auditor] go out 
and carry out specific steps to see whether 
the going concern basis is appropriate. What 
we ask him to do is - as a normal part of his 
audit work, which he must be doing in any 
case to be actually conscious of the 
factors identified in the guideline to see 
whether any of these are present and if they 
are J then to respond to them". 
Did the guideline recommend a 'passive approach'? The answer 
was a clear "yes" from both working party members. What 
exactly is the message of the 'passive approach'? According 
to a member of the working party, it was saying, 
...... go about your audit and by the way if 
something cbmes and hits you over the head 
which suggests that the going concern 
assumption is not appropriate then you really 
ought to respond to it, but you don't 
actually have to make overt inquiries and yOU 
don't actuallY have to think in an overt way 
about the going concern concept". 
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But why recommend the 'passive approach'? Faced with a 
crisis, the profession could have articulated and legitimised 
the 'active approach', but chose not to. The working party 
members and recent APC members explained that the 'active' 
approach extends auditor responsibilities and is 
uneconomical. The profession has to think of auditing firm 
profitabiliy and cannot extend auditor responsibilities 
unless the firms can profit from such an extension. One 
reason (according to a working party member) for the 'passive 
approach' was that 
"when we have 300,000 to 400,000 active 
companies in the country and if you add about 
an hour of audit time to each then you can 
imagine what that does to audit fees. 400,000 
hours at a minimum of £10 per hour is a lot 
of additional fees or should I say 
write-offs, especially as you will do the 
work and then cannot bill it. We have tried 
to write [the guideline] particularly in 
light of such views expressed by [major named 
firms] and others, ...... that we must be 
very very careful in these areas and not to 
extend the responsibilities too overtly or to 
extend them too graphically". 
According to a working party member, the most important 
message (strongly emphasised) of the guideline is that 
"for the vast majority of audits - 90% plus -
the guideline will not be germane. In fact, 
it will not require more than another half an 
hour of audit time to respond ..... This is 
very important because we had to pursue that 
position. We can't go on economically 
extending standards and we also want to be 
very careful that we don't over-extend the 
auditors' responsibilites". 
Another reason for the 'passive' approach related to the 
possible references to auditing standards and guidelines in 
court cases as benchmarks. A working party member explained 
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that 
"As a practical matter, the APC cannot let 
such things [issues of auditor 
responsibility] go by for long without these 
things to be referred in auditing standards . 
..... few people fully recognise that the APC 
is in a more difficult situation than the 
ASC. It is rare for a legal suit to take 
?lace on accounting standards. Such standards 
are unlikely to find their way to the courts 
and be contested. The sort of things the APC 
has to deal with are very much to do with the 
credibility of the profession. There is no 
political way for us to standstill". 
The 'passive'/'active' confusion did not end with the 
publication of the guideline either. For example, two 
Canadian authors (Boritz and Kralitz. 1987) interpreted the 
guideline as advocating an 'active approach'. 
During interviews. Mr. M.J.C. Butchers, a senior civil 
servant at the Department of Trade and Industry and its 
representative on the APC denied that the APC had intended to 
promote a 'passive'. This view conflicts with the article 
written by Robert Charlesworth (the APC Secretary). In this 
respect, it would be helpful to refer to a document 
circulated by the APC to major firms~z. It shows that in 
order to protect the 'economic interests' of auditing firms, 
it intended advocating a 'passive approach' all along. It 
noted the following: 
fo ints of Principle 
The auditor should 
~~t'~ormallY be requir~d to 
search actively for gOlng 
concern problems. or to 
carry out any additional 
work when considering the 
appropriateness o~ the 
going concern baS1S 
Response 
This was the original 
intention. Paragraphs 6, 14 and 
15 (as now renumbered) 
emphasise that although the 
auditor must be satisfied that 
the going concern basis is 
appropiate, and must consider 
any evidence to the contrary, 
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no specific additional 
procedures will normally be 
necessary. Indications of 
possible going concern problems 
will normally be identified by 
the auditor's other procedures. 
(Only when the validity of the 
going concern basis is called 
into question are further 
procedures required)~1. 
To sum up, this section has shown that the formulation of 
the auditing guideline (APC, 1985a) was motivated by a need 
to protect the 'economic interests' of auditing firms and to 
reduce the incidence of litig~tion against auditors without 
any meaningful increase in audit work. The intention of the 
working party and the APe was to promote a 'passive approach' 
in line with SAS 34 (AICPA, 1981). Many accountancy firms 
were hostile to the original exposure draft, but the wording 
hardly changed in the revised version, possibly due to 
compromises and behind the scene discussions amongst the 
major firms. This concern with liability, responsibility and 
profitability is present throughout all considerations of the 
auditing guideline and is a major determinant of the meanings 
assigned to the going concern concept. 
1.6: CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the 
formulation of the auditing guideline, 'The auditors 
consideration in respect of going concern'. This embodied 
institutional interpretations of the going concern concept in 
an auditing context, 
considered to be 'fundamental' in 
accounting thought. 
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The ASC (1971) described the 'going concern' concept as 
fundamental to accounting, but the APC (1980a, 1983a, 1985a) 
felt it to be 'material but not fundamental'. Chapter 3 noted 
that the traditional interpretations of 'going concern' 
frequently involve discussions of valuation concepts. 
However, in an auditing context, the guideline did not do so. 
Historically, the concept has also been associated with 
discussions about disclosure (e.g. cashflow), but here the 
APC felt that the management would not be willing to disclose 
the uncertainties and ruled out such a step. Seemingly, the 
interpretations have considerable regard for auditor-director 
relationships and the auditors showed considerable sympathy 
with the interests of the directors, who are effectively 
responsible for appointing auditors and upon whose patronage 
auditors also rely for non-auditing and other income. 
As chapter 6 noted, most of the discussions about the 
concept were propelled by an economic crisis. This, 
accompanied by legal changes and the sharpening of conflict 
between accountancy firms and other fractions of capital, 
resulted in lawsuits against auditors. The major firms were 
keen to protect themselves from litigation. This chapter has 
shown that the guideline was developed with that in mind. 
Faced with a crisis, the profession was sympathetic to an 
earlier and subordinate meaning, mainly that going concern is 
concerned with 'survival of a company'. The acceptance of 
such a meaning enabled the profession to reconstruct its 
social identity. However, the profession only accepted a 
'passive' responsibility to make going concern evaluations. 
The 'passive' approach justified minimum audit effort. Such 
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an approa.ch is only artic:ulated in the case of' gOing 
concern' and is not adopted. for example. in relation to 
verification of accruals or consistency of accounting 
policies etc. - also defined as 'fundamental' in accounting 
(ASC. 1971). The particular meanings of the going concern 
concept were shaped to safeguard the 'interests' of major 
accountancy firms who were facing a rush of litigation. With 
professional pronouncements increasingly being treated as 
benchmarks in court cases and the DTI reports, the 
institutional interpretations of the going concern concept 
were seen as being particularly helpful to auditors in 
defending themselves in lawsuits'. The concern with auditor 
liability affected a broad range of meanings, such as those 
relating to 'forseeable future', audit reports, symptoms of 
going concern and so on. The going concern audit reports were 
also designed to provide the auditors with opportunities for 
protecting themselves, even if it involved using the 
'emphasis of matter' report as a 'soft option' or a 'cop 
out' . 
The chapter also noted the 'real' influence of social 
structures on interpretations of the concept and the 
institutions. It was the economic crisis, which placed going 
concern on the profession's agenda and provided a backdrop 
for the creation of the APe. Such an economic crisis had 
serious implications for a powerful economic bloc within the 
accountancy profession, the auditing wing. This bloc had 
. 
previously managaged to protect itself by arguing that a 
crisis of legitimacy was caused by the preparers of 
accounting reports. However, the deepening economic crisis 
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and State led investigation revealed that the auditing wing 
was not performing its functions efficiently. This exerted 
considerable pressures and eventually persuaded the 
profession to form the APe. However, the APe came under the 
control and domination of the very firms whose activities 
could be threatened by the creation of this new agency. A 
major function of the APe came to be to protect the major 
firms from lawsuits and much of its work proceeded along 
those lines. The interpretations of the going concern concept 
are in line with this overall objective. It is noticeable 
that the working party and the respondents mainly came from 
firms facing criticisms and litigation. The same firms also 
controlled the APe. Major firms were also privy to 'inside' 
information and had ample opportunity to tailor the issues, 
agenda, wording of the pronouncements, audit report examples 
and various definitions. 
The profession did not publish the identity of the working 
party, but its identity was known to major firms who were 
privy to many discussions. The working party had its last 
formal meeting in July 1984, but the APe received suggestions 
for revising the draft from major firms after this date. The 
suggestions were accommodated by holding a meeting on 17th 
December 1984 to consider the implications of the Insolvency 
Bill 1984. Minor revisions were also made to the specimen 
exPosure draft after pressures from major firms. One such 
amendment was made on 22nd May 1985, even though the draft 
had finally been approved on 25th March 1985. 
The extent of opposition, if any, to the guideline within 
PAGE 457 
the APC is not known as the details of voting are not 
published. According to the APC's Constitution, the approval 
of two-thirds of the membership is required for' the release 
of a guideline. This means that a vote has to take place and 
this practice is acknowledged in the official literature 
(APC, 1986, page 24). A DTI Minister has also confirmed that 
the APC votes32 • As Appendix 6 shows, the APC balloted its 
members on 23rd April 1985, however, the APC did not publish 
the results of such voting. When the information was 
requested, the Chartered Associa~ion of Certified Accountants 
(CACA) replied that the 
"APC does not vote ....... It will only issue 
a guideline if there is general agreement to 
do so. If there were strong and reasoned 
opposition to doing so, even from a small 
minority of members, I think APC would 
endeavour in redrafting to meet the reasoned 
opposition"33. 
It is tempting to conclude that the major firms' interests 
are promoted through secrecy and control of information. It 
is noted that the membership of the APC and its working 
parties is neither elected nor meets in the 'open'. Access to 
institutions and information depends upon patronage. Major 
firms able to make financial contribution being able to have 
a disproportionate Say. The critics may argue that given the 
influence on the major firms on the auditing market, it is 
inevitable that they would dominate the institutional 
structures. Such observations would lend support to Marx and 
Engels's insistence that in the final analysis, it is the 
'economic' which shapes and influences social practices. 
Due to the crisis nature of capitalism and various 
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ideologies, the State was unable to create an independent 
body to formulate auditing standards. However, through its 
'observers', the government has been able to have a direct 
influence on the details of the guidelines. Through the 
critical reports, the DTI indicated some preferred 
interpretations of the concept, but the extent to which it 
intervened in the formulation of the auditing guideline is 
less clear and visible. Perhaps it is more concerned with 
promoting accountancy firms in order to secure legitimacy for 
corporate disclosures and thus act in the long-term interests 
of capitalism. It is signifi~ant that the firms accused by 
the State of failing to diagnose going concern problems were 
involved with the formulation of the guideline. The Chairman 
of the working party came from Arthur Anderson, a firm sued 
by the government over DeLorean. Arthur Young sued over 
Johnson Mathey and other firms criticised by the DTI reports 
were all present on the APe, responsible for approving the 
guideline. 
In developing and approving the interpretations of the 
concept, quick solutions were being sought, even if this 
meant relying upon personal experiences of chosen individuals 
rather than research. The profession heavily relied upon the 
American standard. It should also be noted that wider 
constituencies, such as the various 'user groups', were not 
consulted in formulating meanings and interpretations of the 
concept. Such groups had no direct representation on the APC 
or the working party. Furthermore, the lack of information 
about the working party may have prevented some parties from 
influencing the interpretations of the concept. 
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· ''', 
The interests of small practitioners only received secondary 
attention. The main thrust of the guideline was to give 
auditors protection from lawsuits without any meaningful 
increase in audit work. The 'passive' approach was desired 
because it is more economical and advantageous to auditors. 
On 90% plus of the audits it was not expected to affect what 
the auditors already do and where it does affect. the APC 
reasoned that it would not require more than half an hour's 
extra time. Such aspects. especially if they protect and 
promote the material interests. may appeal even to small 
practitioners and thus persuade them to support the guideline 
and the APC. 
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Chapter 7 Footnotes 
1) Rather than presenting an encyclopaedic history of the 
APe, the aim is to concentrate on those aspects which will 
help in understanding the 'interests' which have shaped the 
meanings of the going concern concept. 
2) For example, see the 'Ethical Guidelines' issued by the 
professional bodies. 
3) A review of the developments relating to the formation and 
development of the ASSC is not intended here as this has been 
ably done in other places, for example, see Stamp and Marley 
1970; Zeff 1972; Lowe ~d Ti~ker 1977; Leach and Stamp 1981; 
Bromwich. 1985. The 1ntent1on here is to refer only to some 
aspects of the episodes relevant to understanding the rise of 
the APC. 
4) Harmood Banner merged with Deloitte Haskins and Sells in 
1974. It was not a small firm. At the time of merger it had a 
UK staff of 1,100 compared to .Delotte's 1,600 (Accountancy. 
July 1979, pages 70-73). 
5) A letter from a former Secretary of State for Trade, dated 
6th December 1989. 
6) These included the 1969-70 ICAEW President and Peat 
Marwick partner, Sir Ronald Leach; Ernst & Whinney partner 
Peter Godfrey; Spicer & Pegler partner Richard Langdon; 1972 
ICAEW President and Touche Ross partner, Douglas (later Sir) 
Morpeth; Price Waterhouse partner Martin Harris: Coopers & 
Lybrand partner David Hobson; Thomson McLintock partner and 
1969-70 ICAS President, Sir William Slimmings, amongst 
others. 
7) As published in The Accountant (15th April 1971, page 
479) . 
8) As per The Accountant (20th April 1972, page 512). 
9) A profile of David Richards will be found in Accountancy, 
July 1979, pages 70-73. 
10) David Richards went on to be nominated the President of 
the ICAEW in its centenary year, 1979/80 (Accountancy, July 
1979, pages 70-73). 
11) The APC's first membership came from the following firms: 
e; 
Arthur Anders~n 
Barber Harrison and Platt 
Carter Newman • 
Coopers & Lybrand 
HaYS Allan 
Kidsons . 
Peat Marwick and M1tchell 
Price Waterhouse (3) 
Pridie Brewster & Gold 
Spicer & Pegler 
Stokes Kennedy and Crowley 
PAGE 461 
Thornton Baker 
12) Since 1986, the APC has been a division of a private 
limited company, CCAB Ltd. Its shareholding is as follows: 
ICAEW 
CACA 
CIMA 
lCAS 
CIPFA 
ICAI 
51.7% 
17.2% 
14.7% 
7.3% 
6.0% 
3.0% 
13) Letter dated 19th October 1989. 
14) However, it should be noted that the firms criticised by 
the DTI and implicated in negligence law-suits have 
representatives on the APC. 
15) During 1987 (press release dated 23rd April 1987), the 
APC introduced five observers representing various 
non-auditor interests, but these are 'non-voting'. 
16) The accounts of the professional bodies do not reveal 
information about the financial resources devoted to the APC. 
The annual reports of CCAB Ltd for 1985 and 1986 were also 
examined, but these did not provide any indication either. In 
fact, the words ASC and APC do not even get a,mention in such 
reports. 
17) A letter dated 8th October 1987 from the Secretary of 
State, Lord Young of Graffham. 
18) As per the letter dated 10th December 1986. 
19) From the letter dated 26th September 1986. 
20) In letter dated 6th October 1986. 
21) In letter dated 21st November 1986. 
22) Extract from a letter dated 17th December 1986. 
23) Letter from the APC, dated 26th September 1986. 
24) Only a tiny fraction of DTI reports is published. For 
example, between 1979 and 1989, so~e 1,100 investigations 
were conducted by the DTI, leadlng to the appointment of 
inspectors in 56 cases. However, only 13 reports have been 
published (Hansard, 27th November 1989, col. 93). 
25) In his letters of 22nd Septmber 1989, 1st November 1989 
and 30th January 1990, the Minister for Corporate and 
Consumer Affairs has confirmed the DTI practice of providing 
copies of unpublished DTI reports critical of auditors to the 
ICAEW. Such reports are not placed in front of Parliament. 
26) Quote from a letter dated 26th September 1986. 
27) In this respect, the view expressed by a professional 
body may be of interest. The Secretary of the CACA wrote 
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(letter dated 27th November 1987), "As one of the bodies 
participating in the sponsorship and working of a joint 
committee (APC), we are concerned primarily with the progress 
and effectiveness of that Committee's work, and less with the 
intellectual routes travelled by the Chairman and members in 
arriving at their conclusions". 
28) According to Robert Charlesworth (1985), the APC 
Secretary, the 'passive approach' assumes that the "going 
concern basis is appropriate, unless indications to the 
contrary come to his attention as a result of other audit 
procedures. Only when such problems have been identified does 
he [auditor] need to apply audit procedures specifically 
directed towards the going concern basis". The 'active 
approach' involves "carrying out specific audit procedures 
designed to obtain positive audit evidence that substantiates 
the applicability of of the going concern concept" 
(Charlesworth, 1985). 
29) From a letter dated 19th September 1986. 
30) This document was provided by an interviewee who 
confirmed receiving internal information as a matter of 
routine. See Sikka. Willmott and Lowe, (l98S) for discussion 
of this. 
31) Following are the appropriate 
paragraphs mentioned. 
extracts from the 
"6) ..... if during the course of his audit, 
the auditor becomes aware of any indications that 
the going concern basis may no longer be valid, he 
should carry out the additional procedures 
outlined in this guideline. If the auditor's 
procedures reveal no such indications, it will be 
reasonable for him to accept that the going concern 
assumption is appropriate." 
"14) In performing the preparatory procedures 
identified in the Auditing Guideline "Planning, 
controlling and recording", the auditor should 
consider whether any of the indications of the 
nature described in paragraphs 10 and 11 above 
are present.·· 
"15) Such procedures should not generally 
encompass any specific additional procedures, 
since the matter identified above would normally 
be known to the auditor as a result of his other 
audit procedures .......... . 
32) As per a 
Parliamentary Under 
Consumer Affairs. 
letter (19th October 
Secretary of State 
33) Letter dated 26th February 1987. 
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1989) from the 
for Industry & 
CHAPTER 8 
MEANINGS OF GOING CONCERN: ExpLAINING THE PRACTITIONERS' 
YIEWS 
~,0: Introduction 
This chapter continues to provide further explanations of 
meanings, interpretations and implications of the going 
concern concept in an auditing context. It follows from 
chapter 4, which referred to ,what the auditors regarded as 
the meanings, implications and interpretations of going 
concern concept. The meanings and interpretations of the 
concept by auditors were solicited through interviews and 
questionnaires. The respondents had considerable experience 
of auditing in general and going concern aspects in 
particular. Overall. the subjects' auditing experience 
amounted to 17.91 years on average and all the interviewees 
occupied senior positions in their respective firms. Chapter 
4 noted that many of the interpretations and meanings 
assigned to the concept by practitioners were often 
contradictory and also different from those being advocated 
by the professional bodies. These were summarised in figure 
4.1 on page 191. It is as though some practitioners were 
refusing to be addressed by some aspects of the professional 
pronouncements. 
The exPlanations offered are within the methodological 
framework explained in chapter 2. A number of cross-cutting 
influences which have shaped the practitioners' worldviews 
and thus help to reproduce and transform the meanings of the 
concept are identified.These factors are shown in figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 
Practitioners' Interpretations of the Going Concern Concept 
8.1 
Influence of 
Ed uc a t;.:i:...;o:..:.n~_-," 
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8.4 
Material 
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Practitioners 
The first section (8. 1) 
8.5 
L~rge 
Audit 
Firms 
Small 
Audit 
Firms 
8.6 
Interpre_ 
~ __________ ~tations 
of GOing 
Concern 
shows that the nature of 
professional education is a major determinant of the meanings 
which practitioners attach to the concept. The second section 
(8.2) shows that the i.nterests of finance capital help the 
auditors to make sense of the meanings of going concern. 
During discussions, almost all auditors argued that 
identification of going concern symptoms had not been a major 
problem for them, as they had sufficient professional 
eA~ertise. A major problem was whether having identified such 
Symptoms, they should qualify the accounts. Almost all argued 
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that a number of material influences and 'interestc' 
prevented them from putting some interpretations on the 
concept. Such factors included the tendency for auditors to 
sympathise with the general interects of directors (section 
8.3) and the material .interests of practitioners themselves 
(section 8.4), where' the concern with litigation &ld risk 
reduction are major factors influencing the meaning and 
interpretations of the concept. The fifth section (8.5) 
highlights the differences of interpretation by large and 
medium/small 
are thus 
opportunities 
firms. 
subject 
and 
OCCUpy different 
structures (see 
Such firms have different clientele and 
to different economic pressures, 
threats. The large and small firms also 
positions within the po 1 i cj-°-making 
chapter 7) and may thus oppose some 
institutional meanings. Section 8.6 concludes the chapter 
with a discussion and summary. 
B.l: PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANCY EDUCATION AND GOING CONCERN 
At the beginning of interviews, each interviewee was asked to 
give his views on the going concern concept. Chapter 3 has 
alreadY noted the contradictory and often contentious 
meanings of the concept. It was shown that the concept has 
been invoked to justify many practices in financial 
reporting. The earlier writings by Dicksee, de Paula, Leake 
and others related the going concern concept to issues 
concerning the· contents of the balance sheet and interim 
valuation. Since that period, the going concern concept has 
been invoked t() justify the use of original cost, constant 
purchasing power (CPP), current cost accounting ( CCA), 
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deprival values. exit values. entry values. deferring of 
~xpendit\Jre. permanent capitalis8:tion of costs, lower of cost 
and market value rule for inventories, depreciation, cashflow 
~eporting, etc. Going concern concept has been used to 
justif;j-· disclosure relating to doubtful debts and purchases 
subject to reservation" of title. It has also been used to 
justify numerous treatments of goodwill and avoidance of 
valuation of assets by property companies. Indeed, it is 
difficult to think of any area of financial reporting where 
the going concern concept has not been invoked to support or 
oppose the need for some inform~tion or accounting treatment. 
Given such a colourful history, there was an expectation that 
the interviewees would have considerable views on the issues 
mentioned above. 
When asked to give their views on the going concern concept, 
almost all interviewees started by quoting the standard 
definition from SSAP 2, in many cases word perfect. However, 
beyond the standard definition of the concept, it was 
difficult to engage practitioners in any discussion relating 
to valuation bases or the contradictory meanings of the 
concept referred to in chapter 3. In the course of 
discussions, a vast majority of the inteviewees felt that the 
going concern concept was of fairly recent origin. "It was 
the ASC which invented it"; "there was no such thing in my 
d " ";t was certa;nl v not younger ays; ... ... " around in my student 
days"; "It was not in any book I read when I qualified"; "the 
term became fashionable during the 1970s recession"; "it must 
have come from America ...... "; "I never heard of it until 
SSAP 2 was issued"; "I had not thought about it. until now" 
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was not an uncommon response. Going concern was not regarded 
as the result of a particular kind of theory, research or 
society, but instead simply considered to be "a matter of 
reality and practicality"; "going concern concept is so 
obvious to anyone, there is hardly any need to mention or 
theorise it"; "it is a funny sort of a concept, unlike 
accruals and consistency, it is difficult to visualise", "it 
is more to do with preparation of accounts and less, if of 
any, concern to auditors". Overall, despite the rich history 
of the concept, the practitioners were unwilling, or unable, 
to engage in any discussion to disentangle the meanings and 
interpretations of the concept. The practitioners' focus on 
what they regarded as 'practical concerns' ruled out 
discussions relating to valuations and disclosures which form 
the heart of much of the historical and contemporary debates 
on the concept. Practitioners continued to express the view 
that they do not "have any difficulties with the meaning of 
going concern. It seems to be a practical matter, rather than 
theoretical"; "concepts are of interest to academics, we at 
the coal-face are interested in hard facts and practical 
matters"; "this firm's survival and perhaps I should say my 
income depends on identifying going concern problems, I do 
not see how questions of valuation and disclosure are related 
to that", were some of the sentiments expressed by 
practitioners. Most were content to accept whatever valuation 
base the accountancy bodies recommended. According to them it 
was up to the professional bodies to guide the accountants on 
the valuations and disclosures appropriate for going 
concerns. 
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Nhl1st numerous factors play a part in shaping the 
practitioners~ worldviews. the influence of professional 
education on the interpretations of going concern should not 
be underestimated. The professional education socialises 
practitioners into role specific knowledge. role specific 
vocabularies and routines and filters out some issues .. from 
consideration altogether. It plays a part in creating and 
maintaining subjective reality of aspiring practitioners by 
engaging them in professional conversations. promoting a 
particular kind of social order and relations of power to 
shape their worldviews. 
What images of going concern has the professional education 
process given to practitioners? Such issues cannot easily be 
addressed without a comment on the nature of professional 
accountancy education. In the main. professional accountancy 
education makes little effort to make practitioners aware of 
theoretical debates. history. institutionalised power and 
conflicts or contradictions which silently form the backdrop 
against which meanings are assigned to accounting concepts. 
Instead, as Hastings and Hinnings (1970) argue, 
anti-theoretical pragmatism rules. Even though the Royal 
Charters of the acountancy bodies require them 
..... to advance the theory and practice of 
accountancy in all its aspects. including in 
particular auditing ....... (ICAEW's Royal 
Charter of 1948). 
The professional accountancy education imposes meanings. of 
accounting concepts by requiring the students to continuously 
repeat and recite them. The text books for professional 
courses tend to place excessive emphasis on professional 
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pronouncements and less and less time is devoted to' 
discussing anything radical or different (Baxter, 1981j. As 
Tinker (1985) notes. 
"Professional accounting education is 
certainly not a talking shop for exploring 
social existence: rather it resembles a rote 
learning process. in which students are 
inculcated with the profession's party line 
by pedantic and legalistic methods" (page 
xx) . 
The contents of major accounting and auditing text books 
have also not promoted a wider discussion of the going 
concern concept. Significantly, despite the earlier debates 
(see chapters 3 and 5. 6 and 7), and the numerous meanings 
which various authors have attached to the concept, recent 
professional literature (for example, Cooper, 1971; Waldron, 
1978; de Paula and Attwood 1982; Howard, 1982; Stoy Hayward, 
1983), prior to the publication of the draft auditing 
guideline (APC, 1983a) made little or no reference to going 
concern in an auditing context. Only fleeting references 
could be found in Thornton Baker (1981). However, after the 
issue of the draft auditing guideline, a large number of 
books (for example, Coopers and Lybrand, 1984, 1985; Thornton 
Baker, 1983; Millichamp, 1984; Pratt, 1983) began to refer to 
the concept not by critically evaluating it, but by producing 
summaries or copies of the guideline. SSAP2 institutionalised 
the going concern concept in 1971, but despite this Lafferty 
(1982) did not contain any mention of the concept, whereas 
Beckett (1980) Farmer (1983), Lewis and Firth (1985) and Gee 
(1985) tended to repeat the words from SSAP 2 and Companies 
Acts and little else. It is as though professional 
accountancy education, combined with other factors, was 
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denying space to the competing meanings. Chapter 7 noted that 
a powerful elite had formulated the instltutional meanings of 
the ooncept. Through the educatiori process the 'interests' of 
the elites are being privileged and the historical 
debates/developments have been renedered either insignificant 
and/or invisible. 
The contents and conteA~ of professional education not only 
influences discussions of the concept, but also the 
techniques which practitioners may select to identify going 
concern problems. For example, accounting scholars (Beaver, 
1966; Taffler and Tisshaw, 1977; Kida, 1980) have noted the 
power of acoounting ratios to make going concern predictions 
and Westwick (1980) specifically recommends them to auditors 
to identify going concern problems. In view of the long 
history (Horrigan, 1968; Dev. 1974). the usefulness of 
accounting ratios is emphasised in numerous accounting books 
and is an accepted part of accounting folklore and 'common 
sense'. The going concern definition in SSAP 2 (ASC, 1971) 
treats the concept as though it is future orientated, i.e. it 
is defined as "the enterprise will continue in operational 
existence for the forseeable future" (para 14) which might 
mean less emphasis on past data. However, accounting is seen 
as a science where predictions can be made from past 
experiences and hard data (FASB, 1978; Sterling, 1970). The 
use of ratios is considered to be 'common sense'. With such 
an ideology, the -auditors also make use of ratios to identify 
going concern problems 1 , frequently looking at trends to see 
patterns~. When asked to explain the reasons for using ratios 
to make going concern evaluations, many practitioners 
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explained. that "all the books show usefulness of ratios"; 
"the Institute's digest shows their Jmportance"; "I attended 
courses on going concern where the usefulness of ratios was 
shown". One practitioner from a m~jor firm, startled by a 
request to explain reasons for using ratios, telephoned his 
technical director (TD). The conversation, heard through a 
telephone amplifier, went as follows: 
\ 
Partner: ....... I am being interviewed. 
why do we use ratios to identify 
concern problems". 
~ [after a silence of around 12 seconds] 
". . . . . ummm .... What else is there ..... . 
All accountants use them ..... Ratios are in 
all the books ..... we all studied them and I 
think even the auditing guideline recommends 
them. All major firms use them and we have 
been using them for years with good effect, I 
might add. 
[after more silence] ..... It is a funny sort 
of a question. The answer is so obvious. 
Partner: "I think [the researcher] would like 
to know the ratios which we specially use and 
the reasons for that. 
~ ........ Our practice is no different from 
what one might find in good professional 
books, journals or the Institute's 
recommendations. If you send him [the 
researcher] to me I will show him the books 
. in our library" ::5 
Overall, the context and content of professional education is 
important in influencing which aspects of the going concern 
would be elaborated and which would be ignored. The meanings 
and interpretations expressed in books themselves are 
reflective of the wider relations of power and dominance. But 
nevertheless, the accountancy profession and professional 
education mobilises bias by giving institutionalised 
legitimacy to some meanings and interpretations of the 
concept, whilst rejecting others. 
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8,2: DOMINANT INTERESTS OF FINANCE CAPITAL 
In view of its growth and development under the influence of 
bankruptcy practies, the accountancy profession has paid 
particular attention to the interests of 'finance capital' 
(Brown, 1905). As chapters 3 and 5 noted, the earlier 
interpretations of the going concern, especially the rules 
relating to valuation of fixed assets and floating assets. 
were formulated with the interests of 'finance' in mind. This 
also needs to be seen in a wider social context, where the 
'interests' of finance are privileged (also see chapter 2). 
There is a deeply held belief that the financial statements 
are primarily for the benefit of 'finance capital' (Bryer and 
Brignall, 1986). Such beliefs frequently manifest themselves 
through authoritative accounting pronouncements (for example. 
American Institute of Accountants, 1936; FASB, 1978; lCAS, 
1988; Solomons 1989) which promote a set of power relations 
and state that the purpose of financial statements is to help 
investors and creditors to make useful decisions by enabling 
them to make predictions of future revenue, cash flows, 
performance. etc. The scholars concentration on the interests 
of institutional and private investors (Lee and Tweedie, 
1976; 1981) and capital markets (for example, Revsine, 1973), 
further reinforces the reality that financial statements must 
be, and are. of particular significance to 'finance capital'. 
Such ideologies are further reinforced through education and 
accounting and auditing text books (for example, Underdown 
and Taylor. 1985; Woolf, 1979; Millichamp, 1984) which 
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routinely emphasise the supremacy of investors and creditors. 
Such images of accounting practice shape the meanings and 
interpretations of the going concern concept. 
The concern with the interests of 'finance capital' is 
universal amongst auditors regardless of the firm size. This 
is highlighted by an extract from the questionnaire 
responses~ given by auditors. Table 8.1 shows that the going 
concern qualifications are meant to alert financial investors 
and creditors. The auditors associate going concern with the 
information needs of capital markets, creditors, 
institutional and individual investors. Comments such as 
"share prices depend on published information and surely 
without the audit opinion the information would not be very 
believable, would it"; "no creditor managing his finances 
properly can afford to ignore the auditors opinion" were 
common enough. No participant associated going concern with 
information relating to employees. control of pollution, 
health and safety, equitable distribution of wealth, social 
responsibility, etc. It was always associated with the 
investors' concern for 'f!~ancial returns' or the creditors' 
concern with recoverability of the amounts advanced. 
The concern with the interests of 'finance capital' was 
highlighted whenever the auditors referred to the purpose of 
audit reports. An unqualified audit report has messages for 
investors and creditors, implying that a business is 
financially viable (statement 13) . A going concern 
qualification was described as providing 'red flags' and 
'danger signals' which had messages and consequences for 
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share prices, institutional investors and creditors. As 
statement 5 in table 8.1 shows, 93.1% of the respondents 
believed that going concern qualifications had serious 
consequences for such parties. Such beliefs existed even 
though no participant was able to refer to any evidence which 
suggested that going concern qualifications influenced share 
prices, or that the audit qualification safeguarded the value 
of shareholder investment. When pressed, the response was "it 
[going concern qualification] must be important"; "., .... it 
has to be" ; " ...... it is common sense" ; . .... it is an 
important source of information for any investor and 
credi tor"; "surely, our work is of great importance, 
otherwise one would not see all the press fuss about 
auditors", From such thoughts, the purpose of a going concern 
qualification was frequently explained ~ to be 'to alert 
shareholders and other investors and creditors of impending 
solvency and liquidity problems'; 'to inform the shareholders 
that the company has possible financial problems'; 'to alert 
users of the need for third party financial support which if 
withdrawn may lead to corporate collapse'; 'to alert the 
readers of the risks surrounding investments'; 'warning of 
possible liquidation'. Overall, there was a strong feeling 
that going concern qualifications have considerable 
consequences for investors. This sense of importance existed 
even though 29.2% of the respondents felt that users do not 
understand the significance of a going concern qualification 
(statement 29) and 42.8% of the respondents (statement 25) 
deemed them not to be very informative. Respondents reasoned 
such views by arguing that "only those who have made 
reasonable efforts to understand going concern matters have 
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any right to understand them" ; "what is important is that the 
institutional investors understand them"; "what matters is 
the understanding of major investors"; "as long as bankers 
and pension funds understand them, I am not too worried"; "I 
would not expect an ordinary person to understand them, it 
needs special knowledge and skills". The respondents did not 
see any contradictions in their responses to statements 5, 25 
and 29. 
The auditors 1 concern with the interests of finance capital 
is shaped by a wider structure of social relations in which 
the State plays a vital role in legitimising a certain kind 
of social order. Ingham (1984) refers to the historical 
struggles and processes which have given 'finance capital' a 
prominent place in British economy through its ability to 
finance wars, trades, empires and political prestige. A 
capitalist economy has to rely upon credit for expansion of 
trade and production. In a capitalist economy, where the 
production prcesses are in the hands of private capital, the 
State has to rely upon the revenues generated by private 
capital for its own survival. In view of the political 
importance attached to 'finance capital', it is not 
surprising that the State has taken active steps to promote 
and protect the interests of 'finance'. The State has 
promoted the interests of 'finance capital' through 
legislative programmes and frameworks (e.g. the Joint Stock 
Companies Act, 1856; Companies Act, 1985 and 1989; Financial 
Services Act, 1986). Since the Companies Act 1948, 'secret 
, 
reserves are prohibited for ordinary companies, but banks 
and insurance companies are permitted to have them. The 
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legislation requires auditors to consider the interests of 
shareholders and creditors (Companies Act 1985, section 390). 
Such legislation also forms the core of professional 
education and forms a 'common sense' view of auditors, who 
have looked to legislation for guidance. For example, early 
accountants associated going concern with 'costs' because the 
Companies Act 1862 and the Railways Act 1868 required so. The 
Companies Acts emphasise the power of shareholders by 
referring to their right to remunerate auditors (Companies 
Act 1985, section 385), remove auditors (section 386) and the 
auditors' obligation to report to them (section 236). 
Government ministers frequently see audits primarily for the 
benefit of shareholders only (Accountancy Age, 6th August 
1987). When a participant was asked why he considers the 
'interests' of shareholders to be paramount in making going 
concern decisions, his reply was "it is the law " . . . . . .. , 
...... 
the accounts are for shareholders". The impact of 
legislation in creating and reinforcing social reality and 
influencing the auditors' considerations of going concern 
issues affects what might even appear to be minor issues, 
such as the selection of accounting ratios for diagnosing 
going concern problems. Here is a sample of a discussion with 
practitioners: 
Researcher: ..... which accounting ratios do 
you consider to be helpful for going concern 
purposes? 
Participant: ..... current ratio, liquidity 
ratio and ratios like that ....... . 
Researcher: What is the special significance 
of these ratios? 
ParticiPant: Most of the ratios which we use 
are influenced by our experience and legal 
requirements ...... Section 518 of the 
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Companies Act 1985 emphasises 
of these ratios in determining 
of a company. This and the 
1986. emhasises the need to 
certain that a company's debts 
the importance 
the solvency 
Insolvency Act 
be reasonably 
will be paid . 
.... . The Insolvency Act in particular 
requires me to focus on current assets and 
liabilities and ability to protect creditors. 
Basically, we are guided by law and common 
sense" . 
........ 
section 
mentions 
I look at company forecasts, because 
173 of the Companies Act 1985 
it ...... ". 
To sum up, the interests of finance capital are an important 
determinant of the meanings and' interpretations of the going 
concern concept which cause auditors to focus on questions of 
mortgage repayments, debt redemptions, creditor turnover, 
gearing, interest payments etc. Such approaches to going 
concern are the result of a particular kind of social order 
and are influenced by deeply rooted historical and 
ideological factors which give special emphasis to the 
interests of finance capital. The State, through its 
promotion of the interests of 'finance capital', also 
reinforces the practitioners' social reality, The nature of 
professional accountancy education also reinforces the 
dominance of 'finance capital', 
~!3: SYMPATHY WITH THE INTERESTS OF DIRECTORS 
Though the interests of finance capital are considered to be 
paramount in consideration of the meanings and 
interpretations of the going concern concept, the auditors do 
not ignore the interests of the directors who effectively 
employ them. Throughout their work, the auditors have to 
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interact directly with the representatives of various 
~ 
fractions of capital, i.e. directors. Despite the legal 
rights of shareholders relating to appointment, removal and 
remuneration of auditors, it is the directors which control 
such factors and for all practical purposes are the 
paymasters of auditors. In general, it is the directors, not 
shareholders, who are known as tclients'. The auditors have 
to consider the interests of directors or risk losing their 
financial rewards. Such economic dependence forces auditors 
to make ooncessions and protect the directors' interests. 
Vivid evidence of this has been provided in many of the 
Department of Trade reports reviewed in chapters 6 and 7. 
However, such pressures also create conflicts in that the 
auditors may be seen as being too close to directors, from 
whom they are supposed to be independent, and thus risk 
losing their wider social legitimacy. The auditors make 
concessions to the interests of directors as long as it is 
consistent with their own material interests and the 
concessions are made within whatever is considered to be 
consistent with the auditor's definition of tpublic' or 
'professional' interests. Such fears and concerns shape the 
meanings and implications of the going ooncern concept. 
Table B.2 highlights the auditor's perception of some of the 
consequences of going concern audit qualification. These 
include the belief that such a qualification could increase a 
client's financial problems (statement 6), precipitate 
business failure (statement B) and increase the cost of 
obtaining finance (statement 9). Such consequences, in the 
minds of the users, may create negative images of director 
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efficiency and propriety and put pressures upon the auditor 
for delaying completion of an audit (statement 7) until at 
least some of the uncertainties could either be resolved, or 
better dealt with. Such factors and their consequences for 
auditor-director relationship figured heavily in 
interpretations of the concept and the auditor's decision to 
issue a qualified audit report. Auditors were uncertain as to 
whether a going concern qualification was a comment on 
managerial abilities or not. There was a tendency amongst 
respondents from larger firms to argue that such 
qualifications are purely financial and are not really a 
comment on the managment. However, 34.4% felt that such 
qualifications are a very direct reference to managerial 
abilities (statement 11): "The directors are, of course, 
concerned with any negative comment"; "they do not want a 
whole lot of suspicions and questions raised against them" 
were some of the comments. "By qualifying, I would be saying 
that the directors have not done their best or been 
successful in raising finance, managing debtors, cash or even 
11 ' ... se lng ...... , .. everyone knows that it is the 
directors who appoint auditors, if I insisted on qualifying I 
had better be ready to be replaced ...... I am not sure 
whether I should be making these comments", reflect a range 
of opinions given. Anbther partner stated, "it is far better 
for all concerned to co-operate, we are not there to put 
management down or to put them in.s bad light. Auditors are 
the first people management turn to when faced with viability 
problems and it is our professional duty to assist them". A 
number of commentators also interpreted the going concern 
problem indicators outlined in the auditing guideline as 
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directly relating to management integrity and acumen. The 
auditors tended to put director welfare above the need to 
inform the users of financial statements. This was frequently 
justified by the feeling that auditors "have to give the 
company a chance to recover" even at the expense of "delay in 
completing the audit". 
One partner (recent member of the APe) e~~lained his 
attitude by referring to his real experience. He recalled 
that in the early 70s he was faced with a company whose 
balance sheet suggested insolvency and in view of the 
recession. the prospects looked bleak. But he had to trust 
the directors' "business knowhow" as "they know more about 
their business than I do". The publication of the accounts 
was delayed to give everyone a chance of assessing the 
situation with a cool head. Eventually, after being satisfied 
on profit on future contracts, a clean audit report was 
given. The partner went on, "You see ..... by issuing a going 
concern qualification I might have put that company out of 
business. but it is a thriving company today. This is a 
difficult situation, which also poses threats to our legal 
liability. The easiest situation is where a company's 
financial situation, or should I say problems, such as 
losses. not paying creditors or overrunning the overdraft are 
well known. In that situation. our qualification cannot do 
harm to anyone. One thing I am sure of is that as auditors we 
must listen to· the directors and not rush into making 
qualifications which we might come to regret". 
The auditors were certain that in the event of any 
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significant doubts about the applicability of the going 
concern assumption, directors were to be consulted first. The 
relevant audit evidence has to be collected from directors 
and, if necessary. auditors would help to generate such 
evidence. For example, cash forecasts are thought to provide 
relevant data for assessment of an enterprise's ability to 
remain a going concern. A number of respondents felt that in 
the absence of any legal framework requiring companies to 
provide such information to auditors, they did not always 
receive such information. However, the director's refusal to 
give access to readily available forecasts, or to 
provide/prepare cash forecasts was not seen as impairing the 
conduct of an audit or infringing the auditor's statutory 
rights and obligations (section 237, Companies Act 1985). In 
such circumstances, the auditors did not proceed to qualify 
the accounts, but held discussions with management and 
frequently prepared the forecast themselves or assisted the 
directors or took no action at all~. 
This section has suggested that the auditors' meanings and 
interpretations of the concept are shaped by their sympathies 
with the interests of directors. This itself is influenced by 
the perceived impact of going concern qualifications on 
companies and the resultant consequences for the material 
interests of auditors. 
§.4: MATERIAL INTERESTS OF PRACTITIONERS 
A major determinant of the meanings and implications of the 
going concern concept is the material interests of 
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practitioners themselves. Auditors exist in a capitalist 
society where in order to survive and reproduce their 
businesses they must earn profits. The audit fees (in many 
cases also leading to the provision of non-auditing services) 
are a major source of their incomes, property, prestige and 
status. Such privileges are threatened not only by the 
possible actions of directors, but also whenever the auditors 
confront adverse publicity, a lawsuit or risk losing a 
client. The pursuit of material interests frequently brings 
auditors in conflict not only with other fractions of 
capital, but also with wider social movements and concerns. 
In such an environment, auditors cannot single-mindedly 
pursue their own material interests. Such a pursuit can lead 
to open warfare with other fractions of capital and a loss of 
legitimcay for capital generally. In many cases, compromises 
have to be made and they shape the meanings of the going 
concern concept. Table 8.3 highlights some instances where 
the material interests of practitioners play a particular 
part in shaping the meanings and interpretations of the 
concept. 
It is the concern with material interests which persuades 
the auditors to pay attention to some aspects of the 
valuation debate. Whereas the auditors were unwilling to 
discuss the appropriateness of any valuation base implied by 
the historical nature of the going concern concept, they were 
quite concerned 
of circumstances 
about 
where 
the valuation problems 
a company is not 
nevertheless 
arising out 
considered to be a going concern or when a serious doubt 
exists concerning its survival. According to the professional 
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pronouncements (APe, 1985a), in such circumstances "the 
auditor should consider the recoverability and classification 
of assets, the classification of liabilities and the 
possibility of new liabilities, were the company to cease to 
be a trading concern" (para 26). Despite the myth of a 
professional knowledge base, 59.5% of the respondents agreed 
(statement 30) that for a non-going concern, the auditors do 
not have the ability to ascertain the recoverable value of 
assets and considered this to be a problem. Most auditors did 
not have any direct personal experience of preparing 
financial statements for non-going concerns, but due to 
traditional beliefs in accounting, felt that such businesses 
needed to show their assets and liabilities at break-up or 
liquidation values. Whilst noting that the primary 
responsibility for preparing financial statements for 
non-going concerns rested with the directors. the auditors 
felt that they would have difficulty in verifying such 
values, if used, and thus would make them vulnerable to 
criticisms and possibly legal action. The interviewees aired 
their anxieties by stating. "the directors could give me a 
figure of 'recoverability', but I do not know how valid such 
figures would be"; "at the margin it is difficult for us to 
judge the recoverability of assets and then say yes this 
information would be useful ..... ". Another partner stated, 
"The profession has never explained what is meant by 
'liquidation value' or 'break-up value'. I do not have any 
exPertise in that field". The auditors were concerned that by 
attesting to such financial statements they might invite 
lawsuits. Indeed, chapters 6 and 7 noted that the fear of 
lawsuits has been a major influence on the institutional 
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meanings and interpretations of the going concern concept. 
In pursuance of short-term profits and returns, auditors 
look for low cost auditing techniques to identify going 
concern problems. The auditors make use of accounting ratios 
because they are already familiar with them. The usefulness 
of ratios is taught on almost all accounting courses. Faced 
with a pressure to make going concern evaluations, the 
auditors fall back on traditional technologies and despite an 
appeal to claims of professionalism, are reluctant to incur 
additional costs in exploring new techniques. In order to 
boost their short-term profitability, the auditors very 
rarely introduced any new auditing techniques to make going 
concern decisions. All of the interviewees were asked, but 
none claimed to have audit routines specific for going 
concern decisions. "It all depends on the circumstances", was 
a typical comment. Such evaluations tended to be a by-product 
of simple analytical reviews in which the ratios already 
played a prominent part. Appendix 7 shows a checklist headed 
'Financial Review Checklist' which, according to a partner in 
a major multinational firm, contains "all that there is to 
know about detecting going concern problems". Such a 
checklist is an all purpose checklist and focuses on 
operating performance, accounting reports, financing 
arrangements, future plans and insurance cover. Many of the 
lawsuits and DTI criticisms mentioned in chapter 6 were due 
to the fact that the auditors failed to recognise a new or 
novel situation which threatened the ability of a company to 
remain a going concern. In contrast, the checklist encourages 
auditors to audit by the book because such an approach is 
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believed to be more cost-effective. The partners interviewed 
were reluctant to experiment with techniques such as 
Z-scores 7 as they found little use for them. Some firms were 
willing to consider such techniques, but only if the courts 
and insurers were willing to accept them as part of relevant 
audit evidence. They were concerned that in the event of 
litigation, the conclusions reached from such evidence might 
not be acceptable. 
Table 8.3 also refers to some other meanings and 
interpretations of the concept arising from the material 
interests of practitioners. An interesting feature of 
discussions with auditors was that almost all argued that 
they were able to correctly diagnose going concern problems, 
frequently by looking at ratios derived from past accounting 
information and by considering additional quantitative (e.g. 
Z scores) and non-quantitative (e.g. bank mandates) 
informationel • As a Big-Eight partner put it "all you need is 
good judgement and about six or so accounting ratios and any 
accountant worth anything will tell you whether the business 
is likely to continue. I have made going concern 
evaluations all my life". However, having diagnosed going 
concern problems and after consideration of additional data, 
it did not necessarily follow that they would issue a going 
concern qualification. As one partner put it, "there are so 
many factors and dangers which we have to consider . 
.. , .people do not understand the dilemmas and dangers which 
we face ...... If we qualify we would be damned, if we do not 
qualify, we would still be damned. We have to consider the 
consequences of qualifying for everyone concerned". Other 
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partners said, "we have to consider our portfolio of clients, 
competition. and the legal environment. We can't dish out 
going concern qualifications like confetti, but have to be 
alert to its implications"; " the problem is not 
identification of going concern problems but rather when to 
qualify or not to qualify"; "suppose we qualified and .the 
company went out of business, we cOt.lld be open to a massive 
claim. We try to be positive and avoid qualifications if we 
can ...... So, what are the factors which persuade or 
prevent auditors from issuing a going concern qualification 
and place particular interpr~tations on the concept? Table 
8.3 highlights such factors. 
Do the auditors worry about any bad publicity Which might 
result from a decision to issue a going concern 
qualification? The responses to statement 10 show that audit 
qualifications are not perceived as giving bad. publicity to a 
firm. As one partner put it, "bad publicity results from not 
issuing a qualification when the markets are e)."Pecting it". 
In other words, the auditors can protect themselves by 
issuing a qualification when the publicly available 
information suggests that this ought to be done. The going 
concern qualification was also viewed as a 'liability 
insurance' which would enable auditors to demonstrate their 
impartiality and propriety. 
The auditors' thinking 
concern is very much 
on the whole 
influenced by 
question of going 
issues relating to 
responsibility and liability. Within this context, audit 
qualifications were seen as protecting the auditor from 
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unwarranted lawsuits (statement 16). The practitioners saw 
threats emerging from scenarios where the~' had not qualified, 
but the 'significant others' were now saying that they should 
have. A number of respondents commented that the auditors are 
sued and criticised for failure to issue a going concern 
qualification and warning the shareholders of problems rather 
than the tendency to issue a going concern qualification. 
Such factors may explain the considerable agreement with 
statement 12. 
Responses to statement 26 show that the auditors would 
prefer to issue a going concern qualification even though the 
financial statements reveal all material uncertainties. The 
idea of not being able to issue a qualification was unwelcome 
by the majority of the respondents. They felt that the 
qualification protected them. "Nobody has ever been sued for 
issuing a going concern qualification ..... the press only 
looks at situations where people with hindsight allege that 
we should have qualified ...... this is where litigation also 
comes in", was the comment of a senior member of the 
profession with more than 30 years audit experience. He also 
suggested that the rate of going concern qualifications would 
rise as more and more auditors become caught in litigation 
and added, "all it needs is a major case or an out-of-court 
settlement ........ Another partner added, "I can tell you 
from 
is 
personal experience that issuing an unqualified opinion 
more e::-..-pens i ve than a going concern qual i fication" . 
d d some respondents saw the 'emphasis of matter' report In ee , 
as a qualification which they used to protect themselves from 
litigation. Some partners felt that by issuing going concern 
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qualifications, the auditing firms were asserting their 
independence and professionalism and allaying fears that 
auditors might be colluding with the management. The 
preferred choice for qualification was a tsubject to' 
(statement 27) type of report rather than a tdisclaimer' 
(statement 28). The auditing guideline preferred the tsubject 
to' report, though it did not rule out the possibility of a 
tdisclaimer of opinion'. The respondents stated their 
preference for the tsubject to' audit report by arguing that 
a disclaimer "carried too strong a message and in the event 
of a business failure would make auditors the subject of 
unwelcome attention". 
Some partners argued that in a litigious and uncertain 
environment, the auditors would resort to a higher number of 
going concern qualifications as a way of protectirlg 
themselves from lawsuits. For this reason, some interviewees 
felt that their firms ,'!'ere issuing a higher number of audit 
qualifications now than ever before. One senior partner 
stated, "if you are sued and your private possessions are up 
for grabs yOU do not easily forget to hedge In 
response to statement 35, 38.2% of the respondents felt that 
they were issuing' more qualifications now and e>""Pected the 
rate to increase, especially if any firm is forced to make a 
massive negligence settlement. 
During interviews, the question of issuing a going concern 
qualification frequently tended to be associated with the 
possible loss of that client. Around one-third of the 
partners interviewed associated losing a client as a direct 
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consequence of their consideration of issuing a going concern 
qualification. Some 39.7% of the respondents felt that going 
concern qualifications increase the likelihood of auditors 
losing that client (statement 14). Thus, a going concern 
qualification is double-edged. On the one hand, it could give 
protection in a law-suit, whilst on the other it could sour 
relations with directors and result in the loss of a client. 
This view was almost equally shared amongst large and small 
firms. A partner explained thus: "You have to recognise that 
other firms compete with us. Some firms are willing to accept 
r 
fairly liberal interpretations of accounting treatments and 
principles. It is not really surprising then that we would 
lose a client when someone comes along and says, oh we would 
not have qualified for so and so, or your financial 
assurances would have been acceptable to us". Another partner 
stated, "Often the reasons for a going concern qualification 
are known or are anticipated in the market, but problems 
arise when we want to qualify for something which might not 
be so widelY anticipated ....... The auditors, however, felt 
that a decision to issue a going concern qualification did 
not have a knock-on effect which persuaded any potential 
clients to avoid a particular auditing firm (statement 15). 
overall. the question of client loss and the resultant impact 
of auditor income had a considerable impact on the 
interpretation of the going concern concept and the auditors 
willingness to qualify. 
Chapters 3, 6 and 7 noted that for some authorities, going 
concern meant reporting on solvency, competitiveness and 
retention of market shares. However, in fear of extended 
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responsibility and implications for public scrutiny arid 
possible lawsuits, most auditors opposed institutionalising 
responsibility for reporting on insolvency (statement 17), 
competitiveness (statement 18), market share (statement 19), 
analysis of financial plans (statement 20) and reporting on 
cashflow forecasts (statement 24); whilst others were willing 
to accept some responsibility if they were to be protected 
from any subsequent litigation. In the main, the 
responsibility for such matters was thought to be the 
exclusive domain of "directors ...... not ours". Such views 
echo the sentiments of the Auditing Practices Committee which 
was also concerned with narrowing auditor responsibilities. A 
recent President of an accountancy body stated. "r guess our 
work is used to make judgements on solvency and some people 
argue that this is the major function of an audit ..... . 
putting an audit on such a basis is to invite a flood of 
litigation". Involvement in reporting on competitiveness and 
market shares was considered to be "dangerous" as the matters 
were considered to be highly subjective. "These areas have 
little to do with auditors", was a frequent comment. "If the 
shareholders want information on such things then they should 
ask directors not auditors", was a typical reply. "An audit 
is about verification of facts in the financial statements. 
It is not concerned with highly subjective and debatable 
matters". Such views were also opposed. by some. For example, 
a partner stated, "This is what my clients hire me for. I am 
like a doctor who reads the financial pulse and then decides 
whether a company is sick or not. I belong to the old school 
and believe that the public is entitled to the kind of audit 
it wants as long as it pays for it and suitable safeguards 
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exist for auditors .. The involvement with cashflow forecasts' . 
was opposed by a significant number even though the going 
concern gu'ideline asks auditors to examine plans and 
forecasts, The respondents felt that their involvement with 
such documents would give an air of authenticity to what is 
essentially subjective ,information and pave the way for 
greater litigation. "Forecasts have a habit of not being 
fulfilled ., .... and we are the only ones with insurance 
..... 
most lawsuits are now emanating from areas where 
forecasts are involved". was . the view of one partner. 
Overall. the practitioners were concerned with any 
interpretation of the concept which extended their current 
responsibility as this was seen as being connected with the 
likelihood of higher negligence claims. 
Opinions were divided as to whether the auditors should 
1 l'n how he/she made his/her going exP a concern decisions 
(statement 23). Some participants argued that there was no 
legal or professional requirement for the auditor to explain 
such matters. therefore. they would not give this 
information. Along functionalist lines. some respondents 
argued that the disclosure would be too cumbersome and make 
audit reports or financial statements too long. However. the 
main reason for opposing disclosure related to the question 
of la'ilsuits and auditor responsibility. The disclosure was 
seen as being disadvantageous to the auditor as it would make 
the Ilsers familiar with the auditor'S standard of work and 
further harm the litigation aspects. "The lawyers would go 
through such matters with a fine tooth-comb and make things 
difficult .',.. I am opposed to anything which articulates 
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auditor responsibility or makes statements which extend our 
responsibilities", was the stark comment of one influential 
partner. Despite such reservations, around 49% of the 
respondents supported the idea of the auditor explainitlg the 
basis of his going concern decisions. Such explanations were 
thought to be helpful in protecting and furthering auditors' 
interests. Many respondents felt that the disclosure would 
help to educate the users to see the limits of audit work and 
would remove the public's misunderstanding relating to 
auditor responsibility. Such education was seen as being 
helpful in controlling and reducing the tide of litigation 
which frequently arises in the aftermath of a business 
ceasing to be a going concern. An important point to note is 
that the emphasis tended to be on educating the 'other side' 
and making it accept the auditor version of responsibilities. 
as though it is the users who are invoking incorrect meanings 
of an audit and thus needed educating. 
On the one hand auditors owe their appointment and rewards 
to the directors and will, therefore, have to co-operate with 
them in order to maintain their rewards. The directors in 
order to make the published financial information legitimate. 
alsO find a need to co-operate with auditors. On the other 
band, however. the directors may promote their interests by 
hindering the auditors' gathering and evaluation of evidence. 
Within tbis setting, a conflict arises between directors and 
auditors in which each party, whilst being dependent on the 
other, may nevertheless try to further its aims. In this 
conflict, each party tries to bring resources and weapons to 
further its material ~ interests. In such a conflict the 
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directors may wish to deny the auditors additional 
information, or construe their responsibilities in an onerous 
way. There may be disputes concerning the likelihood of audit 
qualifications, availability of evidence and so on. The 
auditors may construe their responsibilities narrowly and 
refer to professional pronouncements in support. There is a 
very strong feeling amongst auditors that the going concern 
guideline strengthens their position in any discussions with 
the directors (statement 32). The going concern guideline is 
welcomed as it helped to '''remind directors of their 
responsibilities" and "showed what exactly the 
auditors'responsibility is"; "remind everyone what we cannot 
be held responsible for". The participants referred to the 
increasing incidence of professional pronouncements being 
relied upon by auditors in litigation cases to defend 
themselves. The case of Lloyd Cheyham & Co v Littlejohn & Co 
(1985)~ was mentioned by most of the interviewees to support 
the point that professional pronouncements strengthened their 
position and reduced the chances of successful lawsuits 1~ 
The professional pronouncements are given a prominence not 
onlY in the legal cases, but also in the reports by DTI 
inspectors and the hearings of disciplinary committees in 
which they form benchmarks for assessing auditor work. Thus, 
the auditing guideline is seen as strengthening the auditor's 
position against any challenges from the directors, the State 
or any fraction of capital. Some of the comments by auditors 
were, the going concern guideline "gives us something to hang 
hat on"; "we can tell the directors what we are not 
.our 
responsible for"; "In a worse situation, I can refer to the 
guideline and ask for information"; "it depersonalises 
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audits"; "with increasing incidence of litigation and 
accusations .we need a clear statement of our responsibilities 
and this guideline helps", 
The going concern guideline was welcomed by most respondents 
(statement 36), even though it introduced very little of what 
could be regarded as 'new', It was thought to have aided 
auditors in "combating the public's expectations"; "a useful 
reminder of what our responsibilities are" and was thought to 
"remind the interested partie's of the limits on auditor 
obligation for the going concern aspects", The guideline was 
thus seen as a major weapon in any negotiations with 
management and society, However, the auditing guideline was 
also seen in a negative light by some respondents. The 
respondents were concerned (statement 31) that the guideline 
gave the impression that the auditor is attesting to the 
financial viability of a business, which would open the 
flol)dgates to litigation, "The auditors have never had any 
professional or legal responsibility of forming opinion on 
financial viability, This opinion is formed by the 
readers of accounts. Our task is to faithfully and accurately 
provide the information for them to do so", was the comment 
of one respondent, The impression that the auditor is 
concerned with financial viability worried some practitioners 
who feared that in future litigation, the guideline may be 
cited against them, Indeed, some saw not only the tone, but 
the very existence of the guideline as a pointer towards 
increased lawsuits (statement 33). They were concerned that 
the guideline would draw attention to issues which were 
previously low key, Such increased attention to auditor 
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~esponsibility in an uncertain and litigious environment was 
also an invitation to issue more qualifi~d audit opinions 
(statement 34) to protect auditor interests and higher audit 
costs (statement 38). 
This section has argued that the meanings and 
interpretations attached by auditors to the going concern 
concept are influenced by their material interests. Such 
interests are protected by accenting the concept in a 
particular way and narrowing the matters for which auditors 
are willing to accept any responsibilities. 
B.5: LARGE/SMALL FIRM CONFLICT AND GOING CONCERN 
The accountancy profession is not a homogeneous profession. 
Large and small firms have common as well as competing 
interests. In chapter 7, it was shown that the major firms 
have come to control the APC, a body responsible for invoking 
meanings and interpretations of the going concern concept. 
Through their control of the APC, its working parties and 
privileged access to information, such firms were able to 
articulate a preferred meaning of the concept to protect 
their 'interests'. In the main, they were concerned with 
promoting their economic interests and reducing the 
incidences of litigation. The particular meanings assigned to 
the concept may not adequately reflect the 'interests' of 
small firms who ~ere not privy to any inside information and 
had little representation on the APC. 
Large and small firms have different clientele and this 
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brings them under differing pressures. Small firms auditing 
small/medium companies have more direct contacts with owners 
of the companies and are thus under greater pressure to 
explain the significance of accounting concepts and auditing 
approaches. Their conception of audit work may be whatever 
they have to do to complete an audit. This may include 
commenting on cashflow. competitiveness and advice on 
financial resources. which some other firms may not regard as 
part of an audit. Small firms. due to their relative 
inability to devote resources to the development of 
techniques, may wish the professional bodies to advocate 
clear policies and techniques for making going concern 
evaluations, i.e. subsidise them and further their material 
interests. But the larger firms, experiencing increasing 
litigation, may wish to prevent such developments in case the 
resulting documents may be cited against them. This section 
now focuses upon some of the differences in approaches. 
meanings and interpretations. attached to the concept by 
individuals from large (top 20 firms) and 'other' accountancy 
firms. Such differences are highlighted in table 8.4. 
One of the major issues which the APC had to confront in 
formulating the going concern auditing guideline was whether 
to recommend a 'passive' or an 'active' approach for 
consideration of going concern issues. As chapter 7 
explained, the APC under pressure from large firms rejected 
the tactive' approach by arguing that it was impractical and 
opted for the 'passive' approach. It should be recalled (see 
chapter 7) that most of the respondents to the going concern 
guideline came from the large (top 20) firms. In addition, 
membership of the APe has also continued to come from the 
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same major firms. The large firms. with greater contacts with 
the City of London and increased exposure to litigation may 
recognise the value of professional pronouncemnts in limiting 
their liability and thus support the 'passive approach'. Is 
there a widespread opposition to the 'active l approach, or 
are there interests which differentiate the firms? In . 
response to statement 21 of the questionnaire (see table 
B.4), some 40% of the large firms (from top ten firms) 
opposed the suggestion of following an 'active approach', 
whereas only 3% of the medium/sm~ll firms opposed such an 
approach. The large firms, in view of their distance from the 
'owners l and frequent lawsuits supported the 'passive 
approach', but small firms with closer contacts with owners 
and possibly facing lesser and fewer lawsuits may have 
reasons to support an 'active approach'. Whilst the narrowing 
of auditor responsibility under the banner of a 'passive 
approach' may benefit all firms, it also has negative 
consequences. The owner-directors might oppose the auditor1s 
conception of responsibilities. The auditor might risk losing 
social legitimacy. The auditors of small/medium companies, 
may find it difficult to explain to shareholder directors 
that they have less responsibility for going concern issues 
than has otherwise been traditionally assumed. Whenever the 
auditors undertake procedures to verify intenal controls, 
stock, loans, bank mandates, etc., they in the minds of 
non-accountant directors of small/medium companies l at least 
are creating an image that they are 'activelyl reporting on 
business solvency and survival. The denial of such 
responsibility can sour relationships with directors who 
are effectively employers of auditors. Such factors may have 
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caused some auditors to oppose the adoption of a 'passive', 
appro3.:::h. Th:::::::: advocating the ' active e.:pr'roe.ch' res.!::·:aned; 
that "annual accounts ar8 akin toa prospectus. By reporting 
on them we are inviting the public to believe that they are 
meaningful. This means that we must take definite steps to 
satisfy ourselves that the business will continue". The 
auditors from small/medium firms indicated that actively 
evaluating the solvency and liquidity aspects of a business 
was part of their responsibility. However, the small 
practitioners could not refer to any auditing procedures used 
under the 'active' approach, which were different from that 
used by larger firms under the 'passive approach'. They 
contrasted the going concern guideline with the general duty 
of an auditor to activelY search for audit evidence and 
commented that they could "not see how going concern can be 
an exception to the operational standard ...... requiring the 
auditor to take specific steps and procedures to satisfy 
himself". Some felt that the 'passive approach' was contrary 
to their "legal and professional obligations". Another 
partner supporting the 'active approach' argued that "the 
assessment of the financial position should be a vital part 
of every audit; this is what the shareholders hire an auditor 
for"; "1 do not want to extend auditor's responsibilities any 
more than we have to, but the alternative is to risk 
ridicule", When a partner from a Big-Eight firm (and a member 
of the APe) was asked to comment on the small/medium firm 
opposition to the 'passive approach', he reacted by saying, 
"only firms like ours know anything about the going concern 
matters. It is a very delicate 
attention and analysis. Most small 
don't know anything about this area 
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area 
and 
..... 
requiring careful 
medium size firms 
they rarely have to 
enter this contentitious area. You are wasting your time' 
asking them anything about this important topic". 
The firms which influenced the development of the auditing 
guideline seemed to be more satisfied with its contents. Only 
15% of this group felt that the guideline gives the 
impression that the auditor is giving assurances on the 
financial viability of the company being audited (statement 
31). But 47% of the other firms confirmed this impression. 
The small/medium firm practitioners felt that the auditor was 
now intimately concerned with the financial viability of a 
company. Some explained that' the directors frequently 
expected them to comment upon the financial vulnerability of 
the company. Whereas, the major firms facing rising 
litigation, opposed such an audit objective. Individuals from 
the major firms argued that the whole purpose of the 
guidelines was to remove such an impression and thus prevent 
unwarranted lawsuits. Not a single respondent from the top 
twenty firms felt that the auditing guideline increased the 
possibility of lawsuits (statement 33), but 28% of the 
respondents from other firms felt that by emphasising auditor 
responsibility for reporting on business survival and 
viability, the guideline actuallY increased the possibility 
of lawsuits and conse~uentlY they were more likely to resort 
to issuing going concern qualifications to protect themselves 
(statement 34) as compared to the larger firms. Some partners 
also associated incease in their insurance premiums to the 
auditing guideline. 
Not a single respondent from the large firms agreed with the 
statement that 'the APe guideline is of little use to my 
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firm', but 26% of the responde~ts fr6m medium/small firms 
argued that in common with most ether auditing gutdelii:!8s, 
the going concern guideline was of little use to them 
(statement 36). "The Institute is more concerned with the 
Big-Eight" was a frequent complaint. The respondents 
complained that the auditing procedures advocated in the 
guideline were not practical for them to apply. The 
small/medium size firms wanted some advice on techniques 
specifically useful for identifying going concern problems, 
but felt that the going concern guideline was silent on such 
advice. Only 20% of the top 20 firms wanted the APC to 
indicate the techniques useful for making going concern 
decisions, but 70% of the other firms wanted the APC to give 
guidance on techniques (statement 37). One partner who 
opposed such developments argued that such 
developments would harm the profession. Everyone will be 
checking to see what we should have done or whether it was a 
good technique ........ lawyers would be the only winners". 
Another reason for the antagonisms is that the major firms 
have the financial resources and economic incentives to 
develop the appropriate techniques. Whilst the smaller firms 
may not have the resources to develop such techniques and may 
be e:.;:pecting the professional bodies to subsidise them by 
developing and recommending suitable techniques. As one 
interviewee put it "we are busy people. The profession needs 
to guide us on the best practice and techniques. I do not 
have the time to go and study books and magazines. I expect 
the profession to tell us". Another commented, " ..... the 
profession has issued guidance notes on SSAPs, surely the 
same can be done for the guideline". Small firms were also 
concerned that in the event of any dispute with the client or 
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·' 
third parties.; the guideline. would 'become a focus o~ . 
attention and as a defensive measure they are having to 
expend resou'rces to brush up on techniques and train their 
staff. "When your staff are working all possible hours, any 
training means revenues lost", said a partner. As a result 
43% of the small/medi~m size firm respondents felt that the. 
auditing guideline had increased the audit costs but amongst 
the larger firms this view was only shared by 5% of the firms 
(statement 38). • 
95% of the respondents from the top 20 firms disagreed with 
the suggestion that 'the auditing guideline' has increased 
the possibility of a lawsuit against their firm' (statement 
33), but only 37% of the respondents from other firms shared 
such views. The major firms felt that the auditor's position 
has been protected by the guideline, but the small/medium 
firms were not always so certain. What they feared most was 
not auditor responsibility being mentioned, but the rather 
narrow way in which it was being defined. According to the 
respondents. in the event of any litigation, firms would cite 
the auditing guideline, but the narrow and passive definition 
would be damaging to their defence. The small/medium firm 
respondents 
very little 
saw two alternatives for the profession. Either, 
or not~ing should be said about auditor 
responsibility or very clear statements should be made about 
it. Overall. they argued that both positions presented some 
difficulties. If the first alternative is accepted then 
uncertainty may exist about auditor responsibilities and is 
likely to lead to disputes with clients and possible 
litigation. something they were very concerned with. This 
view differed from large firms who felt that in view of the 
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current debat'es about auditor responsibilities, as little as' 
possible should be said about the issues. If the second 
alternative' is accepted, then small/medium firm respondents 
argued that this would help them to explain their going 
concern obligations to clients. This view is, however, 
opposed by large firms who argued that the profession's 
articulations of auditor responsibilities may not meet the 
public's expectations and this would lead to problems of 
legitimacy for the social role of auditors. 
Another major area of disagreement between the large and 
small/medium size firms is the definition of the term 
'forseeable future'. The APC defined it as "a minimum of six 
months following the date of the audit report or one year 
after the balance sheet date whichever period ends on the 
later date" (APC. 1985a; para 8). The views of the responding 
firms were highlighted in table 4.11 (page 211). Whilst a 
variety of meanings depending upon the auditor relationship 
with clients were expressed. it should be noted that only 19 
of the 129 responding firms supported the APC definition. It 
is significant that the top 10 firms completely supported the 
APC definition. 14 of the 19 assenting firms came from the 
firms which were involved with the formulation of the 
guideline. Once again, the small firms felt that their 
interests have not been adequately considered. They were 
uncertain of the source of the APC definition and of the 
reasons for abandoning the traditional meanings. Concerns . 
were also exPressed about the acceptance of the official 
definition. Comments such as "six months assurance will not 
be good for our professional image " . • • • • •• J twelve 
months from the audit repIJrt date is more cons istent with the 
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public's expectations" were expressed by many respondents. 
The explanations in this section have suggested that the 
meanings and interpretations of the going concern are not 
homogeneous across auditing firms. The differences in 
meanings arise because within the constraints of capitalism. 
large and small/medium firms service different sizes of 
clients and hence different sections of the market. Whilst 
all firms attach importance to techniques, small firms, in 
view of their relatively limited resources would like to see 
specific techniques developed by the professional bodies. 
However, the disagreements between small and large firms are 
glossed over because the smaller firms feel that their 
interests are inadequately represented. The larger firms 
dominate policy-making and through their influence have come 
to give certain meanings to the concept, advantageous to 
their <interests'. Such conceptions are both shared and 
contested by small/medium firms. 
fL 6: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter provided exPlanations of the meanings and 
interpretations which auditors assigned to the going concern 
concept. The views were solicited through interviews and a 
questionnaire. In accordance with the framework presented in 
chapter 2, this chapter argued that the manner in which 
practitioners transform the meaning of the concept is 
influenced by a number of cross-cutting influences. These 
included influence of education which through the neglect of 
history and earlier debates on valuation, has made some 
meanings of the concept less prominent. Such aspects were 
once considered to be the guts of the going concern concept. 
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The relative d.isappearance of earlier themes and concerns may· 
well be connected with the economic changes and presSlIrpq of 
litigation mentioned in chapters 6 and 7. 
The key determinant of the meanings of the going concern 
concept is not some universal accounting theory. but the 
social relations of power within a capitalist framework. 
Within this framework there is always struggle and 
contestation over 'meaning'. This struggle means that some 
meanings will gain ascendancy whilst others will become 
subordinate. In this struggle, education played a 
considerable part in bringing the concerns of the major firms 
to the fore. The books did not discuss the past themes of the 
concept but rather tended to repeat the professional 
pronouncements which privileged the interests of major firms. 
Students are encouraged to learn the party line and their 
horizons are rarely extended beyond a legalistic and pedantic 
approach to accounting concepts. It is within this social 
context that the meanings and interpretations of the concept 
are being forged and transformed. Due to the influence of 
historical factors, the State has also played its part in 
aligning external financial reporting very closely with the 
. t ts of 'finance capital' and considerations 1n eres . of going 
concern reflect this. Indeed, the audit reports and going 
concern qualifications are frequently judged in terms of the 
benefits and ills they confer to 'finance capital'. Though 
the interests of 'finance' are now deeply rooted in all 
accounting discussion, the auditors' regular contact is with 
directors -representatives of capital- who directly employ 
them. Thus auditors are dependent for their economic welfare 
on directors. This economic dependence means that auditors 
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hav" to consider the interests of directors and make 
concessions or risk losing their economic rewards. Such 
factor~ alsl) influence the manner in which the auditors will 
interpret going concern. 
A major determinant of the meanings attached to going 
concern is, however, the material interests of practitioners 
themselves. The auditing firms are a significant fraction of 
capital and in common with other fractions, need to be 
efficient, make profits and win social legitimacy in order to 
ensure the survival of their bu~inesses, income, prestige and 
statuS. In order to protect and promote their interests. 
auditors' interpretations frequently privilege those meanings 
which will protect them from law-suits. Whereas the 
professional literature asserts that "the auditor is rarely 
carrying out his work with the thought of subsequent 
litigation at the front of his mind" (APe. 1986, page 36), 
the research described here found that matters of litigation 
were a major influence on the meanings assigned to the 
concept. 
The auditors are particularly concerned with the incidence 
of litigation, responsibility and any additional costs which 
might impair their economic rewards. It is the 'economic' 
which has been ensuring that the auditors pay attention to 
some aspects of the valuation debates, likelihood of issuing 
qualification, loss of client and publicity. Such economic 
interests influenced the auditors' reluctance to become 
involved in issues relating to reporting on solvency, cash 
flows, financial plans, competititiveness, market share etc., 
something which the literature suggests follow from the going 
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concern 
concern 
concept. 
in the 
The 
light 
auditors tended to 
of their current 
interpret going 
problems. Thus 
interpretations are likely to be episodic and contradictory. 
The going concern qualifications are also seen as a tool for 
managing litigation, risk and crisis of responsibility. It is 
the concern with mat~rial interests which makes auditors 
reluctant to explain the basis of their work to users. The 
going concern guideline was welcomed because of the way it 
strengthened the auditor's hand in any conflict with 
management and feared by some in case it opened the way to 
greater litigation. 
Within the context of pursuing their material interests, the 
auditors' decide whether a particular interpretation of the 
concept ought to lead to a qualification. A qualification was 
frequently seen as giving the auditor a hedge. The 
interpretations of the concept are not consistent across 
firms. The larger firms through their domination of the 
policy-making committees have tried to institutionalise 
certain meanings and approaches, but the small/medium size 
firms, as this chapter shows, try to resist such meanings. 
For example, unlike larger firms, they advocate an 'active 
approach' to going concern issues. Small/medium and large 
firms are dependent upon businesses of different sizes for 
their income. In the case of small/medium business, the 
owners have a different degree of contact with auditors and 
thus a greater chance to interrogate auditors. Such closeness 
and regularity of contact with the owners subjects auditors 
to a different degree of economic reality and affects the way 
they interpret the concept. 
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Chapter 8 Footnotes: 
1) The auditors' reliance on accounting ratios to detect 
going (~oncern problems is highlighted in tables 4, 5 and 8 of 
chapter 4 {pages 203, 204 and 208}. 
2) The auditors prefer to see a trend of ratios etc to make a 
going concern evaluation. The period of the trend is shown in 
table 7 of chapter 4 (page 207). 
3) The books turned out to be ordinary undergraduate and 
professional books. The technical director talked about the 
relevenace of his education and the knowledge of his 
trainees. 
4) The questionnaire and all the responses are shown in 
chapter 4. 
5) See table 3 of chapter 4 (page 201) 
meanings which auditors attached 
qualification. 
for a list 
to a going 
of the 
concern 
6) A list of the 
produce a cash 
(page 206). 
actions taken if the directors do not 
forecast in shown in table 6 of chapter 4 
7) Table 4 of chapter 4 (page 203) noted that 20 of the 
respondents claimed to be using Z-scores. Some criticisms of 
Z-scores will be found in Laughlin (1981) and Gambling 
( 1985) . 
B) The techniques and the minimum information which the 
auditors find useful for diagnosing going concern problems 
are shown in tables 5 and 8 of chapter 4 (pages 204 and 208). 
9) This case was reported in Accountancy, February 1986. 
10) In the Lloyd Cheyham case, the auditors were accused of 
negligence by directors but were exonerated on the grounds 
that they followed the requirements of SSAP 2. 
11) Paragraph 24 of the auditing guideline states that "there 
may be circumstances w~ere ~he reader will obtain a better 
understanding of the flnanclal statements, and of the 
appropriateness of the basis on which they are prepared, if 
h is attention is drawn to important matters". 
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TABLE 8.1 
GOING CONCERN AND THE INTERESTS OF FINANCE CAPITAL 
STATEMENT 
1) Going-concern qualifi-
cations cause a negative 
share price reaction in 
the client company's 
share price. 
2) Going-concern qualifi-
cations alert institutional 
investors to uncertainties 
inherent in the financial 
statements. 
3) Going-concern quali-
fications alert individual 
investors to uncertainties 
inherent in the financial 
statements. 
STRONG 
LY DIS 
AGREE 
1.5 
0.8 
4) Going-concern qualifi-
cations alert creditors to 
uncertainties inherent in 0.8 
the financial statements. 
5) Going-concern qualifi-
cation is of no consequence. 66.4 
13) An unqual i fied audit 
report indicates that in 
the auditor's opinion the 11.5 
business is financially 
viable. 
25) Going·-concern qual ifi-
cations are not very 9.2 
informative. 
29) Users do not underst~nd 
the significance of a g01ng 6.9 
concern qualification. 
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% RESPONDING 
DIS 
AGREE 
5.3 
6.1 
UN 
mmE 
12.2 
5.3 
9.2 25.2 
AGREE 
49.6 
48.9 
51. 9 
9.9 23.7 42.7 
26.7 3.1 1.5 
29.0 8.4 48.9 
35.9 12.2 42.8 
32.1 32.8 26.7 
STRONG 
LY 
AGREE 
31. 3 
38.9 
13.7 
22.9 
2.3 
2.3 
Nil 
1.5 
TABLE 8.2 
GENERAL SYMPATHy WITH THE INTERESTS OF DIRECTORS AND GOING CONCERN 
STATEMENT 
6) A going-concern quali-
fication is likely to 
increase the client's 
financial problems. 
7) A client experiencing 
going concern problems 
should be given more 
time by the auditor. 
8) Going-concern quali-
fication is likely to 
precipitate the client 
company's failure. 
9) A Going-concern quali-
fication is very likely 
to increase the client's 
cost of obtaining finance. 
11) Going concern qualifi-
cations are a reflection on 
the management's abilities. 
STRONG 
LY DIS 
AGREE 
1.5 
13.0 
7.6 
2.3 
4.6 
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% RESPONDING 
DIS UN 
AGREE mmE 
11.5 13.7 
32.1 19.1 
29.0 22.9 
18.3 16.8 
32.1 29.0 
AGREE 
61. 1 
26.7 
31. 3 
44.3 
31. 3 
STRONG 
LY 
AGREE 
12.2 
9.2 
9.2 
18.3 
3.1 
1'bBLE 6.3 
MATERIAL INTERESTS OF PRACTITIONERS AND GOING CONCERN 
STATEMENT 
10) Going-concern 
qualifications give bad 
p1..lbl ici ty to your firm 
12) A decision to issue a 
going-concern qualification 
~nhances your firm's 
credibility. 
14) A decision to issue a 
going-concern qualification 
increases the likelihood of 
~our firm losing that client. 
15) A decision to issue 
going-concern qualification 
increases the likelihood of 
~our firm losing potential 
clients. 
16) A going-concern qualifi-
cation will increase the 
likelihood of a law-suit 
against your firm. 
17) Auditors should be 
required to alert the 
investors on the 
likelihood of company 
insolvency. 
18) Auditors should take 
active steps to satisfy 
themselves that the 
business remains competitive 
in the forseeable future. 
19) Auditors should take 
active steps to satisfy 
themselves that the business 
retains its market share. 
STRONG 
LY DIS 
AGREE 
42.7 . 
7.6 
3.1 
16.8 
23.7 
16.8 
26.7 
35.1 
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% RESPONDING 
DIS 
AGREE 
31. 3 
27.5 
38.9 
54.2 
47.3 
37.4 
46.6 
51. 9 
UN 
.sum; 
13.0 
28.2 
18.3 
21. 4 
18.3 
13.7 
5.3 
8.4 
AGREE 
12.2 
35.1 
37.4 
5.3 
7.6 
26 
19.1 
3.1 
STRONG 
LY 
AGREE 
0.8 
1.5 
2.3 
2.3 
3.1 
6.1 
2.3 
1.5 
STATEMENT 
20) Auditors should not be 
required to analyse the 
~()mpany' s f inane~ i al plans. 
23) The auditor should 
~xplain to the users how 
he/she made his/her 
~oing concern deoisions. 
(4) If the companies publish 
~ashflow forecasts then the 
l!1uditors should be required 
to report on them. 
26) If financial statements 
~isclose all material uncert-
ainties, then the auditor 
~hould not issue a going 
Ooncern qualification 
27) 'Disclaimer of opinion' 
should be the most 
appropriate form of audit 
qualification for going 
ooncern problems. 
(8) 'Subject to' audit 
reports are the most 
~ppropriate for going 
ooncern qualifications. 
STRONG 
LY DIS 
AGREE; 
6.9 
12.2 
9.9 
18.3 
13.0 
3.1 
% RESPONDING 
DIS 
AGRE;E; 
41. 2 
30.5 
37.4 
56.5 
61. 1 
9.2 
UN 
mlEE 
19.8 
8.4 
12.2 
9.9 
18.3 
14.5 
AGREE; 
29 
42.7 
35. 1 
12.2 
4.6 
67.2 
30) For a non-going concern, 
aud i tors do not have the 
knOW-how to ascertain the 
recoverable value of assets. 
4.6 25.2 10.7 51. 1 
31) The auditing guideline 
gives the impression that 
the auditor is giving . 
assurances on the financial 
"iability of the eJompany 
audited. 
32) The auditing guideline 
has strengthened the 
auditor's ability to 
withstand pressure from 
tnanag emen t . 
33) The auditing guide~i~e. 
bas increased the posslblilty 
of a law-suit against your 
firm. 
3.1 
3.1 
6.9 
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35.1 19.1 37.4 
17.6 15.3 62.6 
38.9 29.8 23.7 
STRONG 
LY 
AGRE;E; 
3.1 
6.1 
5.3 
3.1 
3.1 
6.1 
8.4 
5.3 
1.5 
0.8 
STATEMENT 
34) The auditing guideline 
has increased the likelihood 
of you issu~ng a going 
concern qualification. 
3.5 ) We are likely to 
issue more going concern 
qualifications now. 
36) The APC guideline is 
of little use to my firm 
38) The APC guideline has 
increased the audit costs. 
STRONG 
LY DIS 
AGREE 
5.3 
9.2 
13.7 
5.3 
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% RESPONDING 
DIS 
AGREE 
26.7 
30.5 
51. 9 
36.6 
UN 
SURE 
21. 4 
22.1 
13.0 
21. 4 
AGREE 
45.0 
37.4 
15.3 
32.1 
STRONG 
LY 
AGREE 
1.5 
0.8 
6.1 
4.6 
TABLE 8.4 
LARGE. SMALL/MEDIUM FIRM CONFLICT AND GOING CONCERN 
TOP 20 FIRMS % SMALL/MEDIUM FIRMS % 
Strong- Strong Strong Strong 
Statement Iy Dis Dis Iy Iy Dis Dis Iy 
agree agree Unsure Agree Agree Total agree agree Unsure Agree Agree Total 
21 ) The auditor should 
take active steps to 
satisfy himself/herself 40 50 10 100% 3 4 64 29 100% 
0-0 
that an enterprise is a 
g; going concern. 
t:tl 
<:''11 
31) The auditing guideline 
..... gives the impression that 
~ the auditor is giving 
assurances on the 5 60 20 15 100% 3 30 20 40 7 100% 
financial viability of the 
company being audited. 
33) The auditing guideline 
has increased the 25 70 5 100% 4 33 35 27 1 100% 
possibility of a lawsuit 
against your firm. 
34) The auditing guideline 
has increased the likeli- 10 65 25 100% 5 20 25 48 2 100% 
hood of you issuing a going 
concern qualification. 
--d 
~ 
tx1 
CJ1 
.... 
C1I 
Strong-
Statement ly Dis Dis 
TOP 20 FIRMS % 
Strong 
Iy 
agree agree Unsure Agree Agree Total 
36) The APe guideline is 30 50 20 100% 
of little use to my firm. 
37) The APe should develop 
an auditing guideline 
indicating the techniques 65 15 20 100% 
useful for making going 
concern decisions. 
38) The APe guideline has 
increased the audit costs. 15 65 15 5 100% 
SMALL/MEDIUM FIRMS % 
Strong 
Iy Dis Dis 
agree agree Unsure Aoree 
10 52 12 18 
3 11 16 63 
3 31 23 37 
Strong 
Iy 
Agree Total· 
8 100% 
7 100% 
6 100% 
9.0: Introduction 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to explore the relationship between 
accounting and society by focusing upon the changing meanings 
of the going concern concept. In order to understand the 
relationship between accounting and society, a methodological 
framework informed by Marxist thinking was adopted. This 
chapter now reflects upon the evidence and analysis presented 
to reach some conclusions. The first section (9.l) refers to 
the meanings and interpretations of the going concern 
concept. The second section (9.2) refers to the way in which 
accounting has responded to changes in the economic, 
political and social developments. The third section (9.3) 
argues that the actions of the State are central to 
understanding the relationship between accounting and 
society. The fourth section (9.4) argues that the accountancy 
profession should not be seen as a homogeneous, neutral 
entity. The fifth section (9.5) refers to possible future 
research and the sih~h (9.6) refers to the limitations of 
this thesis. Section 9.7 concludes the thesis with some final 
comments. 
~. 1: MEANINGS OF THE GOING CONCERN CONCEPT 
The going concern concept does not have a single unambiguous 
meaning. It is multi-accented and has numerous competing 
meanings. The concept began to be described as 'generally 
accepted' in the USA in the 1930s, but it only·received such 
descriptions in the UK in the 1970s. Historically, the 
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concept has been associated with disucssions of bases of 
valua~ion and contents of the balance sheets. I~ has been 
used to justify adherence to original costs, depreciation, 
capital maintenance, focus on solvency, lower of cost and 
market value rule, market values, secret reserves, disclosure 
of various kinds, current cost accounting, constant 
purchasing power accounting, cash flow reporting, reject exit 
values and going concern values, etc. The concept has been 
used to perpetuate the view that a business has the prospect 
of a long/permanent life. 
In the auditing conteA~, explicit references to the going 
concern concept were relativelY scarce prior to the 1970s. 
However, from the early 1970s, the concept began to attract 
greater attention. Its discussions tended to privilege the 
interests of finance capital. It implied that the auditors 
were concerned with reporting on business solvency, liquidity 
and survival. Towards this end, the auditors were expected to 
pay attention to company forecasts, budgets, plans, post 
balance sheet events, recoverability of assets, etc. After an 
initial indication that an auditor should 'actively' evaluate 
the applicability of the going concern assumption, the 
profession eventually recommended a 'passive' approach, 
requiring minimum aud~t effort. 
The practitioners' felt that the concept had important 
implications for investors and creditors. They argued "that 
they had little difficulty in assessing symptoms of going 
concern problems. However, whether a symptom was considered 
to be material, was dependent upon a combination of a number 
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of factors. These related to the interests of finance 
capital, interests of directors, influence of education and 
the material interests of the auditors themselves. Some 
auditors were reluctant to accept some meanings of the 
concept, in case it widened their responsibilities and thus 
subjected them to a greater number of lawsuits. These related 
to a reporting role on market share, company plans and 
competitiveness. There were also some differences in the 
practitioners views. Most significantly, the smaller firms 
did not support the 'passive' approach favoured by the large 
firms and the Auditing Practices Committee (APC). 
Through reflection upon the changing meanings of the going 
concern concept, a number of comments can be made about the 
relationship between accounting and society. 
i.2: ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The meanings of the going concern concept have been shaped 
by social, political and economic changes. The influence of 
'finance capital' is particularly relevant. The early 
accountants worked for financiers and bankers who were 
particularly concerned with the recoverability of the loans 
given to traders and manufacturers. In this context, they 
paid particular attention to solvency and liquidity of the 
businesses and going concern became synonymous with 
. 
discussions of such factors. In times of economic recessions 
and falling prices, attention focused upon the valuation' of 
current (easily realisable) assets and the rule of 'lower of 
cost and market value' became associated with the concept. 
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The 1930s·· economic and political orisis in the USA led to 
the institutional recognition of the concept as 'generally 
accepted'. However, this could only be understood by looking 
at the prevailing social environment. The American State was 
concerned with restoring confidence in the institutions of 
capitalism and business confidence in general. In this 
conteh~' it encouraged faith in the eoonomic reality captured 
by accounting numbers, by appealing to the going concern 
concept. Seemingly, the concept is a political weapon. The 
accountancy profession has appealed to the concept again and 
again to restore its own legitimacy. In the USA, the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have referred to the 
concept a number of times to deflect criticisms. In the UK, 
in the 1970s the profession, when faced with a crisis, also 
appealed to the going concern concept to defuse criticisms of 
accounting and auditing. 
The evidence suggests that there are differences in the 
accounting and auditing trajectories. The meanings in an 
auditing context were particularly shaped during times of 
economic crisis. These included a secondary banking crisis, 
property collapse, falling profitability. increasing 
liquidations, falling liquidity, pressures from the State, a 
crisis of legitimacy for the profession and lawsuits against 
major firms. The evidence suggests that during economic 
crises searching questions are asked of the adequacy of 
auditing practices. It is this questioning which provided the 
space for some meanings of the concept to become ascendent. 
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However, there is no simple Way of predicting which meaning 
will become dominant. 
The ascendancy of meanings is dependent upon control of 
institutions, resources and mobilisation of bias in the face 
of possible opposition (or co-operation) from 'significant' 
others'. In order to manage the economic crisis of the 1970s, 
the State commissioned a number of company investigations. 
These were critical of auditing practices and suggested that 
the auditors ought to be paying particular attention to 
corporate survival, liquidity and solvency. However, the 
crisis which exposed the weaknesses of the auditing practices 
also paralysed the State. The State was unable to set-up an 
independent body to promulgate auditing standards. The 
responsibility for this passed to the profession. To gain 
mastery in discourse, the profession now accepted that going 
concern meant that "it was reasonable to expect the auditor 
to consider the future viability of his client" (APC, 1986, 
page 32). Having accepted this meaning, it did not, however, 
make concessions on what this implied for auditor 
responsibility and liability. It went on to legitimise a 
'passive' approach to going concern. Legitimation for the 
'passive' approach was achieved because the auditing wing -
the most powerful wing of the profession controlled the 
working party and the APC. It tailored the agenda and 
mobilised support for the auditing guideline. 
, ~.3: THE STATE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 
In traditional accounting 1 i terature, the State's 
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involvement in shaping accounting and auditing practices is 
hardlY mentioned. However. this thesis found that the State's 
role is central in understanding the various meanings of the 
going concern concept. 
The State nurtured the early accountancy profession through 
Royal Charters, bankruptcy and corporate legislation. In 
order to promote the long-term interests of capitalism, it 
encouraged investors to believe that businesses can expect 
perpetual or permanent life. In order to continue in 
business, the directors WOUld. assure investors of their 
propriety by giving a 'factual' account of the manner in 
which they utilised the resources. Thus 'costs' were promoted 
as evidence of 'facts' for a going concern. To remain in 
existence, the companies had to comply with the laws, such as 
those relating to control of profiteering. The State 
controlled profiteering by reference to 'costs'. By the early 
twentieth century, through practice, 'costs' became 
associated with going concern and entered the 'common sense' 
of accounting. 
To remain'going: businesses had to find resources to enable 
them to reproduce and transform themselves. For this purpose, 
depreciation was seen as a 'reserve fund' from which the 
companies could invest and maintain themselves as a going 
concern. The need for depreciation was legitimised by the 
State and the courts. Too much depletion of resources through 
'payment of dividends could also threaten the survival of 
companies. The courts gave guidance on such problems and 
matters relating to dividends, solvency and liquidity came 
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within the scope of the going concern concept. In an era of 
laissez-faire and 'caveat emptor', the State's policies 
respected the discretion of directors and permitted them to 
maintain 'secret reserves', But when in the aftermath of the 
1930s economic crisis, the public opinion and demands of the 
developing capital and finance markets required, the State 
exercised its 'relative autonomy' by removing such 
discretion. 
The evidence presented here has' shown that the accounting 
concepts should not just be seen as a technical phenomena. 
They are also political weapons. Appeals to the various 
descriptions and meanings help the State and related 
institutions to maintain a particular social order. For 
example, in the 1930s, the American State appealed to the 
going concern concept and its historical meanings. This was 
done to restore faith in corporate disclosures and the 
financial institutions, In the wake of the Wall Street crash 
and the ensuing economic decline, the concept helped to 
sustain the imagery of permanent or long lived enterprises 
and thus created confidence in institutional structures. The 
American profession also invoked the concept to sustain its 
own legitim~. When in the 1970s the UK profession came 
under critical scrutiny, the profession appealed to the going 
concern concept to maintain its legitimacy. Each appeal was 
accompanied by a residue of historical meanings rather than 
the invocation of any new ones. 
The State also had a decisive influence on the auditing 
'd It took increasing interest in accountin~ and auditin~ Sl e. ~ ~ 
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against a background of a severe economic crisis. In Britain 
this happened in the 1970s. In order to promote the long-term 
interests of capitalism. the State through the Department of 
Trade reports argued that 'going concern' means concern with 
solvency. liquidity and corporate survival. Such meanings 
were already in existence. for example, the early financiers 
focused on these aspects to judge the security of their 
investments. However, in professional circles. such meanings 
were not considered to be the major meanings. But now the 
State was giving prominence to.such meanings. It argued that 
the auditors should acknowledge responsibility for reporting 
on such matters. The reports argued that the going concern 
concept meant paying attention to corporate forecasts, plans, 
budgets, liquidity, post balance sheet events, financial 
arrangements, correspondence with bankers, immediate economic 
environment and other aspects. It appears that during times 
of economic crisis, the State scrutinises the ability of 
accounting and 
be regarded as 
reality. 
auditing to construct and present what could 
an independent, impersonal and objective 
The State was concerned with the long-term survival of 
capitalism and was prepared to go to considerable lengths to 
improve auditing practices. In addition to critical 
inspectors' reports. it issued lawsuits against auditors and 
forced the profession to acknowledge the importance of the 
going concern 
paralysed by 
independent 
guidelines. 
i~sues. In the mid 1970s, the State was 
the economic crisis and was unable to create 
agencies to develop auditing standards and 
But its actions, nevertheless, paved the way for 
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the formation of the APC. This enabled the profession to 
assign greater weight to its preferred meanings to the going 
concern concept. Seemingly. a paralysis of the State creates 
opportunities for the profession. 
9.4: PROFESSION 
The 'official professional line is that "the auditor is 
rarely carrying out his work with the thought of subsequent 
litigation at the front of his mind" (APC. 1986, page 36). 
However, the evidence presented·here shows the reverse to be 
the position. In order to formulate the auditing guideline, 
the working party. the APC and partners from major firms, 
were primarily aiming to reduce the incidence of litigation 
against auditors. The practitioners' approach to audit 
reports and interpretation of the symptoms of going concern 
was heavily influenced by the possibility of lawsuits. 
Further support for this view is presented by some additional 
evidence. 
There was a chance meeting with some interviewees (partners 
in major firms) in 1990. The subjects remembered being 
interviewed on going concern issues and stated that they were 
now issuing a greater number of going concern qualifications. 
Whereas some symptoms were previously being interpreted as 
not significant, or immaterial to warrant the issue of a 
qualified audit report, now the same symptoms warranted a 
qualification. The subjects explained that their attitude has 
been changed by the Johnson Matthey settlement. In this case, 
Arthur Young made a £25 million out of court settlement in 
October 1988 and a further £24.25 million payment in February 
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1989 . (Financial Times, 14th February 1989, page 6). The 
auditors now. feared the possibility of further and massive 
claims and protected their position by issuing more going 
concern qualifications. The decision to issue more 
qualifications was also influenced by the onset of an 
economic recession where the auditors expected greater 
scrutiny of their craft and possibly more lawsuits. The 
evidence presented in Appendix 8 lends some support to. the 
fact that in the aftermath of the Johnson Matthey settlement 
and the appearance of a recession, what previously did not 
constitute as a symptom of ,going concern began to be 
interpreted as such. Indeed, this thesis has argued that the 
meanings and implications of the concept cannot be understood 
without recognising that they are dependent upon the material 
interests of the practitioners. It would also appear that the 
practitioners' 'common sense' interpretations are shaped by 
contemporary episodes which threaten their economic 
interests. The extent to which these leave any lasting 
inventory is a matter for future research. 
The meanings advanced by the profession and the formulation 
of the auditing guideline shows that the profession is 
concerned 
profession 
with promoting 
responded to 
'sectional interests' . The 
the crisis of lawsuits by 
legitimising a 'passive' approach to going concern. This made 
minimal demands on audit effort, yet strove to give auditors 
considerable protection from lawsuits. In time, the 
. contradictory nature of the guideline may result ·in 
criticisms of the profession by 'significant others'. The 
auditing guidelines are also important in that they are used 
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as 'benchmarks' in DTI investigations and are influential in 
court cases. 
The evidence presented here suggests that the auditing wing 
(and major firms) has a greater voice in the shaping of 
accounting discourses. In view of its power and influence of 
the auditing wing, a body to promulgate auditing standards 
was not set up at the time of the creation of the ASC. 
However, when the mid 1970s banking and property crisis 
exposed the deficiencies in the auditing practices, the 
profession responded by setting up the APC, entirely under 
the control of the auditing wing. The major firms facing 
lawsuits and public criticisms came to control the APC and 
articulated an auditing approach most beneficial to them. The 
meanings of going concern were not derived from any 
Systematic research, but were shaped by the views of a 
relativelY few well connected partners. One may find similar 
influences in studies of auditing policymaking in other 
areas. 
Following the evidence of this thesis, the profession should 
not be seen as a homogeneous entity. It consists of groups 
with possibly conflicting interests. Industrial/Commercial 
accountants did not have any say in the formulation of the 
guideline. Small practitioners were rarely consulted. They 
indeed, disagreed with some aspects of the guideline, most 
notably the recommendation of the 'passive approach'. In view 
of the evidence presented, a plea is also made for a critical 
scrutiny of the term 'profession'. The phrase carries notions 
of exPertise. knowledge base, ideals of service and many 
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other meanings. Such images of the profession do not help in 
appreciating the fact that accountancy firms are a \fraction 
of capital'. They have common and competing interests which 
bring them in conflict with other fractions of capital, as 
evidenced by a large number of lawsuits and DTI reports. The 
firms try to win the most favourable social environment to 
enable them to compete, control markets and enjoy profits, 
growth and economic rewards. It is such pressures, which made 
the auditing firms prefer a \passive' approach and reject 
auditor responsibility for reporting on cash flows, market 
shares and company competitiveness. The firms also have 
competing interests as highlighted by the different 
interpretations of the going concern concept. By recognising 
the existence of a fractionated profession and acknowledging 
that accountancy firms are a fraction of capital, this thesis 
has been able to show the nature of the \ interests' which are 
being advanced as the meanings of the going concern concept. 
~.5: FUTURE RESEARCH 
The tpassive' approach to going concern is also enshrined in 
th American standard and the guideline issued by the e 
International Auditing Practices Committee in 1986. Chapters 
5 and 7 have already noted the influence of American 
accounting developments on Britain. It would be useful to 
perform a cross-national study to see whether the American 
and International auditing guidelines are also the result of 
the pursuance of sectional interests, dominance of major 
firms and economic crisis. 
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In recent years, regulators· have argued that accounting 
standards ought to be underpinned by accounting concepts. 
This debate begs some important questions: What exactly do 
the concepts mean and which meanings are to be regarded as 
dominant? Such questions have rarely been considered by the 
profession. Upon investigation, this thesis found that going 
concern does not have a fixed meaning and in view of the 
nature of concepts and society. cannot have a fixed meaning. 
The articulation of meanings is a political activity, which 
in appropriate circumstances gives ascendancy to some power 
blocs, discourses and meanings. The methodological framework 
advanced in this thesis would be helpful in exploring the 
competing meanings of other fundamental accounting concepts. 
The debates about the meanings of going concern are also 
debates about the meaning of an audit. Here the profession 
blames the 'eA~ectations gap' for its criticisms and 
litigation. The framework of this thesis m~ help in 
understanding the dominant meanings of an audit and the 
manner in which profession might periodically accept some 
meanings to enable it to reconstruct its identity. The 
changing meanings m~ also be linked to· economic and social 
developments. 
Following the framework of this thesis, it would be helpful 
to exPlore the extent to which auditing standards and 
guidelines have. been shaped by the actions of the State, or 
the influence of powerful elites within the profession. Are 
the auditors always interpreting accounting discourses and 
auditing guidelines with issues of liability at the forefront 
or was the case of going concern an exception? 
PAGE 528 
$,6: LIMITATIONS 
It is also appropriate to reflect upon the methodological 
strength has been that it 
social context. The going 
framework of this thesis. 
helped to see accounting in 
Its 
a 
concern concept, rather than just being a technical 
phenomena, was seen as being shaped by a variety of 
institutions and events. Each being enabled and constrained 
by the sociopolitical contexts. One of the major criticisms 
of this thesis may be that it has attached too much weight to 
the 'economic' factors in understanding the relationship 
between accounting and society. It is possible that the 
economic, social and political spheres move according to 
their own rhythm and only when they come together in some 
sustained way that meanings of accounting are transformed. In 
the USA, the stock market crash. the economic decline and a 
presidential election coincided to give legitimacy to the 
going concern concept. In the UK. concerns with reviving the 
economy. restoring confidence in financial markets. press 
criticisms of the profession and a legitimation crisis for 
the State. seemingly coincided to transform the meanings of 
the concept. It has not been possible to suggest the kind of 
factors which must coincide in some appropriate weights to 
provide an opportunity for transforming the meaning of 
accounting concepts. It is possible that cultural. 
organisational and other influences may also have shaped the 
meanings of the concept. However. this is an empirical 
question which can only be addressed through further 
research. 
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With a positivist conception of social science, there may be 
an expectation that researcn will help to produce testable 
hypothesis and predictions. Therefore, in common with much of 
the social sciences, this thesis may well be criticised for 
only offering exPlanations and understanding of the way 
accounting is shaped bya wide variety of events. However,. 
such understanding emancipates and offers opportunities for 
change. 
9,7: CONCLUSION 
This thesis examined the relationship between accounting and 
society by focusing upon the changing meanings and 
interpretations of the going concern concept, thought to be 
'fundamental' in accounting and claimed to be 'material but 
not fundamental' in auditing. In view of the conflict and 
contradictions of a capitalist society, the meaning of 
accounting practices cannot be finally fixed. The thinking on 
accounting and auditing will continue to be informed by a 
sedimented residue of 'common sense', upon which new layers 
wilt be added. Such layers will result from the competing 
meanings of the concept and struggle for ascendancy. During 
times of acute crisis, the profession will be forced to 
rearticulate a preferred meaning to protect the interests of 
its dominant members. The meanings of accounting and auditing 
concepts do not develop in any unproblematic way. In this 
context, the methodological framework relying upon mainly 
Marxist thinking helped in understanding the contested nature 
of the concept, the role of the economic sphere, privileged 
groupS and the State. 
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APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO AUDITORS; 
AUDITOR AND GOING CONCERN DECISIONS 
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Questionnaire: Auditor and Going Concern Decisions 
SECTION A 
Elease indicate your attitude towards each statement by 
circling the number which approximates your attitude. 
Following is a key to the numbers. 
1 - Strongly disagree. 2 - disagree. 3 = Unsure 4 - agree 
and 5 Strongly agree 
Going-concern qualifications c~ause 
a negative share price reaction in 
the client company's share price. 
Going-concern qualifications alert 
institutional investors to uncertainties 
inherent in the financial statements. 
Going-concern qualifications alert 
individual investors to uncertainties 
inherent in the financial statements. 
Going-concern qualifications alert 
creditors to uncertainties inherent in 
the financial statements. 
Going-concern qualification is of no 
consequence. 
A going-concern qualification is likely 
to increase the client's financial 
problems. 
A client experiencing going-concern 
problems should be given more time by 
the auditor. 
Going-concern qualification is likely to 
precipitate the client company's failure. 
A Going-concern qualification is very 
likely to increase client's cost of 
obtaining finance. 
Going-concern qualifications give bad 
publicity to your firm. 
Going concern qualifications are a 
reflection on the management's 
abilities 
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1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
A decision to issue a going-concern 
qualification enhances your firm's 
credibility, 
An unqualified audit report indicates 
that in the auditor's opinion the 
business is financially viable. 
A decision to issue a going-concern 
qualification increases the likelihood 
of your firm losing that client. 
A decision to issue going-concern 
qualification increases the likelihood 
of your firm losing potential clients. 
A going-concern qualification will' 
increase the likelihood of a law-suit 
against your firm. 
Auditors should be required to alert the 
investors on the likelihood of company 
insolvency. 
Auditors should take active steps to 
satisfy themselves that the business 
remains competitive in the forseeable 
future. 
Auditors should take active steps to 
satisfy themselves that the business 
retains its market share. 
Auditors should not be required to 
analyse the company's financial plans. 
The auditor should take active steps to 
satisfy himself/herself that an 
enterprise is a going-concern. 
The auditor is in no better position than 
the financial statement user to predict 
the resolution of uncertainties. 
The auditor should exPlain to the users, 
how he/she made his/her going concern 
decisions 
If the companies publish cash flow 
forecasts then the auditors should be 
required to report on them. 
Going-concern qualifications are not very 
informative. 
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1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
12345 
12345 
It tinancial statements disclose all 
. material uncertainties, then the auditor 
should not issue a going-concern 
qualification. ' 
'Disclaimer of opinion' should be the 
most appropriate form of audit 
qualification for going concern 
problems. 
'Subject to' audit reports'are the most 
12345 
12345 
appropriate for going-concern qualification 1 2 3 4 5 
Users do not understand the significance 
of a going-concern qualification. 1 2 3 4 5 
For a non-going concern, auditors do not 
have the know how to ascertain the 
recoverable value of assets. 1 2 3 4 5 
The auditing guideline gives the 
impression that the auditor is giving 1 2 3 4 5 
assurances on the financial viability 
of the company audited. 
The auditing guideline has strengthened 
the auditor's ability to withstand 1 2 3 4 5 
pressure from management. 
The auditing guideline has increased the 1 2 3 4 5 
possibility of a law-suit against your 
firm. 
The auditing guideline has increased the 
likelihood of you issuing a going-concern 1 2 3 4 5 
qualification. 
We are likely to issue more going concern 
qualifications now. 1 2 3 4 5 
The APC guideline is of little use to my 
firm 1 2 3 4 5 
The APC should develop an auditing 
guideline indicating the techniques 1 2 3 4 5 
useful for making going-concern decisions. 
The APe guideline has increased the audit 1 2 3 4 5 
costs 
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SECTION B 
Shown below is a list of some approaches used to help 
identify and evaluate going-concern problems. Please 
indicate the importance which you have attached to each of 
the approaches in your actual decisions, by weighting each 
approach from 0%-100%. Please ensure that the sum total of 
the weights adds up to 100%. 
Approach 
Accounting ratios 
Graphs 
Z Score Models 
Company forecasts 
Other (please specify) 
Weight 
100% 
In connection with the approaches identified above, how many 
years data do you examine? 
What is the mlnlmum information which you need to identify 
going concern problems? 
Cont'd 
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Has the auditing guideline changed your firm's procedures in 
~yw~? 
[~~J [~~J 
Yes No 
If yes, please indicate how. 
Who identifies going-concern problems in your firm? 
Who makes the decision to issue going-concern qualifications 
in your firm? 
What is your interpretation of the term 'foreseeable 
future'? Please indicate the reasons for your 
interpretation. 
Do you have formal written policies for issuing going 
concern qualifications? Please explain. 
Do you require your clients to prepare financial plans for 
the forseeable future? 
[~~J [~~J 
Yes No 
What do you do if the client company does not have a cash 
forecast to cover the foreseeable future? 
Cont'd 
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What in your opinion is the purpose of a going concern 
qualification? 
What are your reservations about the auditing guideline? 
If you use accounting ratios to identify going-concern 
problems. please indicate the importance which YOU attach to 
~ach of the following ratios by circling the appropriate 
number. 
Eor this question only. 1 = of no importance. 2 = of very 
little importance 3 = of moderate importance 4 = important. 
And 5 = Very important 
Working capital/total assets 
Horking capital/net sales 
Net income/ net sales 
Current assets/total assets 
Current assets minus stock 
/current liabilities 
Current assets/current liabilities 
Current assets/total liabilities 
Current assets/net sales 
Creditor Turnover 
Retained earnings/total assets 
Current liabilities/total assets 
Total debt/total assets 
Net income/total assets 
stock Turnover 
Shareholders' funds/ fixed 
assets 
PAGE 537 
12345 
12345 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cont'd 
Profit before tax/current liabilities 
Earnings before interest and taxes/ 
total assets 
Operating profit before interest 
and taxes/interest expense 
Cash/total assets 
Operating profit before taxes/total 
tangible assets 
Operating profit/shareholders' funds 
Total liabilities/shareholders' funds 
Debtor Turnover 
Cash flow/total debt 
Common equity/ total debt 
Market value of equity/book value of 
total debt 
Sales/total assets 
1 2 345 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 345 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
In the space below please add any other accounting ratio(s) 
which yOU use and indicate the relative importance on a 
:acale of 1 to 5, 
SECTION C: Details about your firm 
The following information is being asked, so as to enable me 
to analyse the responses. 
Please indicate your job title, 
. 
When did you qualify? 
How many years auditing experience do you have? 
Cont'd 
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Has your work ever required you to identify going-concern 
problems? 
[~~J 
Yes No 
Have you ever issued a going-concern qualification? 
[~~J 
Yes No 
How many qualified accountants are employed in your 
particular office ? 
Please indicate the number of partners in your firm. 
If you would like to receive a summary of this research, 
please write your name and address below. 
In the event of a query may I contact you. 
[~~] [~~] 
Yes No 
If yes, please provide your name and telephone number. 
Ihank YOU very much for completing the questionnaire. Please 
~rn it to me in the envelope provided. 
PAGE 539 
APPENDIX 2 
COVERING LETTER ACCOMPANYING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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North East London Polytechnic 
Longbridge Road, Dagenham, Essex RM8 2AS 
l· .(;~.:I 
;'ccounlancy Research Group __ ~ n:~:, . .-
'~ACurlisMAMScMPhii '"? .... ~, --,'r ,...,-~ Ffforner BSc(Econ) MSc FCMA FCCA ~,'{\~",~ f~ Sikka MSc FCC A tl.~ -:~~ 
\ ..... I r:". 1 I t_ \ 
.............. ________________ ... ~L~r_7il;V 
-~~'. "\'{-, " 
\ ,.' 
.~ 
Dear Mr. 
Telephone: 
01-5907722 
Ext. 2236 
I am currently researching into the auditor's consideration 
and evaluation of going-concern problems. My intention is to 
compare the auditors' and the directors' views and draw the 
differences, if any, to the attention of those interested in 
auditing. There is no prior UK study of this type. 
I appreciate that as a practising accountant you have very 
little spare time, but I hope that you will find the 
questions on the next few pages thought provoking. The 
enclosed questionnaire was compiled after extensive 
discussions with auditors and directors. It will take you 
about thirty minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
The practitioners participating in research often complain 
that they never see the results of that research. This is a 
problem which I would like to avoid. Therefore, if you would 
wish to receive a summary of the findings, I would be very 
happy to oblige. This would give you a unique opportunity to 
compare your answers with those from other firms. 
Please return the completed questionnaire to me in the 
enclosed prepaid envelope. I look forward to hearing from you 
and would stress that your reply will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
Yours sincerely 
p, Sikka 
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ACCOUNTING RATIOS BELIEVED TO BE USEFUL 
IN MAKING GOING CONCERN DECISIONS 
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APPENDIX 3 
ACCQUMTIMQ RATIQS EQUMD TQ BE USEEUL ItI 
AUDITQR AtID GQING-CONCERtI DECISIOtIS 
Ratios Study 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Working capital/ X 
total assets 
Working capital/ X 
net sales 
Net income/ net X 
sales 
Current assets/ X 
total assets 
Current assets X X X 
minus stock/current 
liabities 
Current assets/ X X X 
current liabilities 
Current assets/ X 
total liabilities 
Current assets/ X 
net sales 
Retained earnings X X 
/total assets 
Current liabilities/ X 
total assets 
Total debt/total X X 
assets 
Net income/total X X 
assets 
No-credit interval X 
Current year cash X 
flow/total debt 
.Profit before taxi X 
current liabilities 
Ea.rnings before X X 
interest and taxes 
/total assets 
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1 2 3 . [. 6 
"* 
Operating profit X 
before interest 
and taxes/interest 
expense 
Cash/total assets X 
Operating profit 
before taxes/total 
X 
tangible assets 
Operating profit/ X 
shareholders' funds 
Total liabilities/ X 
shareholders' funds 
Net worth/total X X 
debt 
Cash flow/total X 
debt 
Common equity/ X 
total debt 
Market value of X 
equity/book value 
of total debt 
Sales/total assets X X X 
Notes. 
1. Altman and McGough (1974): Use of discriminant models to 
shoW that the model can outperform man. 
2. Campisi and Trotman (1985): Ratios which produced auditor 
consensus. 
3. Kida (1980): Ratios with predictive power according to 
the discriminant models. 
4 Levitan and Knoblett (1985): Ratios with some predictive 
p~wer according to the discriminant models. 
5. Mutchler (1984): Ratios considered to be important by the 
auditors. 
6. Taffle: and Tis~haw.(;977); Taffler a~d Tseung (1984). 
Both studles use dlscrlmlnant models to ldentify ratios 
which outperform auditors' judgement. 
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PRICE LEVELS 1851-1913 
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1851 
1852 
1853 
1854 
1855 
1856 
1857 
1858 
1859 
1860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 
1866 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
·1894 
Appendix 4 
PRICE LEVELS 1851- 1913 
Wholesale 
Prices 
Index (al 
91 
92 
112 
120 
119 
119 
124 
107 
111 
116 
115 
119 
121 
124 
119 
120 
118 
116 
115 
113 
116 
125 
130 
126 
121 
118 
121 
113 
107 
111 
109 
110 
108 
98 
92 
87 
85 
87 
89 
89 
92 
87 
85 
80 
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Cost of 
Living 
Index (bl 
93 
89 
85 
1895 78 83 
1896 76 82 
1897 77 86 
1898 80 89 
1899 79 85 
1900 86 90 
1901 83 90 
1902 83 91 
1903 83 92 
1904 84 92 
1905 84. 92 
1906 87 91 
1907 91 94 
1908 88 96 
1909 89 96 
1910 93 98 
1911 94 98 
1912 99 103 
1913 100 103 
(a) Assumes 1913 = 100. 
(b) Assumes Jan-July 1914 = 100. 
Source: Mitchell and Deane (1962). 
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A MEMORANDUM SHOWING EARLY CONSIDERATION OF 
GOING CONCERN ISSUES ay ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS 
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AUDITING PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE LIQUIDITY CRISIS IN INDUSTRY 
BACKr.ROUND TO PROBLEMS 
1.1 The liquidity crisis -
Effect of inflation, made worse by 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
high interest rates, 
over borrowing, 
high commodity prices, 
high wage claims and related employee 
benefits (such as pensions), and 
an inability to pass on costs by price 
restraints and profit margin restrictions. 
Affects large and small business - frDm 
British Leylaod/Burmah Oil to shopkeepers/ 
farms. Varying degrees depending on which 
factor is dominant, e.g. property companies hit 
by high interest rates, retailing by price 
controls, and heavy industry bY raw material 
... 
costs. 
Taxation policies added to pr~blem; inc~~ase of 
rate of corporation tax from 50$ (equivalent to 
40% under old system) to 52~ and ACT . 
Stock relief gave correction by 
releasing ~75Cm/£1,OOCQ back to the private 
sector. 
1.2 The Accountants' ·involvement -
As professional adviser, director, management 
consultant, "friendly neighbourhoo~ auditor", 
or potential receiver. 
As participators in formulating accounting 
tecbniques -
1. e. SSAP 2 
SSAP 10 
ED 24 
1 
Accounting policies (with 
particular reference to "going 
concern" concept). 
Source and application of funds 
statements. 
\ Accounting for inflation. 
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Aa auditors - awareness of responsibilities to 
creditors as well as sbareholders and willing-
Dess to qualify wbere necessary. 
l.3 Directors' responsibilities -
Continuation ot business as a going concern is 
responsibility of directors, not auditors. 
Quite legal tor directors to make losses in 
company, but possible misfeasance if eftect is 
to prejudice company and shareholders. S.332 
ot C.A. 1948 could involve direc~ors in 
personal liability on a liquidation. Now 
being extended by E.E.C. Convention on 
BankrUPtcy which may involve an~ manager of a 
company wbich has gone backrupt" in persona.l 
!ia.bi:'ity. 
Uncertain position wbere Government is 
, , , 
involved, except where it 1s a clear-cut 
Government grant. Examples ot tr.C.S. and 
"Beagle-type" responsibility, Court Line 
biatus, and Bank of England "liteboat" 
, 
committee - all areas ot implied support, and 
where an auditor migbt assume aid which may 
not in the event be forthcoming . 
. 
AUDITING APPROACH 
2.1 Necessary to determine whether company 1s gOing 
concern betore assuming basis ot valuing assets 
and liabilities. It not - disclose. Wbere 
doubt or disagreement remains, qualiticat10n 
cecessary. 
2.2 Is it a going concern? Now necessary to 
determine answer to this on each and every 
occasiOc for all clients. Requires review of _ 
(a) c~:rent situation, 
(b) future cash flow, 
(c) availability ot resources. 
(d) consirier 'oOl:ov1:lg pover. 
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2.3 Review of current situation embraces -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
(j) 
(k) 
consideration of source and application 
of funds of recent period to ascertain 
trend; 
net current liability position and in 
particular debtor/creditor ratio; 
amount of short term borrowings including 
bank overdrafts; 
amount of fixed term borrowings falling 
due for repayment; 
are long term assets financed by short 
term finance?; 
dependance on a limited spread of 
business, or reliance on a few customers, 
suppliers or products; 
pattern of paying creditors; 
pattern of settlement by customers of 
amounts receivable; 
legal actions or political action, e.g. 
sit in; 
new business development (over trading); 
. . 
government or economic circumstances. 
2.4 Review of future cash flow -
.. ' 
Normally statements available but if not, 
usually capable of being drafted quLckly -
necessary discipline for businesses of all 
sizes. Extension of judging the future, e.g. 
stocks, depreciation. Necessary to cover 12 
months in some detail (monthly), but no 
longer possible merely to restrict review to 
12 months and disregard future beyond that • 
. .. 
Certain ~ituations also require special con-
sideration beyon~ 12 months -
(a) where review takes place long after year 
end; 
(b) where business cycle extends beyond 12 
months, e. g. construction contracts; 
(c) ongoing loss situation; 
(d) repayment of borrowings not evenly spread 
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Review budgets and cash flow in normal way. 
although in lesser detail than profit forecast 
situation unless evident that it is in 
critical position. Note that assumptions used 
cannot be stated (unle5s critical) so accepta-
bility must be judged by auditor only and not 
reader of accounts. In particular consider 
reasonableness of -
(a) forecast profits; 
(0) level of stocks, debtors and creditors; 
(c) projected capital expenditure; 
(d) other capital financing; 
(e) effect of inflation. 
2 - Consider availability of resources -. ;:) 
(a) 
(0) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(!) 
short term borrowings - agree direct with 
the bank facilities available and their 
review date. 
longer term borrowings - repayment dates 
and ability to replace with further 
borrowings; 
government grants; 
additional share or loan capital, e.g. 
rigbts issue; 
mortgaging specific assets, includi'~g 
factoring of debts and hire purchas'e of 
fixed assets; 
sale and leaseback of properties or out-
ri~ht sale of surplus assets, e.g. 
investments. 
2.6 Consider borrowing powers -
May be laid down in Ar"ticles. or Deeds.· Often 
margin required and therefore tbere may be 
"technical" default without actual insolvency; 
particularly after major loss affecting 
capital and reseryes. 
Impact of "technical" defa.ult ma.y be a.s 
·serious 
g Burmah Oil Directors' statement of e. . 
December 31st 1974 said 
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"A~ a result of the anticipated trading 1 
results for the year, the Company expect 
that it will not be able fully to comply 
~ith ~e~tain provisions of loan agree-
ments with the bankers under which 
foreign currency loans amounting to 
£650m have been advanced to the Group 
.. 
and amplified on January 1st 1975 
"Reference to the fact that the Company 
might not be able fully to comply with 
certain provisions of foreign currency 
loan agreements is related specifically 
to aspects of the covenants and ratios 
associated with such agreements and does 
not in any way imply inability on the 
part of the Company to pay due amounts 
either of principal or interest". 
'- 3. WHAT HAPPENS IF ALL IS NOT WELL? 
3.1 May mean partial curtailment of business 
requiring that part to be valued on a "break 
up" basis wi th p~ov1sion to·r· £utur·e·-costs of 
redundancy and other losses. Comment 
required in directors' report (state.of 
business) and reference in accounting 
policies notes (as going concern concept not 
wholly applied); No reference required in 
audit report if there are no material 
uncertainties • 
• 3.2 Uncertainty remaining, e.g. negotiations for 
alternative or additional finance still in 
hand. Valuation of assets on a going·· 
concern basis justifiable but necessary for 
reference to be made in auditors report to 
uncertainty. 
Example (1) where there is a reasonable 
chance of success -
"We have examined the accounts set out 
on pages - to -. 
The accounts have been prepared on a 
going concern basis, the validity of 
which 1s dependent on the successful 
conclusion of current ·negotiations for 
additional finance. In the absence 
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of this finance, tbe going concern basis 
would oe invalid and provision would bave 
to be made .for any loss on realisation of 
the Company's assets wbich might arise. 
In our opinion, subject to the successful 
conclusion of tbe negotiations referred 
to above, the accounts give a true and 
fair view of the state of the company's 
affairs at ....... and of its profit for 
the year ended on tbat date and comply 
with· the Companies Acts 1948 and 1967". 
Example (ii) - where there is doubt as to 
whether finance will be available -
"We have examined the accounts set out on 
pages - to -. 
The accounts have been prepared on a gOing 
concern basis tbe validity of whicb is 
dependent on the company obtaining further 
fin~nce •. In the absence of sucb finance, 
this basis would be invalid and provision 
would cave to be ~ade for any 106s on 
realisation of the company's assets Which 
might arise. 
• We are unable to satisfy ourselves that , 
further finance w111 be torthcoming and 
accordingly, we are unable to form an 
opinion as to tbe validity of the use of 
tbe going concern basis and, therefore, 
whether' the accounts give a true and fair 
view of the state of the company's affairs 
at ... '. . . .. and of its profits for' the 
year ended on tbat date. ' 
In our opinion, the accounts comply in all 
other respects with the requirements of 
the Companies Acts 1948 and 1967". 
~ Where it is not possible to determine wbether ~.3 
there is a need (e.g. no cash forecasts at all), 
then doubt MUS~ be expressed as to the basis of 
adopting tbe going concern concept and Conse-
quent valuation of assets. 
Example (iii) -
"We have examined the accounts set out on 
pages - to -. 
The accounts have been prepared on a gOing 
concern oasis but i~ the absence of 
adequate information concerning the 
company's future casb reqUirements, we are 
unable to form an opinion as to the validi y 
of the use of' this bUis. 
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'. ------~ 
For this reason we are unable to 'form an 
opinion whether the accounts give a true 
and fair view of the sta.t.:: of the company' 
affairs at .••..... and of its profit for 
the year ended on that date. 
I 
In our opinion, the accounts comply in all 
other respects with the requirements of 
the Companies Acts 1948 and 1967". 
1 O~HER IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 Danger of "self-fulfilling prophecy", but 
auditors have specific responsibilities which 
cannot be abrogated. Increasing likelihood of 
legal action against auditors, including 
possibility of class actions., Directors should 
comment more in their annual report and in 
interim announcements - both ,half yearly and 
others. 
4.2 Watch post-balance sheet events and consider 
their implication on any changes in'liquidity,. 
'Make audit' reports"as c'lose to C~l'~~'i~g th~'" 
job as practicable. 
'", 
4.3 Be aware of conflicting pulls of PSSAP 7 and 
ED 13. • .... 
Major defect in PSSAP 7 is the inclusion of 
gain on borrowings which makes very highly 
geared companies appear to be' more successful 
under CCP accounting than others - yet they are 
most likely to go bust. 
4.4 If a qualification is necessary, refer to 
outcome in following year. Argument for 2 year 
report but at least cover any earlier qualifi-
cation. 
4 ~ ~uestions asked of an auditors invo, lvement • • 0 "'C 
When does an auditor resign? Does he make his 
doubts public (for a listed company)?, can he 
require directors to convene an E..G'.M. to 
inform shareholders of position? Should he 
tell other parties, e.g. Bank of £ngland, in 
the case of a bank, Department of Trade, in 
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," 
tbe caae at an insurance company? . 
~NCLDSIOH 
~.1 Very difficult· area involvinK judg,ment. 
~.2 Must be considered and documented in audit fil 
noW as standard routine with work performed 
ana conclusions set out. 
~.~ No lonKer possible to assUme extension ot 
credit and therefore where doubt exists, . 
report should state position. 
~.4 Ensure that what is said in audit .report 
enables reader to jUQKe position properly. 
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A LETTER SHOWING THAT THE APC BALLOTED ITS MEMBERS 
FOR THE APPROvAL OF THE GOING CONCERN GUIDELINE 
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I 
TO: All members of ~he 
Auditing Practices Committee 
DRAFT AUDITING GUIDELINE: 
AUOmlNG PRACTICES COMMITIEE 
P.0' ... "'33, . 
Moooga:ata Place, 
lon"~2P28J 
leU 01~S·1060 
Our ~~f: AR/RC/PJW APC 12-39P 
23 April 1985 
THE AUDITOR'S CONSIDERATIONS IN RESPECT OF GOING CONCERN 
I enclose a copy of the above draft auditing guideline 
which was approved by APC at the meetLnq on 25 March 1985. 
Amendments which have been made since ~at date are identi-
fird by barlines. 
The principal amendment is to the eXaQ~e of a qualified 
audit report (paragraph ~). This has now been expanded 
so that all the material matters giving rise to the qua11-
fication are referred to in the repor~_ In particular, 
the basic facts concerning the negotia~on of vital financ-
ing arrangements are now stated. 
I enclose also a ballot paper for app=oval for publication 
of the guideline. Please will you co~~ete this and return 
it to me by 7 May 1985. 
Alun Richards 
~ecretary 
Enc. 
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A CHECKLIST USED BY A MAJOR MULTINATIONAL FIRM 
FOR MAKING GOING COijCERN EVALUATIONS 
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. J'llWlCI.lL REVUlt c:SD:KI,TST lLJ' 
Audit ot ••••••••.•••••••••••••••• Date ot.Acoounts ••••••••••••••• 
. . .. 
Completed b,y ••••••••••••••••••••• Date •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . . 
Notes: 
(1) 'rhe questions in paragrapha 1 to 24 below provide example, ot the mon ~ 
matters which should ba considered by the audit manacer ill hi, rtrriev ot tha 
overall tinancial poaition ot audit clienta (Audit Completion Procramme Qi). 
They are phrased 1D broad terms and 1118¥ otten be used .. aD aic1e-memo1re in 
a general diSCWISioll ot the cOl2lpazq's a.tta.1ra with l1W1IIpDlent. .l441tioD&l. 
matters 1118¥ be appropriate on 1nd1vidual audita. 
(2) Unsatiatactory matters should, it ai&DJ,tioaut, be broupt to the atteD.ticm ot 
the partner on !UPs • 
. Geperal 
1. An there a'D.7 special. tactors a.ttect1.nc the oompaar' s 
tn.de, on which the partner should be Wormed? ... 
.. 
. ...• 
2. Is tha coDlpaDJ satficiently aware 'ot the'atfecta of 
tD!lation on its operations? 
,. ~ Is the CODlpa'D.7' •. businese beiDc reatricted by price 
control legislation? U so, i8 there proper planning to 
minimise aD7 such reatriction. 
4. Has the compaDJ taken adV8Dtap ot all IOvernment 
,rants that II8i be available to it? ' 
operating Per!o~ce 
5 Broadly, what an the reaaCD8 tor !nonuad or 
decreased aalea, profits and general activity in the .ourrent 
yeSZ as con:pared vi th the pftviOWl 1ear? . .:.: 
6 Are there alJ'1 1ndust17 oomparison statistios "tor the 
trade in which the cOlDpBD7 is engaced? U ao, an still'S be1ng 
taken by tha comp~ to compare ita ow reaultaand, productivity' 
wi th that ot .imilar companies by means ot auch, factors. 
. . ,'~. . 
7. If the companT baa incn.u::ed aiga1tican~ I :10aa8a 1n 
az,.y ot the following areas, .is improvemlCt ~qu1'red in the-· 
company'a management or administration? 
(a) stock pxovision tor deterioration, obaoleacence, 
slow movement or shortfall in nat raal1aati1e 
value. 
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, 
.. 
(b) 
(0) 
(d) 
-
Sto~ak1 ng difference. Would ~ compazq 
benefit bf" the introduction or extension of 
contil:m.ous stocktaking? 
»ad and doubtful debts. 
Obsolete fixed assets. 
" (e) Decrease in market value of investments. 
(f) .·Losses !rom individual activities, branches or 
aubsidiaries. 
Accounting and. Administration 
B. Is there aQ1 scope for camputer1sing ~r otherwise 
modernising the CODIpazq's accounting reoords? 
9. Do variances in actual results for the yeu under 
review from those budgeted indicate that budgeting procedures 
need 1mprov1llg? 
10. Baa the audit indicated a:rJ.7 ueas in which the management 
in!oxmation might not be adequate? 
11. Is the financial in!oxmation received by the Boazd of 
Directors adequate? In the contsxt of this ~estion the 
following matters should be considered:-
(a) The regularity and frequency of Board reports. 
(b) The fom and cOntent of Board reports (including 
management accounts and oompuison of perfomance 
against budgets). 
(c) 
(d) 
The extent to which the !oard receives in!o~tion 
in connection with subsidiaries, including 
overseas subsidiaries. 
Whether the !oard is made aware of • off balance 
s~et' items (e.g. management and performance 
of pension funds, extent of guarantees, 
level of discounted bills and similar 
commi tments) • 
12 Is the parent compSllY' oontrol over group accounting 
~ents satisfactor,y, in respect of both OX and overseas 
subsidiaries? In particular:-
is the head office satisfied as to the quality of 
accounting staff in subsidiaries? 
is a group accounting manna1 necessary or, if a 
mam1a1 exists, could its scope be usefully extended, 
does it need updating, or could it be improved in 
a:rI3 other. way? 
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(c) is there sufficient direct control by head office to 
ensure that:-
(d) 
(i) accounting disciplines are satisfactor,y; 
(ii) group accounting policies in difficult areas 
are properly followed? 
are management accounts from subsidiaries accurate 
and prepared on time? If not, does the head 
office take action? 
If there is no internal audit department, should there 
be one? 
14. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
If there is an internal audit departmentl-
are its terms of reference adequately defined? 
is it prop,~rl·,· independent of operational 
management? 
is it adequa~e1y stafted by personnel of the 
proper quality? 
is the quality ~f its reports adequate? 
are its reports received by the right people, 
and acted apon? 
15. Have there been any transactions likely to in.fringe the 
objects clause? 
16. Has the audit indicated any other weaknesses that it 
~ight be convenient for the partner to discuss with the 
diractors? 
17. Is the co:npany having to finance excessive am~unts 
of working capital? In particu1ar:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
is the company carrying excessive stocks? 
are deb~s being collected sufficiently 
promptly? 
is the company taking full advantage of ored! t 
terms offered by suppliers of goods and 
services? 
18. Is the company having difficulty in obtaining 
sufficient funds to finance its working capital? 
19. TI!'k.ing the co:npany' s overall structure and 
position into.~ccount, is there any imbalance in methods of 
finance betweea equity, lor~ term l~~~~; A~~ short term 
finance?' . 
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20. Is there any indication that the cost to the company 
of loan finance is excessive and, if so, could any recommenda~1ons 
be made for refinancing the company more advantageo~sly? 
Future Plans 
21. Has the company any proposals for significant 
expansion? (This matter should be considered in the light of 
the company's 'budget for the next year.) If so:-
(a) 
(b) 
Pensions 
is any difficulty anticipated in finanCing, for 
instance, fixed asset additions, acquisitlons of 
businesses, or increased working capital? 
do the management resources appear adequate in the 
light of the proposed expansion?' 
'-?. Is there an adequate pension scheme for dir~ctord }td staff? 
23. Has the company any pension obligations, legal or 
moral, which might not be adequately funded? 
Insurance Cover 
24. Has the insurance cover on the buildings, plant, 
stock and other assets and for loss of profits been recently 
reviewed to ensure that it is adequate? 
PAGE 563 
APPENDIX e 
RATES OF GOING CONCERN CONCERN QUALIFICATIONS 
PAGE 564 
APPENDIX 8 
RATES OF GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATIONS 
PERIOD 
May 1984 
June 1984 
July 1984 
August 1984 
September 1984 
October 1984 
November 1984 
Jan 85/Dec 1984 
February 1985 
March 1985 
April 1985 
May 1985 
June 1985 
July 1985 
August 1985 
September 1985 
October 1985 
November 1985 
December 1985 
January 1986 
February 1986 
March 1986 
April 1986 
May 1986 
June 1986 
July 1986 
August 1986 
September 1986 
October 1986 
November 1986 
December 1986 
January 1987 
February 1987 
March 1987 
April 1987 
May 1987 
June 1987 
July 1987 
August 1987 
September 1987 
October 1987 
November 1987 
December 1987 
January 1988 
February 1988 
March 1988 
April 1988 
May 1988 
June 1988 
July 1988 
RATE OF GOING 
CONCERN QUALIFICATIONS 
PAGE 565 
3.0% 
4.0% 
4.0% 
4.0% 
4.0% 
3.0% 
4.0% 
4.0% 
3.4% 
3.9% 
N/A 
N/A 
2.6% 
3.5% 
4.8% 
5.0% 
3.1% 
3.8% 
3.6% 
5.1% 
4.5% 
5.3% 
4.4% 
4.6% 
4.3% 
4.5% 
4.7% 
4.5% 
5.3% 
4.9% 
4.5% 
4.8% 
3.8% 
4.9% 
4.1% 
3.9% 
4.5% 
4.0% 
3.1% 
4.5% 
3.6% 
4.8% 
4.3% 
4.1% 
3.7% 
4.4% 
4.7% 
3.6% 
4.8% 
3.6% 
August 1988 
September 1988 
October 1988 
November 1988 
December 1988 
January 1989 
February 1989 
March 1989 
April 1989 
May 1989 
June 1989 
July 1989 
August 1989 
September 1989 
October 1989 
November 1989 
December 1989 
January 1990 
February 1990 
March 1990 
April 1990 
May 1990 
June 1990 
July 1990 
August 1990 
September 1990 
October 1990 
November 1990 
December 1990 
January 1991 
4.5% 
5.9% 
4.4% 
4.1% 
5.1% 
4.6% 
3.9% 
5.1% 
N/A 
10.0% 
12.0% 
11.0% 
12.0% 
12.0% 
15.0% 
9.0% 
13.0% 
13.0% 
14.0% 
12.0% 
19.0% 
14.0% 
13.0% 
21.0% 
19.0% 
18.0% 
16.0% 
15.0% 
27.0% 
25.0% 
Source Various editions of The Audit Report. 
The rates are affected by the size of the samples. 
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